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ON-SITE INSPECTIONS 
UNDER THE INF TREA TY 



Joseph P. Harahan 







COVER: In May 1991, the Soviet Union eliminated the last of 654 SS-20 missiles. Flanked by their 
inspection teams, American team chief, Captain John C. Williams, USN, and Colonel Miklaylovich 
Komogortsev, USSR, cosign the INF Treaty Inspection Report at Kasputin Yar, USSR. 



TREATY HISTORY SERIES 






















ON-SITE INSPECTIONS 
UNDER THE INF TREATY 




A History of the On-Site Inspection Agency 
and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991 


Joseph P. Harahan 







Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publishing Data 
Harahan, Joseph P. 

On-Site Inspections Under The INF Treaty, A 
History of the On-Site Inspection Agency and 
Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991 
Treaty History Series 
Includes bibliographical references 
ISBN 0-16-041719-8 

1. Treaties, Anns Control — United States — History. 

2. United States — INF Treaty — On-Site Inspections — 
History. 3. USSR - INF Treaty — End of Cold War — 
History. 4. United States Government — On-Site 
Inspection Agency — History, Government. 

I. United States. Treaties. INF Treaty. II. Title 


u (\ j a 

. 5 

■ Mjxs 


QJ- - 6.TJV S 


For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP. Washington, DC 20402-9328 

ISBN 0-16-041719-8 



FOREWORD 


When a new agency undertakes a precedent-setting mission, like implementing the Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the excitement and energy of the historic moment sustains the effort in 
the initial years. Then, after the passage of time, the arrival of new people, and the conduct of new treaty 
missions, questions arise about origins, assumptions, and accomplishments. To answer those questions 
and to tell the story of the men and women who conducted the INF Treaty’s on-site inspection mission, 
the On-Site Inspection Agency is publishing this history. 

This book, the first in a series by the Historian of the On-Site Inspection Agency, documents the 
historical events. In the American constitutional system, those federal agencies which are involved in 
significant, contemporary missions have a special obligation to inform the public of their activities. The 
government is accountable to the people; this history helps meet that obligation by telling the story of 
"On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty. 


ROBERT W. PARKER 

MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE 

DIRECTOR 


v 



PREFACE 


When a historian sets out to research and write the history of contemporary events, the challenge is not 
only to get the story “right” but to see how important, consequential changes fit into a larger and longer 
patterns of human experience. For this history, the contemporary events were the implementation of the 
significant, new U.S.-USSR INF Treaty and the institution of a Department of Defense organization, 
the On-Site Inspection Agency. The really remarkable changes came with the implementation of the 
treaty articles and protocols, which injected the concepts of on-site inspections, continuous portal 
monitoring, and scheduled missile reductions into the U.S.-USSR arms control regime. The context for 
carrying out these changes was the Cold War and the long, ideological, economic, and military struggle 
for dominance. Soldiers of the Cold War on both sides, as this history narrates, proved to be effective, 
professional agents of change in the transition from one historical era to another. 

In 1989, Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, OSIA's Director, initiated this history. He stated then that 
the United States and the Soviet Union had broken new ground with the INF Treaty; he wanted its 
implementation recorded, published, and disseminated to larger audiences. Major General Robert W. 
Parker, OSIA’s current Director, read the final manuscript and offered suggestions. He too saw the 
benefits from its publication and distribution. Dr. Joerg H. Menzel, OSIA’s Principal Deputy Director, 
encouraged, cajoled, redefined, and doggedly mentored the manuscript into book form. To him, I am 
indebted. 

Anyone who has worked on a multi-year government project knows that delays, adversities, and 
mysterious pauses are part and parcel of the experience. No one overcomes these difficulties alone. 
Many people, inside and outside of the agency offered advice, timely suggestions, and encouragement. 
In my initial research in 1989-1990, OSIA’s inspectors and escorts shared their time and experiences, 
especially Paul Nelson, Tom Brock, Terry Comeil, Bob McConnell, Ken Keating, Mark Dues, Paul 
Trahan, Jerry West, Mike Hritsik, Steve Boyd, Bob Yablonski, Joseph Wagovich, Richard Gibby, Susan 
Albom, David Lafleur, and Larry Nelson. In November 1991, three senior military historians. Dr. Alfred 
Goldberg, Dr. Carl W. Reddel, and Dr. Donald R. Baucom, read, critiqued, and recommended its 
publication. In 1992, Judy Cleary edited the manuscript, Bill Way and Eric Emerton collected and 
reproduced photographs, and Paul Andino designed the page layout, and developed the cover art. 
Marshall Billingslea developed new tables, charts, and maps. Jack Kuhn, Paul Andino, and Jack Cobb, 
helped ready the manuscript for final review within the Department of Defense and interagency. While 
longer and more recondite than anticipated, that review sharpened the text. Approval came in February 
1993. Throughout the lengthy process, my thoughts turned occasionally to a saying by the American 
popular singer, Dolly Parton, “If you want to see the rainbow, you gotta put up with a little rain.” 

Joseph P. Harahan 
March 8, 1993 


THE AUTHOR 


Joseph P. Harahan is a public historian w ho joined the On-Site Inspection Agency in early 1989. 
Previously, he had been a member of the Office of Air Force History and the faculties of the University 
of Richmond and Michigan State University. He received a BA from the University of Virginia. MA 
from the University of Richmond, and a Ph.D. in History from Michigan State University. He is the 
author or coeditor of a multi-volume Air Force history series. Warrior Studies (12 volumes), and has 
published articles in International Security, Public Historian, and Government Review. While 
completing this history on implementing the INF Treaty, he has lectured widely at colleges, universities, 
and military academies in the United States and abroad. 


Vlll 


CONTENTS 





INF BASELINE INSPECTIONS 


47 



INF CONTINUOUS PORTAL MONITORING INSPECTIONS 67 


INF ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS 


99 


INF CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONS 


117 








IX 














CHARTS 


Composition of On-Site Inspection Team 10 

INF Treaty Technical Talks - Topic Highlights 25 

OSIA Mock Inspection Schedule, Spring 1988 28 

U.S. INF On-Site Inspection Team Leaders, July/August 1988 55 

U.S. INF On-Site Escort Team Leaders, July/ August 1988 58 

U.S. Team Leaders at Magna, July 1988 - May 1991 73 

U.S./Soviet Team Leaders at Votkinsk/Magna, July 1988 - May 1991 94 

INF Missile Eliminations 102/3 

Monthly Record of U.S. Inspections, 1989 - 1991 124/5 

INF Short - Notice Inspection Timeline 138 

TABLES 

U.S. INF Missile Eliminations 106 

USSR INF Missile Eliminations 111 

United States Closeout Inspections 131 

Soviet Closeout Inspections 133 

Authorized INF Team Equipment 142 

MAPS 

OSIA World Wide Locations by June 1989 5 

United States’ INF Treaty Sites 22 

Soviet Union’s INF Treaty Sites 49 

Elimination Sites in the U.S. 100 

Elimination Sites in the USSR 101 

INF Sites in the Western Soviet Union 120 

INF Sites in Eastern Europe 122 

INF Sites in Central and Eastern Soviet Union 126 


x 


APPENDICES 


Appendix A 

INF Treaty 

169 

Appendix B 

Chronology 

225 

Appendix C 

OSIA Personnel 

229 

Appendix D 

OSIA Personnel 1990-1991 

233 

Appendix E 

OSIA Budget, 1988-1991 

235 

Bibliography 


237 

Index 


249 









CHAPTER 1 


A NEW TREATY, 
A NEW AGENCY 



Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan signed the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. 


O n January 15, 1988, President Ronald Reagan directed the 
Secretary of Defense to establish the On-Site Inspection 
Agency (OSIA). Its mission was to cany out the on-site inspection and 
escort responsibilities of the United States under the provisions of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 1 Signed on December 8, 
1987, by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gor¬ 
bachev, the INF Treaty enjoined the two countries to eliminate all ground- 
launched missiles (approximately 2,700 missiles) with ranges between 500 
and 5,500 kilometers. National teams of inspectors would monitor and 
report on the elimination of these missile systems and other significant 
provisions of the treaty .The INF Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate and 
the USSR’s Supreme Soviet in the spring of 1988, and the instruments of 

















On-Site Inspection Agency 



PRESIDENT Of THE UNITED STATES 
Of AMERICA 


TREATY BETWEEN THE 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE 

UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 


ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR 
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND 
SHORTER RANGE MISSILES 
DECEMBER 1987 


SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

j L — 


c 


—v. 


GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU 


ratification were exchanged at the Reagan-Gorbachev Moscow Summit of 
June 1, 1988. Exactly 30 days later the first phase of the treaty began. On-site 
inspections were a major component of this and all subsequent phases of 
the treaty. They had immediate significance, both as a barometer for 
measuring adherence to the treaty and as a precedent for entering into future 
arms control treaties and agreements. 

In negotiating arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, the United 
States had proposed on-site inspections as a part of treaty verification for 
more than 30 years.' However, until the late 1980s few treaties or agree¬ 
ments had included the provision. One, the Stockholm Document of Sep¬ 
tember 1986, was a multilateral arms control agreement signed by the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and 33 European nations. It went into effect 
on January 1, 1987, and permitted on-site challenge inspections by small, 
four-person teams of military officers of large-scale, scheduled military 
exercises. If a military force of more than 17,000 took part in an exercise, 
the participating states had to provide notification 42 days in advance and 
issue an invitation to all of the signatories to send an on-site inspection team 
to observe the exercise. There was no risht of refusal. However, the 
agreement limited nations that were not members of the same alliance (i.e., 
NATO or the Warsaw Pact) to a single challenge inspection each per year. 
This provision limited the number of inspections. In 1987, the first full year 
of the Stockholm Document, there were only five on-site challenge inspec¬ 
tions. The United States conducted a single on-site inspection under the 
agreement in 1987.' 


By contrast, the INF Treaty required, or permitted through the exercise 
of treaty rights, the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct several 
hundred on-site inspections at operational missile sites, repair facilities, 


U.S. inspectors during an SS-12 
inspection at Saryozek, USSR. April 


1989. 



1 







A New Treaty, A New Agency 



Soviet inspectors at American 
GLCM wing, RAF Greenham Com¬ 
mon, Great Britain, January 1989. 


storage depots, training sites, and former missile production or assembly 
facilities. Effective July 1, 1988, the United States had the right to send, 
within 60 days, 10-person inspection teams to 130 Soviet INF missile sites 
and missile-related facilities in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East 
Germany. The Soviet Union had the right in the same period to send its 
on-site inspection teams to 31 U.S. INF sites and facilities in West Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. 
According to the terms of the treaty, all inspection teams had to be met and 
accompanied throughout the inspection by national escort teams. The treaty 
also stipulated that both states could place resident on-site inspection teams 
of up to 30 inspectors at one former INF missile assembly plant or a former 
INF missile production facility to monitor continuously the entrance portals 
and perimeter. For a minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 13 years, the 
United States and the USSR could conduct these on-site portal monitoring 
inspections. During the first full year of the INF Treaty, in direct contrast 
to the Stockholm Document, the United States and the Soviet Union had 
the right of conducting more than 340 INF on-site inspections. 4 

When the full scope of the new treaty’s rights and obligations were 
understood, it became clear that the U.S. government had to move quickly 
to define department and agency responsibilities, allocate resources, and 
initiate preparations for carrying out the mission. Initial estimates were that 
the treaty's on-site inspection and escort missions would involve recruiting 
and training up to 400 people; establishing a headquarters and field offices 
in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; setting up and managing 
a continuous portal monitoring inspection operation at a Soviet missile 
assembly plant and an escort operation at an American missile plant; and 
managing an annual budget of over $120 million." An added impetus to act 
quickly was the fact that negotiations for a larger, more complex arms 
control treaty—the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—had 
reached a decisive stage in Geneva. In the spring of 1988, senior officials 
and arms control experts testified to the U.S. Congress that the INF Treaty 



3 






On-Site Inspection Agency 



Brigadier General Roland La joie, first 
Director , OSIA. 


was a precursor for the more extensive and complicated U.S.-USSR START 
Treaty.' 1 

Consequently, the purpose of President Reagan’s January 15, 1988, 
directive was to define the INF Treaty mission and to fix responsibility for 
the U.S. government's on-site inspection and escort mission in a new 
Department of Defense organization: the On-Site Inspection Agency. 


First Charter 


Eleven days after the President’s directive, on January 26, 1988, 
William H. Taft IV, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, established OSIA as 
a separate operating agency in the Department of Defense. The Director, a 
senior military officer or DOD civilian, would be appointed by the Secretary 
of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval 
of the President. The Director would report to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition. An executive committee consisting of the Chair¬ 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretaries of Defense for 
Acquisition, and for Policy, would provide oversight, direction, and trans¬ 
mit policy guidance received from a formal interagency process established 
by the President. The new agency would have three deputy directors—a 
Principal Deputy Director, a Deputy Director for International Negotia¬ 
tions, and a Deputy Director for Counterintelligence. The new organiza¬ 
tion’s first charter stipulated that OSIA would have two principal responsi¬ 
bilities: 


• To manage and coordinate the U.S. INF Treaty on-site inspection 
activities in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, and 

• To manage and coordinate all United States activities associated 
with the Soviet Union’s on-site inspections of United States’ INF 
facilities in the United States, Belgium, Federal Republic of Ger¬ 
many, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom." 

On February 1, 1988, Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, U.S. Army, 
became the first Director, On-Site Inspection Agency. A Soviet specialist, 
General Lajoie had commanded a battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 
served as chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Berlin; and had been 
U.S. Army Attache to the Soviet Union and U.S. Defense Attache to France. 
He was fluent in Russian and French.' 1 A week later the initial cadre of 
approximately 40 military officers and noncommissioned officers arrived, 
drawn from all the United States military services, as well as a few civilians 
from other government agencies. They started work in temporary offices in 
an area of southeast Washington, D.C., known as Buzzard Point. 

Because of the diplomatic and military nature of the INF Treaty’s 
on-site inspection and escort missions, extensive coordination would be 
required with other nations and with many federal departments and agen¬ 
cies. OSIA’s first principal deputy director. George L. Rueckert, was 
appointed by the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. A career Foreign Service officer, an INF Treaty negotiator, and a 
senior arms control policy advisor, Rueckert had extensive experience in 


4 








A New Treaty, A New Agency 


the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Secretary of State nominated the 
agency’s first deputy director for international negotiations, Raymond F. 
Smith, a senior Foreign Service officer with experience in the U.S. embassy 
in Moscow. An authority on the Soviet Union, Smith later authored Nego¬ 
tiating With the Soviets (1989), an analysis of diplomatic and negotiating 
strategies of Soviet officials. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves¬ 
tigation selected the agency's first deputy director for counterintelligence, 
Edward J. Curran."’ 

A similar diversity of experience characterized OSIA’s initial cadre 
of inspectors and escorts. Among the military officers, some had recent 
experience in commanding or serving in Pershing II battalions or Ground 
Faunch Cruise Missile wings. A few officers had been in Geneva, assisting 
with the final phases of INF Treaty negotiations. Others had served in 
Washington on the initial task force defining the roles and missions of the 
new agency. Still others had been military attaches to the Soviet Union or 
had served as foreign area officers in the U.S. Army. Among the noncom¬ 
missioned officers, many had special training and experience as Russian 
linguists. Many of the team chiefs were career officers with advanced 
degrees, especially in Soviet area studies and Russian language and culture. 


Initial Organization 


The INF Treaty mission largely determined the new agency’s initial 
organizational structure. Responsibility for planning, operational training, 
and conducting on-site inspection and escort missions was lodged in OSIA’s 
operations directorate. The directorate had two components: an inspection 
division, which prepared for and conducted U.S. on-site inspections at the 
130 Soviet INF missile sites in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia; and an escort division, which was responsible for coordi¬ 
nating the escorting of Soviet on-site inspection teams at the 31 U.S. INF 



Within 7 months of its creation in January 1988, the new agency set up field offices and continuous inspection sites worldwide. 


5 









On-Site Inspection Agency 


missile sites located in Western Europe and the United States. The new 
agency’s portal monitoring directorate had responsibility for conducting 
and managing the continuous on-site portal inspections. The treaty stipu¬ 
lated that each nation had the right to place a team of up to 30 on-site 
inspectors at one former INF missile assembly or rocket motor production 
facility to monitor continuously—24 hours a day, 365 days a year—the 
entrance portal and to patrol the perimeter. U.S. inspectors would go to the 
former SS-20 missile assembly plant in Votkinsk, USSR, and Soviet 
inspectors would go to a former Pershing II rocket motor plant in Magna, 
Utah. OSIA's support directorate was responsible for personnel, budget, 
acquisition, travel, and coordination for military airlift." 

The INF Treaty mission also affected the geographical placement and 
function of the agency’s field offices. One section of the treaty's protocol 
on inspections stipulated that INF on-site inspectors had to enter the nation 
to be inspected at "the point of entry that is closest to the inspection site." 
INF escort teams would meet the inspectors at these designated entry points 
and accompany them throughout the inspection. Eleven points of entry were 
designated in the treaty: Washington D.C. and San Francisco in the United 
States, Frankfurt in the Federal Republic of Germany, Brussels in Belgium, 
Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands. Rome in Italy, RAF Greenham Com¬ 
mon Air Base in Great Britain, Moscow and Irkutsk (later Ulan Ude) in the 
USSR, Feipzig-Schkeuditz Airport in the German Democratic Republic, 
and Ruzyne International Airport in Czechoslovakia. 1 



The United States was responsible for having INF escort teams ready 
to meet Soviet INF inspection teams at seven entry points, two in the United 
States and five in Western Europe. At two of these points, Washington and 
Travis AFB, the On-Site Inspection Agency established field offices. For 
European operations, OSIA established a field office in Frankfurt, which 
was the point of entry for Soviet INF teams inspecting missile sites and 
facilities in West Germany. This office could also dispatch U.S. escort teams 
to meet Soviet inspection teams arriving at designated points of entry in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Great Britain. 

The European field office also played a major role in the United States’ 
inspection operations. Most of the American on-site inspection teams met 
in Washington, flew as a team to Europe, and then traveled into the Soviet 
Union. They were required by the treaty to enter the Soviet Union at 
Moscow, the designated point of entry. In Europe, the inspection teams used 
the field office as a "gateway." In Frankfurt, the inspectors would be placed 
in 10-person teams, issued treaty-permitted inspection equipment, and 
given final instructions before departing for Moscow. 

A second OSIA gateway field office was established at Yokota Air 
Base near Tokyo, for U.S. teams inspecting INF missile sites in the eastern 
USSR. This OSIA field office functioned like the one in Frankfurt—it was 
an assembly point where U.S. inspection teams would complete their final 
preparations before departing for Ulan-Ude, the Soviet Union’s eastern 
point of entry. 


6 


Initially, all U.S. inspection teams flew to and from the Soviet Union, 
East Germany, and Czechoslovakia aboard USAF aircraft. The INF Treaty 




A New Treaty, A New Agency 



U.S. Embassy, Moscow, site of the new Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU), the small embassy 
office which assisted American INF Treaty inspection teams arriving and departing from Moscow. 


created a special category of individuals, "aircrew members," who had to 
be identified on an official list before the flight to the point of entry. No 
more than 200 individuals could be identified as aircrew members at any 
one time. 1 ' 

INF Treaty requirements were also responsible for placing an Anns 
Control Implementation Unit in the U.S. embassy in Moscow. The treaty 
stipulated that a "diplomatic aircrew escort" accredited to the Soviet gov¬ 
ernment (or to the government of the basing nation in which the INF site 
was located) shall meet the INF inspection teams and aircrew at the point 
of entry "as soon as the airplane of the inspecting Party lands." 14 This meant 
that U.S. embassy officials had a treaty obligation to meet each arriving 
American inspection team and aircrew. The United States anticipated it 
would conduct more than 150 on-site inspections in the first treaty year. 
Consequently, in the U.S. embassy in Moscow a new organization, the Anns 
Control Implementation Unit (ACIU), was set up to assist arriving and 
departing inspection teams and aircrews. The State Department and OSIA 
provided people, funding, and logistics for this new embassy unit. For 
American inspection teams arriving in Ulan-Ude, a representative from the 
ACIU subunit met each team and aircrew. 

When its headquarters, field offices, and embassy units were in place, 
OSIA’s organizational structure stretched across 19 time zones. The United 
States and the Soviet Union had produced, tested, deployed, and stored 
ground-based INF intermediate- and shorter-range missiles on sites on three 


7 





On-Site Inspection Agency 





Pershing II missile. 


continents: North America, Europe, and Asia. By signing the INF Treaty, 
the U.S. government, and specifically the people in its newly created 
On-Site Inspection Agency, had to be prepared to travel to every site to carry 
out inspections and escort missions. 


INF Treaty Mission 


Known officially as the "Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles," the 17-article INF Treaty 
was supplemented by two protocols and a memorandum of understanding. 
The "Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile 
Systems Subject to the Treaty" defined the elimination procedures in detail. 
The "Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty" spelled out the 
purpose, rules, and procedures for conducting on-site inspections. The 
accompanying "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Estab¬ 
lishment of the Data Base for the Treaty" provided a detailed accounting by 
each party of the number and location of all missiles, launchers, associated 
equipment, and facilities covered in the treaty. 


The treaty’s first article defined the essence of the United States’ and 
the USSR's obligations: "...each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range 
and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out 
the other obligations set forth in this Treaty." All ground-based intermedi¬ 
ate-range missiles (1,000-5,500 kilometer range), all shorter-range missiles 


* 


a 


v_/ 

SS-20 SS-12 SS-4 

(654) (718) (149) 


★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 


★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 


★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 

* 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 


★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 


★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ ★ 




TOTAL 

MISSILES: 1,846 


SS-5 SS-23 SSC-X-4 
(6) (239) (80) 


TOTAL 

MISSILES: 846 


PERSHING 1A PERSHING II 

(169) (234) 


BGM-109 

(443) 


8 











A New Treaty, A New Agency 


(500-1,000 kilometer range), and their associated launchers, equipment, 
support facilities, and operating bases worldwide were to be eliminated or 
closed out from any further INF missile system activity. Defining the INF 
missile systems by range rather than type of armaments (such as nuclear or 
conventional) was important. Because the INF Treaty prohibited the parties 
from producing or flight-testing any INF-designated missiles, and the treaty 
was for an unlimited duration, no ground-based missiles in these ranges 
could be produced, possessed, or tested by either nation in the future. 15 

Eight different types of intermediate- and shorter-range missile sys¬ 
tems would be eliminated. For the United States, these missiles were the 
Pershing II, the BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile, and the 
Pershing 1A missile. For the Soviet Union, the INF missile systems slated 
for destruction were SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23. Two missiles 
that had been tested but not deployed were incorporated into the treaty 
because of their ranges. These were the U.S. Pershing IB missile and the 
Soviet SSC-X-4 cruise missile. As of June 1, 1988, none of the Pershing 
IBs existed and only 80 SSC-X-4s had been produced for testing. 1,1 

All of these INF missiles would be eliminated under one of the most 
comprehensive verification regimes ever established to monitor compliance 
with a U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty. The monitoring provisions combined 
traditional satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means with 
totally new procedures for on-site inspections of missile production plants, 
operating bases, support facilities, and elimination sites. 


Five Types of On-Site Inspections 


Under the INF Treaty inspection teams performed different functions. 
They carried out these functions through five types of inspections: baseline, 
elimination, portal monitoring, closeout, and short-notice. 17 

The first type of inspection established a baseline inventory. Thirty 
days after the formal exchange of the instruments of ratification, each nation 
had the right, over the next 60 days, to send 10-person on-site inspection 
teams to all missile operating bases, support facilities, and elimination sites 
specified in the official INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. Once 
on site, the teams had 24 hours to confirm the number of all treaty items 
present. The results of this inspection were recorded in treaty-mandated 
inspection reports. These reports, when combined with the official data and 
photographs in the Memorandum of Understanding, constituted the baseline 
data for the duration of the treaty. 

A second function of the inspection teams was to monitor the elimination 
of all 2,692 INF missiles, and their launchers and support equipment at 
designated elimination sites. The Soviet Union designated eight elimination 
sites; the United States established four sites. All INF missile system 
eliminations and elimination inspections were to be completed within three 
years. 


FIVE TYPES OF 
INSPECTIONS: 

• BASELINE 

• ELIMINATION 

• CLOSEOUT 

• SHORT NOTICE 

• PORTAL PERIMETER 


9 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


A third use of on-site inspection teams was for closeout inspections. 
These inspections confirmed, within 60 days of notification by the inspected 
party, that all INF-specified equipment, support structures, and treaty-re¬ 
lated activity had ceased at the missile operating base or support facility. In 
the Memorandum of Understanding, the Soviet Union declared 130 INF 
sites; the United States, 31. INF activities at all of these sites were to cease 
within three years of the treaty's entry into force. 


COMPOSITION OF ON-SITE 
INSPECTION TEAM 


I 
t 
ft 


TEAM CHIEF 


DEPUTY TEAM CHIEF 


LINGUISTS (A MINIMUM 
OF TWO) 


SPECIALISTS 



The fourth function of inspection teams was to conduct annually, on 
short notice, a limited number of inspections of active missile operating 
bases or previously active (closed-out) missile sites, support facilities, or 
launcher production facilities. The purpose of these short-notice inspections 
was to determine if any INF missiles, support equipment, or declared items 
were present. During the first three years of the treaty, each party had the 
right to conduct up to 20 short-notice on-site inspections annually. During 
the next five years, each side would be allowed 15 inspections annually; 
during the final five years, 10 per year. 

A fifth function of the on-site inspectors was initially to monitor the 
portals of a single, designated missile production or final assembly facility 
in each nation. During final treaty negotiations, the Soviet delegate declared 
that its nation intended to continue the final assembly of a ground launched 
ballistic missile that was "outwardly similar" to a stage of an INF Treaty 
missile. For this reason, the United States was given the right to have on-site 
inspectors monitor—24 hours a day, 365 days a year—the portal and 
perimeter of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt Autono¬ 
mous Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR. This inspection right was to be in 
effect for at least 3 years and up to a maximum of 13 years. A maximum of 
30 on-site inspectors could be used for this inspection. At Votkinsk, Soviet 
SS-20, SS-23 and SS-12 missiles had been assembled at the plant; currently, 
Soviet SS-25 missiles—similar but with a greater range—were being 
assembled there. These SS-25 missiles were not banned by the INF Treaty. 
The purpose of U.S. portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk was to ensure 
that the USSR did not assemble the banned SS-20 missile under the guise 
of an SS-25 missile. U.S. on-site inspectors would not enter the plant; 
instead, they would continuously monitor the portal and patrol the perime¬ 
ter. The INF Treaty granted the Soviet Union the right to place a team of 
up to 30 resident on-site inspectors at the portals of Hercules Plant No. 1 in 
Magna, Utah, where Pershing II rocket motors had been produced. The 
Soviet inspectors would monitor the plant's portals and perimeter. As at 
Votkinsk, the INF inspectors could not enter the plant. 


In less than five months from its establishment, the new On-Site 
Inspection Agency had to recruit, train, prepare, and equip the U.S. on-site 
inspection and escort teams to carry out the initial inspections. 


10 





A New Treaty, A New Agency 


NOTES: CHAPTER 1 

Throughout this history the term "INF Treaty" will be used. The actual, official 
title ot the treaty is: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles. 

2 

Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control, Soviet Objectives in the Gor¬ 
bachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). pp. 242-276. Sherr states that both the 
United States and USSR in the 1950s and 1960s agreed to on-site inspections as 
part of multilateral treaties involving arms prohibitions in Antarctica and outer 
space. Neither of these treaties, however, involved on-site inspections on the 
national territory of either the Soviet Union or the United States. Treaties and 
agreements with verification provisions that included on-site inspections on na¬ 
tional territory were not negotiated and ratified until the late 1980s. 

3 

Don O. Stovall, "The Stockholm Accord: On-Site Inspections in Eastern and 
Western Europe." in Lewis A. Dunn and Amy E. Gordon, eds.. Arms Control 
Verification and the New Role of On-Site Inspection (Lexington: Lexington Books, 
1990), pp. 15-38. For statistics on CDE inspections, see p. 35. 

A 

100th US Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty 
Document 100-11: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles, Together With the Memorandum of Understanding and Tw o Protocols, 
Signed in Washington on December 8,1987 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1988). This document contains a letter of transmittal from President 
Reagan to the U.S. Senate. It also has an article-by-article analysis of the INF Treaty 
and the complete text of the treaty. Hereafter cited as Treaty Document 100-11. For 
INF inspection statistics, see: OSIA Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet, June 1, 
1989: OSIA, "INF: The First Year," Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), 
August 1989, p. 31: Washington Post, June 3, 1989. 

^ 100th US Congress, 2nd Session. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Execu¬ 
tive Report 100-15. INF Treaty (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1988), Vol. 1. p. 51. 

6 Ibid., pp. 66-67. Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci. Ambassador Paul Nitze, 
and former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger testified as to the precedent 
of the INF Treaty and its verification regime for the START Treaty. Secretary 
Carlucci and Ambassador Nitze told the Committee that some form of "anytime, 
anywhere" inspections might well be part of a START agreement. Secretary 
Carlucci testified, "I think we are probably going to have to have some form of 
challenge inspections under START." Former Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger told the Committee that "anyplace, anytime—will probably be the right 
regime for START." 

7 William H. Taft, IV, Department of Defense Directive: United States On-Site 
Inspection Agency, January 26, 1988, Section F. Unclassified Extract. 

S OSIA Office of Public Affairs, "The On-Site Inspection Agency," Fact Sheet, 
June 1, 1988. 

9 OSIA Office of Public Affairs. Biographical Fact Sheet, May 1. 1989. 


11 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


l0 OSIA Office of Public Affairs, Biographical Fact Sheet, November 1988. 

1 'Edward J. Lacey, "On-Site Inspection: The INF Experience," in Dunn, Verifica¬ 
tion, pp. 3-14. 

1 9 

INF Treaty Protocol in Inspections, Section I, Paragraph 7. See also: Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-1 /; and 100th U.S. Con¬ 
gress, 2nd Session, Senate Special Delegation to Visit Five NATO Countries, 
Report: The INF and the Future of the Alliance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern¬ 
ment Printing Office, 1988). 

1 Ibid., Section I, III. 

l4 Ibid., Section V. 

1 5 INF Treaty, Article I. See also: Arms Control Association Interview with 
Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, "Insights of an On-Site Inspector," in Arms 
Control Today (Washington, D.C.: November 1988), Vol. 18, No. 9; U.S. Arms 
Control Disarmament Agency, Understanding the INF Treaty (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 1-33; Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disar¬ 
mament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 375-485; SIPRI, SIPRI 
Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), pp. 443-458. 

I6 /VF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding, June 1, 1988. 

17 For the Reagan Administration's explanation of these five types of INF on-site 
inspections, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-11, 
pp. 43-61. Four U.S. Congressional Committees held extensive hearings on the INF 
Treaty. For results of these hearings and reports, see: 100th U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report and Hearings: The INF Treaty 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 6 Volumes; 100th U.S. 
Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Report and Hearings: 
NATO Defense and the INF Treaty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1988), 4 Volumes; 100th U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Report and Hearings: INF Treaty Monitoring and 
Verification Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1988), 1 Volume; 100th U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report: Soviet Compliance With Arms Control 
Agreements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988). 


12 



CHAPTER 2 


CRITICAL MONTHS, 
INTENSE PREPARATIONS 



President Reagan met with U.S. INF inspectors in the White House on June 22,1988. Eight days later, the inspections began. 


O n Monday, February 8, 1988, 40 Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel, along with two 
civilians, reported to a large vacant office at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 
located at Buzzard Point in southeast Washington, D.C. These people 
constituted the On-Site Inspection Agency. They began working in an 
atmosphere more akin to a task force than a fully staffed federal agency. 
From the beginning they worked under considerable pressure. President 
Reagan had submitted the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent 


13 








































































On-Site Inspection Agency 


in late January, and hearings in the Senate and the House of Representatives 
were scheduled to begin in late February. Some experts predicted that the 
treaty would be ratified and enter into force as early as April 1. That meant 
that on-site inspections might begin as early as May 1, less than 90 days 
away. That left little time to organize the agency, set up field offices, 
establish communications centers, write operations plans, recruit inspectors 
and escorts, conduct training classes, schedule and perform mock inspec¬ 
tions, purchase and field equipment, and deploy INF inspection and escort 
teams. 


Inherited Decisions: First Task Force 


In the late fall of 1987, as the final treaty provisions were being 
negotiated and the agenda for the Washington Summit completed, Lt. 
General Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, asked Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, to set up a small task force. Their assignment was to develop a 
concept of operations and recommend an organizational structure for im¬ 
plementing the INF Treaty. One week later, on December 1, 1987, General 
Powell issued specific guidelines for the task force. Verification and com¬ 
pliance mechanisms within the U.S. government would remain for the INF 
Treaty as structured for all other treaties. A new on-site inspection organi¬ 
zation, located in either the Department of Defense or the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, would have the mission of preparing for, con¬ 
ducting, and managing INF Treaty inspection and escorting activities, 
including the transportation of inspection teams to and from the designated 
points of entry in the Soviet Union and the United States. For U.S. inspec¬ 
tions of Soviet missile sites, the Treaty stipulated that a list of up to 200 
inspectors would be established. The new organization would be respon¬ 
sible for recruiting, training, equipping, and managing these inspectors. 
They would be drawn from people knowledgeable about the Soviet 
Union and its military, Russian linguists, and from specialists in INF missile 


The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 



14 








OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 



Gates of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt, USSR, site ofU.S. continuous ported monitoring. 


operations. The treaty also stipulated that there would be a pool of up to 200 
portal monitoring inspectors. At any one time, up to 30 of these inspectors 
could be stationed at the designated Votkinsk missile final assembly plant 
to monitor the plant's portal and perimeter around the clock, 365 days a 
year. For escorting Soviet on-site inspectors to U.S. INF missile sites, a 
designated group of escorts would be the responsibility of the new agency. 
The air crews, responsible for flying the inspectors and escorts to the 
designated national points of entry, would be managed by the new agency, 
and would be limited, by provisions in the Treaty, to no more than 200 
members. 

Using these National Security Council guidelines, the 10-person, JCS 
task force began its work. Brigadier General Eugene L. Daniel, U.S. Army, 
Assistant Deputy Director for International Negotiations, JCS, led the team. 
General Daniel, who had commanded the 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Divi¬ 
sion and who had been involved with the INF negotiations in the preceding 
months, pulled the task force together and moved into temporary quarters 
at Buzzard Point in Washington, D.C. "There was no money," he recalled, 
"no people for a new agency, no structure, just an operational concept 
embedded in the INF Treaty." 1 The task force also faced the pressure of 
events. A week after its first meeting. General Secretary Gorbachev arrived 
in Washington. The following day, December 8, 1987, Gorbachev and 
Reagan signed the INF Treaty. With the treaty signed, pressure mounted 
for defining roles, missions, requirements, resources, and service responsi¬ 
bilities. 

General Daniel led the overall effort. Major Paul P. Trahan, U.S. 
Army, task force member and an armor officer trained in organizational 


"There was no money, no 
people , ...just an opera¬ 
tional concept embedded 
in the INF Treaty." 

General Daniel 


15 





























On-Site Inspection Agency 


theory and corporate planning, began analyzing and visualizing the treaty's 
requirements for inspectors, escorts, and aircrews. He developed a briefing 
concept illustrating the types of on-site inspections, the years they were 
permitted, and the level of people required. Working together, Daniel and 
Trahan incorporated this concept into a series of briefings presented to the 
military service chiefs, the chairman, the senior members of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, and the leadership of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. Another task force member. Major Jerome E. 
Johnson, USAF, began working on arrangements for training courses for 
inspectors and escorts with the Defense Intelligence College. Marine 
Corps Lt. Colonel Sebastian V. Massimini began defining computer and 
communications requirements for tracking the INF on-site inspections and 
treaty-related items. Ft. Commander William G. Evans, U.S. Navy, started 
defining requirements and resources for Russian linguists. Another Air 
Force Ft. Colonel, Nicholas G. Caramancia, worked on the difficult issues 
of air transportation mandated by the rigid schedules written into the Treaty 
protocols concerning on-site inspections and eliminations. Ft. Commander 
Robert P. Barton, U.S. Navy, and Army Captain Feon Hutton, developed 
initial cost estimates of personnel, transportation, and portal housing for the 
INF mission. Finally, Ft. Colonel Ken Keating, U.S. Army, who had 
experience as an INF negotiator in Geneva, helped with all manner of issues: 
logistics, linguists, operations, and organizational structured 



Gates of the Hercules Plant Number 1 at Magna, Utah, site of the Soviet Union's continuous portal 
monitoring inspections. 


16 

































OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


The answer to the most pressing question, whether to recommend that 
the new on-site inspection organization be placed in the Department of 
Defense or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, came quickly. 
General Daniel and the task force concluded that the Department of De¬ 
tense, because of its size (3.3 million people) and resources ($293 billion 
FY87), had the people, assets, and responsiveness to organize, train, and set 
up the new inspection agency within 90 days—by April 1, 1988, the 
anticipated U.S. Senate ratification date. If the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (188 people, $29 million FY87 ) were 
assigned the mission of establishing the new agency, then Defense Depart¬ 
ment people and resources would probably have to be reassigned to it for 
up to three years. In addition, the task force acknowledged the concerns of 
the Joint Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, about the 
presence of Soviet INF inspectors on U.S. military bases. Combining these 
concerns with the assets available in the Defense Department. Daniel’s task 
force recommended that the new on-site inspection agency be assigned to 
the Department of Defense. Further, they suggested that the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the Department of Defense’s Under¬ 
secretary for Acquisition, and Undersecretary for Policy should constitute 
a three person executive oversight committee. 

Turning these recommendations into a decision did not come easily. 
General Daniel explained the task force’s operational concept, placement 
rationale, executive oversight, and training schedule to senior officials at 
the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and finally, on December 
17, 1987, to General Powell and a National Security Council interagency 
group. There were some objections, principally from State and ACDA 
officials who advocated a larger role in treaty implementation. The State 
Department was the lead department in foreign relations between the U.S. 
and Soviet governments. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had 
already been assigned special responsibilities by the National Security 
Council to chair the interagency policy process supporting the United 
States' delegation to the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission. As 
stipulated in the treaty, a small, bilateral U.S.-USSR treaty commission 
would work on resolving those treaty compliance issues that might arise 
during the baseline, elimination, closeout, or portal monitoring inspections 
and to agree on measures to improve the effectiveness of the treaty. In its 
deliberations, the NSC interagency group considered the task force’s rec¬ 
ommendations and the objections. They recommended that the President 
place the new on-site inspection organization in the Department of Defense. 
Because of the urgency of the moment, the National Security Council 
directed that the Secretary of Defense should take the "appropriate steps" 
to see that the new organization would be ready to begin operations when 
the INF Treaty entered into force. 

With this decision in mid-December, the Reagan Administration had 
resolved many of the organizational issues of how it would carry out its INF 
Treaty obligations. First, as stipulated in the INF Treaty, the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center, located in the State Department, would channel all 
official treaty-related communications between the two nations. Next, a 
new On-Site Inspection organization, affixed in the Defense Department, 
would manage and conduct all American inspections and escort Soviet 
inspectors for the duration of the Treaty. Third, U.S. representation to the 



Major General Eugene L. Daniel . 
first Task Force Leader. 



17 


AGE ^ 1 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


Special Verification Commission, mandated by the INF Treaty to resolve 
compliance questions, would be provided by a senior official assigned 
administratively to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Finally, 
other U.S. Government agencies would have the mission of providing and 
analyzing information on INF Treaty compliance. Policy questions con¬ 
cerning Soviet compliance and verification on the treaty would be defined 
and discussed in the National Security Council committees by repre¬ 
sentatives of those departments and agencies—OSD, JCS, ACDA, State, 
and other agencies— which oversaw all arms control treaties. The President 
and his senior NSC advisors would make the final decision. 


Still unresolved, however, were a host of practical issues: composition 
of inspection/escort teams, managerial concepts and policies for portal moni¬ 
toring operations, use of commercial or military airlift, extent of financial 
resources, location of headquarters and field operating offices, organizational 
status within the Department of Defense, and even the new organization's 
name— On-Site Inspection Organization or On-Site Inspection Agency. For 
the next four weeks, mid-December to mid-January, General Daniel's small 
task force attacked these issues on a number of fronts. Rather quickly, they 
recommended that it be named an "agency" over "organization." 


The issue of Department of Defense separate agency status or subor¬ 
dination within an existing DOD agency was much tougher. It involved 
two major issues acutely present in the Reagan Administration in the 1980s. 
First, General Daniel and the senior officers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
perceived that the new "agency" had to be sufficiently independent to 



President Reagan (right) in the Oval Office with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, 
and Lt. General Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 


18 















OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


compete tor resources—people, money, equipment—with other established 
organizations and agencies within the Department of Defense. If the new 
agency were subordinate to another Defense Department entity, like the 
Defense Nuclear Agency, then there was the possibility of confusion in the 
interagency and interservice arenas. Independence implied decisiveness; 
and decisiveness translated into a quickly-established, professional organi¬ 
zation capable of representing the U.S. government with the Soviet govern¬ 
ment. 4 


It the case tor a separate DOD agency was clear, it became consider¬ 
ably muddled when Daniel’s task force studied the second major issue— 
manpower. With figures of 200 inspectors, 200 escorts, and 200 aircrew 
members, and an undetermined number of managers, planners, trainers, and 
logisticians, the manpower requirements argued for placing the new agency 



General Lajoie, OSIA’s first Director, in his small, makeshift office at Buzzard Point, Washington , D C. 


into an existing Defense Department agency. Identifying and reassigning 
so many people so quickly would be very difficult. Establishing a logistical 
base for conducting worldwide operations would take time, money, and 
energy. Setting up the requisite managerial systems required by Congress 
and DOD regulations would require time and professional expertise. With¬ 
out question, there were substantial arguments for subordination within an 
existing Defense Department agency. Proponents of the Defense Nuclear 
Agency made a strong case, but in January 1988, Admiral William J. Crowe, 
Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary 
of Defense, decided to establish a new, separate Department of Defense 
agency: the On-Site Inspection Agency: 


19 













On-Site Inspection Agency 


Out of this defining, redefining, and decision making, certain basic 
assumptions emerged. The new organization—The On-Site Inspection 
Agency—would be an agency of the Department of Defense. Its Director, 
a general officer or DOD senior civilian, would report to the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and receive oversight and direction from an 
Executive Committee composed of that Undersecretary, the Undersecretary 
for Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Executive 
Committee would transmit guidance from the interagency policy committee 
to the new agency. The Director would be appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of 
the President. The Principal Deputy Director would be from the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Two other Deputy Directors would 



In February , 1989, Headquarters OSIA moved to Dulles International Airport outside of Washington 
D C. Holding the OSIA emblem are General Lajoie, Shirley McClain, Commander Edward J. Higgins, 
and David L. Pabst, Deputy Director for International Negotiations. 


come from the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
The bulk of the new agency’s people would be drawn from the armed 
services, along with a few civilian technical experts and support people. 
Agency headquarters would be at Washington Dulles International Airport. 
Logistical support for the new agency would be provided by the Defense 
Nuclear Agency, with contractual support from the Navy, Air Force, and 
the Defense Contracting Advisory Service. Training courses were to be 
organized and conducted by the Defense Intelligence College. On 


20 











OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


January 15, 1988, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to estab¬ 
lish the On-Site Inspection Agency. 


Setting Up An Agency 


When General Lajoie became OSIA’s Director on February 1, he 
inherited the work of the JCS task force. Lajoie came to Washington from 
Paris, where he had been serving as the U.S. Defense Attache. Fluent in 
French and Russian, he knew first-hand both Europe (the geographical 
arena for the INF Treaty) and the Soviet Union, its military, and its senior 
officer corps. His immediate tasks were to organize the new DOD agency, 
participate in a series of bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations on implementing 
the treaty, and develop and train a cadre of inspectors and escorts to conduct 
the on-site inspections/ 1 

Acting quickly. General Lajoie made a key decision: he directed that 
the U.S. INF team chiefs, who would lead the 10-person teams into the 
USSR and escort Soviet teams in the United States and Western Europe, 
would be entrusted with extraordinary responsibility. During inspections, 
especially in the Soviet Union, the teams would be isolated, out of direct 
communications contact, and responsible for making on-the-spot judg¬ 
ments about treaty inspection issues. "I knew we would not have time," 
Lajoie recalled, "to come up with a comprehensive training program, 
well-developed procedures, and comprehensive guidance. If I picked good 
people, I could just rely on their judgment in the absence of all these other 
things." He interviewed and personally selected each team chief. "The 
thing that I keyed on [was that] I wanted someone who was familiar with 
the Soviet environment...but mostly, I wanted somebody whose judgment 
I could trust." 

Each of the first 20 inspection team chiefs was an experienced field 
grade military officer. Most had at least 15 years of service, advanced 
degrees, Russian language proficiency, and experience in commanding 
small teams and military units. General Lajoie emphasized that they would 
be held accountable for establishing a professional, businesslike tone with 
the Soviets in conducting the U.S. inspection, escort, and portal monitoring 
missions. They were also responsible for team discipline, professionalism, 
and, to a degree, team training. They had to know the entire process of the 
on-site inspections under the treaty, including the treaty protocols and the 
Memorandum of Understanding. Decisions as to when to begin and termi¬ 
nate the on-site inspection would be, within certain timelines specified in 
the treaty, made by the team chief. Team chiefs would be responsible for 
preparing and signing, on site, the official INF Treaty Inspection Report for 
each inspection/ 

Initially, team chiefs were instrumental in selecting team members. 
The treaty specified that on-site inspection teams be limited to 10 members 
for three types of INF inspections: baseline, closeout, and short-notice. For 
elimination inspections, the teams could be expanded to 20 members; for 
continuous portal monitoring inspections, the teams could have up to 30 
inspectors. The first cadre of hand-picked team chiefs assisted in testing, 
interviewing, and selecting linguists, deputy team chiefs, and inspectors. 





U.S. inspectors at Saryozek, USSR. 


"... mostly , I wanted some¬ 
body whose judgment I 
could trust." 

General Lajoie 


21 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


By mid-March, 200 inspectors including 20 team chiefs (20 teams), 
50 escorts (three field offices), two elimination teams, and several members 
of the Votkinsk and Magna portal monitoring teams had been identified. 
Most participated in an initial training course taught by INF Treaty nego¬ 
tiators, Soviet specialists, and senior policy officials. After that course, the 
work of starting up the agency began in earnest. Colonel Robert B. 
McConnell, director of operations, concentrated on operational planning 
and managing the staff’s multiple activities. Three team chiefs—Army Lt. 
Colonel Thomas S. Brock, Marine Lt. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, and 
Army Major Paul H. Nelson—began working through the operational 
concepts outlined in the treaty and its protocols. Military linguists—includ¬ 
ing Richard O. Gibby, Floyd L. Riggin, Daniel L. Fodera, Carol J. Dockham, 
William R. Leaf, Larry R. Nelson, Richard E. Zinnert, and David G. 
Lafleur—had completed an intensive Russian course and were preparing 
for mock inspection and escort team training exercises in early April. Army 
Colonel Ronald P. Forest and Air Force Colonel Gerald V. West were the 
senior officers responsible for escorting the Soviet inspection teams. They 
traveled to each of the treaty sites in the United States and checked the 
accuracy of the official diagrams of U.S. missile facilities and sites listed in 
the treaty’s Memorandum of Understanding.' 


Colonel Douglas M. Englund. U.S. Army, headed a separate directorate 
that concentrated on establishing portal monitoring inspection at Votkinsk, 
USSR, and escort operations at Magna, Utah. Colonel George M. Connell, 
USMC, Major Mark L. Dues, USAF, and Lt. Commander Charles N. Myers, 
U.S. Navy, worked with Colonel Englund on all aspects of the continuous 
portal monitoring inspections. U.S. Navy Commander John C. Williams took 
on the task of turning the inspector's equipment authorized for short-notice 
inspections in the treaty and protocols into standardized, rugged equipment that 
would operate in the extremes of climate in the Soviet Union. He also tackled 
the issue of providing the inspectors with standardized procedures for measur- 
United States INF Treaty Sites. ing the components of each INF missile system. Eileen K. Giglio became 



22 






OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


the agency’s liaison with the U.S. Congress. U.S. Navy Commander 
Kendell Pease devised plans and programs for explaining the treaty and the 
on-site inspection mission to the public and American and European media. 
U.S. Navy Commander Maijory M. Stevens worked on getting the military 
services to release more people: Russian experts, Russian linguists, missile 
specialists, and administrative support personnel. Within a matter of weeks 
it became apparent that the new agency was seriously understaffed, espe¬ 
cially in the support and logistics area. For everyone at OSIA, working 60 
to 70 hours a week was the norm rather than the exception in the spring of 
1988. 10 


In Europe, representatives of the five nations where the American INF 
missiles were based (Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the 
Netherlands) wanted to know the new agency’s concept of operations. How 
would OSIA escort the Soviet inspectors? How would the Soviet inspectors 
arrive, by commercial airline or military airlift? How intrusive would these 
on-site inspections be? They wanted answers. In mid-March, General 
Lajoie went to Belgium and briefed the NATO representatives. Earlier, 
Colonel Keating and Major Trahan had gone to Europe to meet with 
American embassy staffs and with representatives of the European nations. In 
late April, General Lajoie returned to Europe, accompanying Secretary of 
Defense Frank C. Carlucci to NATO Headquarters, where he explained the status 
of U.S. preparations for carrying out the INF Treaty mission." 

The U.S. military commands that operated INF missile bases and 
facilities wanted information on OSIA’s plans for transporting, housing, 
and escorting Soviet on-site inspection teams. George Rueckert, the 
agency’s principal deputy director, and Air Force Lt. Colonel Michael J. 
Hritsik, an INF team chief, traveled to Europe to discuss operations plans 
with senior officers and planners of the U.S. European Command and with 
representatives of the NATO nations. In the United States, Congress 
wanted to know how the inspecting and escorting would be conducted. The 
press in the United States and Europe had questions about the treaty, 
inspections, escorts, and the agency responsible for the mission. Journalists 
and television reporters wanted to know about the people leading and 
conducting the inspections. The Air Force wanted information about 
OSIA’s San Francisco field office. Where would it be located? How large 
would it be? How many Soviet INF inspectors would arrive at one time? 
The Army also had questions about INF eliminations. In the spring of 1988 
there were many more questions than answers.'" 


Joint U.S./Soviet Technical Talks 


As they responded to this blitz of questions about the treaty and 
OSIA’s operational and organizational activities. General Lajoie and key 
senior officers also participated in a series of U.S.-Soviet "technical talks' 
held in Moscow, Washington, and Vienna in March, April, and May 1988. 
The agenda for the bilateral meetings focused on implementing the on-site 
inspection provisions of the treaty. During treaty negotiations U.S. and 
Soviet negotiators had acknowledged that certain practical and procedural 
issues —flight call signs, diplomatic visas, communication message for¬ 
mats, and other matters—were best left out of the treaty text. These issues 


23 






On-Site Inspection Agency 



In the spring of 1988 the treaty signatories held a series of INF Treaty Technical Talks. The U.S. and Soviet delegations shown 
here met at the National War College in Washington. D C. in April 1988. 


would be resolved informally in a series of meetings between repre¬ 
sentatives of the two governments once the treaty had been signed. Each 
of the three meetings lasted a week; cumulatively they resulted in a range 
of joint decisions on procedural issues. 1 ' 

Led by General Lajoie and General Major Vladimir I. Medvedev, 
these technical talks resolved more than a hundred issues on how the two 
nations would carry out their treaty-specified rights and responsibilities. In 
March in Moscow, the two delegations agreed on standardizing the photo¬ 
graphic and measuring equipment taken to the site by the inspection teams 
and they discussed how notifications of arrival and departure of the teams 
would be handled. At these meetings, the leaders and their 13-member 
delegations resolved 46 issues, including procedures for operating, landing, 
and refueling INF aircraft flying into and out of each nation’s treaty-desig¬ 
nated entry points. They agreed that inspectors could have a notebook, 
paper, writing instruments, flashlight, and hand-held compass. All inspec¬ 
tion teams would have uniform weighing and measuring equipment. The 
initial portal monitoring on-site inspection operations at Votkinsk and 
Magna were discussed extensively. 14 At a separate U.S.-USSR conference 
in Washington in April, specific formats for INF Treaty messages were 
developed; these messages would be sent and received through the respec¬ 
tive Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). 

Finally, in May the two delegations met for five days in Vienna and 
agreed on a wide range of issues facilitating inspections at the portals, 


24 





















OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


missile sites, and elimination facilities. The issues surrounding the estab¬ 
lishment of resident on-site inspection teams at the two portal monitoring 
sites were taken up in a point-by-point discussion. The treaty granted each 
nation the right to monitor the portal and perimeter of a designated former 
INF missile production facility for up to 13 years. Turning this treaty right 
into an operational reality required extensive working-level negotiations 
over the construction of permanent facilities for housing the inspectors and 
the installation of treaty-authorized monitoring systems. 1 ' 

During the technical talks several questions arose regarding how the 
Soviet Union would interpret the treaty once it had entered into force. Some 

INF TREATY TECHNICAL TALKS 

Moscow - Washington - Vienna 


TOPIC HIGHLIGHTS 


AIRCRAFT 
AND CREWS 


INSPECTION 

PROCEDURES 


PORTAL 
OPERATIONS 
(VOTKINSK 
AND MAGNA) 

* Flight Plans 

* Navigation Escort 

* Alternate Airfields 

* Diplomatic Aircrew 
Escort 

* Aircrew 
Accommodations 


* Accommodations 

For Soviet Inspectors 

* Wearing Identification 

* Solidifying of 

Technical Data 

* Communications 

* Site Transport 


* Accommodations 

* For Soviet Inspectors 

* Housing 

* Communication 

* Transport 

* Supplies 

* Diplomatic Travel 
to Portals 

* Travel of Inspectors to 
Embassy / Consulate 


of these issues were so serious that they were discussed in the U.S. Senate, 
then considering ratification of the treaty. As a direct result. Secretary of 
State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze held 
extensive consultations in Geneva and New York in late April and early 
May. Subsequently, the senior negotiators for the two nations exchanged 
formal diplomatic notes in mid-May, clarifying nine specific INF Treaty 
issues. These notes, technically called a "diplomatic minute," constituted 
an understanding about treaty interpretation and became part of the official 
treaty documents. Resolution of these issues was significant; the U.S. 
Senate had delayed final debate on the treaty until the diplomatic minute 
was signed and made a part of the treaty documents." 1 


Briefings, Testimony, Decisions 


Congressional scrutiny of U.S. treaty responsibilities was intense. In 
March and April 1988, four congressional committees held hearings on the 
INF Treaty. 17 The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give 
its "advice and consent" on all treaties negotiated and signed by the 


25 






























On-Site Inspection Agency 








U.S. and Soviet aircraft at Travis 
Air Force Base, California. 


President. Senior officials from the Reagan administration testified, includ¬ 
ing the Chairman of the JCS, the military service chiefs, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, and the Director of the FBI. Practically every other 
week in February, March, April, and May, General Lajoie briefed the JCS, the 
Secretary of Defense, and senior officials in the Defense Department on the 
status of inspection and escort preparations. Lajoie appeal ed before congres¬ 
sional committees, explaining planning and preparations for the treaty mission. 
These briefings and testimony incorporated the latest information from the 
technical talks and provided current information on preparations for extensive 
inspection/escort training exercises in the United States and Europe in April 
and May. Similar briefings were given to officials at the White House and the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Sandwiched between these briefings and testimony was the decision 
on how to transport U.S. and Soviet inspection and escort teams. Under¬ 
standing the airlift requirement was critical. Because of the structure of the 
treaty, the need would be especially intense during the first 60 days of 
inspections, the period known as the INF baseline. During that period, U.S. 
inspection teams would need daily flights into and out of Moscow and 
flights two or three times a week into and out of Ulan-Ude. At the same 
time, the U.S. portal monitoring team would be establishing its permanent 
inspection base at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This team also needed airlift sup¬ 
port into and out of Moscow on a continuing basis. 


U.S. escort teams for Soviet inspectors also required airlift. When a 
Soviet team arrived at one of the entry points (for example, Frankfurt, 
Washington, or San Francisco), the U.S. escort team was obligated under 
the treaty to get them to the INF site within nine hours. This deadline began 
once the Soviet team chief specified the site to be inspected. For most Soviet 
inspections, OSIA would need a combination of air and ground transporta¬ 
tion. In Europe U.S. missile sites were located in five nations— West 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Great Britain. Commercial 
airline schedules would not meet the nine-hour time requirement. 


Air Force airlift planners and OSIA’s transportation expert, Lt. Colo¬ 
nel Gerald J.K. Heuer, examined other options: leasing a fleet of commer¬ 
cial aircraft, using military airlift from the Air Force, or a combination of 
the two. The cost of leasing, over $50 million per year, was deemed 
excessive. The alternative was to assign the mission to the Air Force’s 
Military Airlift Command (MAC). Following a briefing to the joint chiefs 
in late March, General Lajoie, Colonel McConnell, and Lt. Colonel Heuer 
flew to Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, on April 6, and met with General 
Duane H. Cassidy of MAC. General Cassidy said that MAC would take 
responsibility for transporting U.S. and Soviet teams, their equipment, and 
other logistical supplies. 


The U.S. teams would fly on commercial airlines from OSIA head¬ 
quarters in Washington to field offices in West Germany and Japan. From 
there, the teams would travel on Air Force planes to the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Conversely, when Soviet inspection teams 
arrived in Europe or the United States, an OSIA escort team would meet them 


26 







OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


at the point of entry. Then, depending on the distance, the Soviet inspectors 
would be flown or bused to the inspection site. 

Within days of General Cassidy’s decision. General Lajoie was able to 
incorporate this airlift arrangement into the April technical talks in Wash¬ 
ington. There, discussions turned to practical issues such as military and civilian 

logistical flights, aircraft call signs, and housing requirements for the air 

18 

crews. 


Mock Inspections 


Another key decision was when and how to conduct a series of 
full-scale, on-site training inspections at all of the U.S. INF missile sites in 
Europe and the United States. In early March, General Lajoie had asked 
Colonel Ronald P. Forest, then chief of the escort division, to begin planning 
for mock inspections. They would involve hundreds of inspectors and 
escorts and several thousand INF missile and support systems people, and 
would be held at all 31 U.S. INF missile sites in the United States and 
Europe. Forest, an advisor to the INF Treaty delegation and a former 
Pershing battalion commander, assembled a small group of officers and 
began developing a plan for the training exercise. Army Major John D. 
Allen, Army Captains Dalton D. Graham and James Laufenburg, and Air 
Force Captain Michael W. Slifka scheduled the teams, coordinated those 
schedules with the military services and sites, and set up a system of 
evaluation. After three weeks, Lajoie reviewed and approved their plan." 


OSIA’s mock inspections would run for a month, beginning on April 
7, and would simulate treaty baseline inspections of every U.S. site. Inspec¬ 
tion and escort teams would follow the procedures specified in the treaty 



In 1988, the U.S. held full-scale mock training inspections at Air Force and Army INF sites in the United States 
and Western Europe. Soviet inspectors conducted similar mock training exercises at USSR INF sites in 1988. 


27 


















On-Site Inspection Agency 


"READ, DIGEST, 
MEMORIZE THE 
TREATY. All of us 
have to he THE 
EXPERTS." 

Captain Olsen 


OSIA MOCK 
INSPECTION 
SCHEDULE 

Spring 1988 


Site 

Inspection Date 

Greenham Common 

7 April 

Molesworth 

8 April 

Sabca-Gosselies 

12 April 

Florennes 

13 April 

Redstone Arsenal 

13 April 

Comiso 

15 April 

Fort Sill 

19 April 

Fort Huachuca 

19 April 

Woensdrecht 

20 April 

Davis-Monthan 

21 April 

EMC Hausen 

26 April 

Pueblo Army Depot 

26 April 

Weilerbach 

28 April 

Wueschheim 

29 April 

Dugway PG 

3 May 

Schwaebisch-Gmuend 

3 May 

Cape Canaveral 

5 May 

Waldheide-Neckarsulm 

5 May 

Neu Ulm 

6 May 

Plant 19 San Diego 

10 May 

Comiso 

7 June 

Martin Marietta 

9 June 


and the protocols. The inspections would test the operations plans devel¬ 
oped by OSIA, the Army, the Air Force, and the sites themselves. However, 
as the starting date grew near. Colonel Forest and Colonel Robert McCon¬ 
nell, the agency’s director of operations, recommended postponement. 
They believed that for logistical, service coordination, and personnel rea¬ 
sons (several team chiefs and members would not be available to partici- 
pate) delay would be the wiser choice." 

General Lajoie thought otherwise. He forced the issue, directing that the 
practice inspections must begin on April 7 at Greenham Common Air Base, 
England, and end by May 11 at all 31 sites. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee had completed its hearings with a favorable vote of 17 to 2 on March 
30, 1988. Treaty approval by the full Senate could come within weeks. Once 
ratified, the treaty would enter into force quickly. Lajoie believed that the mock 
inspections were the key to readiness. They would test not only OSIA's 
inspection and escort teams, but also the Army and Air Force, which 
operated the INF missile sites, as well as the industrial corporations that 
owned the missile assembly plants. As the exercise progressed, it incorpo¬ 
rated the use of military airlift, the new communications networks, and the 
provisions for operational security at every step in the inspection process. 
With Lajoie’s decision, the pace of activity accelerated. 

Colonel McConnell notified each team chief and member immedi¬ 
ately. He challenged them to "get it right the first time" and set up OSIA 
exercise controllers to critique each inspection." OSIA’s director of inspec¬ 
tions, Navy Captain David E. Olson, penned a personal note to his team: 
"READ, DIGEST, MEMORIZE THE TREATY. All of us have to be THE 
EXPERTS."" 2 All 31 U.S. INF missile and missile-related sites listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding participated in these mock inspections. 
Once a mock inspection began, the inspection teams communicated in 
Russian and conveyed their requests only to escort team chiefs and linguists. 
The inspection team used actual treaty site diagrams; they followed the 
treaty and its protocols. The entire site was usually inspected twice, with 
the escort team accompanying the inspectors at all times. By the end of the 
six weeks of mock training inspections nearly all of the American inspectors 
and escorts (with the exception of the portal monitoring teams) had been 
through one or more inspections."' 

In Europe, at the 12 Pershing II and GLCM missile bases and depots, 
the mock inspections were seen as critical because most Soviet inspections 
would take place at these bases. In February and March, Air Force Colonel 
John Fer and Army Lt. Colonel Scott G. Lang had set up OSIA’s European 
field office at Rhein-Main Air Base at Frankfurt, West Germany. In the 
United States, Air Force Colonel Gerald V. West and Army Lt. Colonel 
Claesen D. Wyckoff had set up an OSIA field office in Washington at Dulles 
International Airport. Near San Francisco, Colonel Thomas E. Smalls, U.S. 
Army, and Lt. Colonels Robert Yablonski and Stephen B. Boyd, USAF, 
established an OSIA field office at Travis Air Force Base. Each of these 
field offices participated extensively in the mock exercises. 

In Washington, Marine Lt. Colonel Sebastian V. Massimini and Army 
Major John D. Allen, together with SFC Jose R. Amaya, SFC Glenn L. 
Clark, TSgt. Mark A. Havican, RM1 James O. Brooks, and RM1 Michael 
A. Mallard, assembled a staff to set up and run a 24-hour-a-day OSIA 


28 





OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


RECALLING THE MOCK INSPECTIONS 


Lt. Colonel Robert Yablonski, USAF, remembered participat¬ 
ing in the mock inspections in the spring of 1988. An experienced 
field grade officer, he had been an air attache’ in the American 
Embassy in Moscow, an Olmstead Scholar to France, and a RAND 
Fellow prior to his work at OSIA’s San Francisco Field Office. As 
one of the American senior escorts, Colonel Yablonski participated 
in many of the initial inspections. 

"The mock inspections were, no doubt, one of the wisest things 
we did. Whoever decided to do it, I give them great credit. They 
performed a number of functions internally in terms of identifica¬ 
tion with the mission, the escort mission, what it really meant to 
escort inspectors, and it helped reveal a lot about how inspections 
should go." 

"By actually doing the inspections, by making mistakes, it 
helped us immeasurably. In fact, it was in the interest of the United 
States to make mistakes, so that when the treaty went into force on 
June 1, 1988 and the real inspections began, the U.S. would have 
its act together." 

"The other very important thing about the mocks was the 
face-to-face contact between the inspectors and the escorts with 
the treaty-in-hand. I really felt that they had a great didactic and 
educational function in letting the people at the air bases and army 
sites learn what the Soviets were going to be like." 

Arizona, September, 1989. 

"We acted on the principle that it was reasonable to expect a 
consistency of treatment across the gamut of Air Force installa¬ 
tions, both in the United States and in Europe." 

"We found out that as you undertake anything, it helps to have 
a plan, it helps to have a schedule. What really emerged was the 
necessity to communicate to a broad spectrum of people. The 
inspection process involved a great deal of coordination to the 
logistical infrastructure. Then there was another infrastructure for 
security. All these things had to be done." 

"So what became evident during these mock inspections in 1988 
was that OSIA didn't own any resources of its own, but that it had the 
charter to, pardon the word, influence all of these other people to do 
what had to be done under the requirements of the INF Treaty." 

Source: Interview, April 4, 1989 



Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, 


29 












On-Site Inspection Agency 


operations center. This operations center participated in the mock inspec¬ 
tions, as did the Military Airlift Command. The European Command also 
participated fully, experiencing for the first time how on-site inspections 
would intrude on military operations. That experience was invaluable. 
OSIA escort teams were responsible for coordinating and controlling the 
Soviet inspectors throughout the inspection. During the mock inspections 
the OSIA escort team chiefs, linguists, and members became familiar with 
all aspects of the treaty, and they learned to work closely with the Pershing 
II and GLCM site commanders. 

For Colonel McConnell the inspections were a real turning point.' 4 
For General Fajoie they signaled "the most useful training that had been 
done." 2 " For the escort team chiefs and site commanders the inspections 
were a chance to work through coordination issues, especially with the 
military services and commands in Europe. 

The American military officers who would lead the teams into the 
Soviet Union also found the mock inspections useful, but still felt a measure 
of uncertainty. 26 Apprehension ran high in the weeks following the final 
mock inspection at Comiso, Italy. In less than six weeks, Americans would 
be traveling into the Soviet Union to conduct inspections of Soviet military 
forces and missile sites never before visited by U.S. officials. Among the 
team chiefs, linguists, and inspectors, tensions increased rather than less¬ 
ened as the date for the first on-site inspections approached. 


The Moscow Summit 


On June 1, 1988, President Reagan stood in the Kremlin and presented 
the INF Treaty and the U.S. articles of ratification to General Secretary 
Gorbachev. The U.S. Senate had ratified the treaty by a 93 to 5 vote on 
May 27; the instruments of ratification had been flown to Moscow for the 
ceremony. At the moment the two leaders exchanged documents, the treaty 
entered into force. Thirty days later, on July 1, both parties had the right to 
initiate on-site inspections. Both intended to do so. 

From the beginning, OSIA’s operational concept called for the for¬ 
ward deployment of inspection teams at agency field offices in Europe and 
Japan before departing for inspections in the Soviet Union. In mid-June, 
teams of inspectors departed from OSIA headquarters in Washington and 
Few east to Frankfurt, or west to Tokyo. At Rhein-Main and Yokota air 
bases, each team received inspection equipment, supplies, and final instruc¬ 
tions before embarking on Air Force planes for the flights to Moscow or 
Ulan-Ude. U.S. portal monitoring inspection teams entered the Soviet 
Union in the same way, from Frankfurt through Moscow to Votkinsk. 27 


"Trust everybody, but 
always cut the cards." 


President Reagan 


Just before their departure, President Reagan invited General Fajoie 
and 15 INF inspectors and escorts to the White House. The President 
listened to their plans in the Oval Office. There, surrounded by the depart¬ 
ing American inspectors and escorts, he commented on their forthcoming 
mission: "Trust everybody, but always cut the cards." 28 


30 






OSIA: Critical Months, Intense Preparations 


NOTES: CHAPTER 2 

1 Interview with Brigadier General Eugene L. Daniel (USA), Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
June 7, 1989. 

"Interview with Major Paul P. Trahan (USA), OSIA, April 20, 1989. 

3 

' Ibid. See also Interview, Daniel; and INF Treaty. 
interview, Trahan (USA), OSIA, April 20, 1989. 

'’interview, Daniel. 

"interview with Brigadier General Roland Lajoie (USA), Director OSIA, March 1 
and 29, 1989. See also: Interview with Colonel Robert B. McConnell (USAF), 
OSIA, February 2,1989; Washington Times , February 5, 1988, p. 3; Defense News, 
February 15, 1988, p. 16; and Washington Post, February 15, 1988. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid. 

interview with Commander Kendell Pease (USN), OSIA, February 1, 1988; See 
also: Interview with Colonel Ronald P. Forest (USA), OSIA, November 15, 1989; 
Interview, McConnell; and Interview, Trahan. 

"'interview, McConnell. 

1 'interview, Trahan. 

12 

“Interview, McConnell. See also: Interview, Trahan. 

13 

Reports of the Technical Consultations Between the United States and Soviet 
Experts on Implementation of the INF Treaty, 9-12 March, 13-21 April, 18-22 May, 
1988. See also: Interview, Lajoie; Washington Post, May 13, 1988, p. Al; Wash¬ 
ington Post, June 1, 1988, p. 29; Secretary of State George P. Schultz, Testimony 
Before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee—The INF Treaty: Strength¬ 
ening US Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, May 16, 1988), pp. 8-9. 

l4 Briefing at OSIA headquarters, May 5, 1988. All positions on these INF 
Technical Talks issues were coordinated with senior officials throughout the U.S. 
government. 

1 ^Reports of the Technical Consultations. See also: Washington Post, June 1, 
1988, p. 29. 

16 INF Treaty Diplomatic Minute, signed in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 12, 1988. 
See also: Washington Times, March 15, 1988, p. 5; Washington Post, May 13, 
1988, p. Al; Shultz, Testimony, pp. 5-9; Washington Post, June 1, 1988, p. 29; 
Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), July/August 
1988. 

17 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, INF Treaty. See also these reports: 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, NATO Defense-, Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Monitoring-, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Compliance. 

IS Betty R. Kennedy, Supporting the INF Treaty: Report by the USAF Military 
Airlift Command (Scott, AFB: Officeofthe Historian, November 1989),pp. 29-41. 
See also: Interview, McConnell. 


31 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


"interview. Forest. 

“»Q 

Interview. McConnell. See also: Interview. Forest. 

" ! Colonel Robert B. McConnell. OSIA Director of Operations. "Letter to INF 
Inspectors.' March 23. 1988. 

""Captain Da\id Olsen (USX). OSIA Director of Inspections. Memorandum to 
INF Inspectors. March 24. 1988. 

Interview. McConnell. 

24 Ibid. 

~~ Interview. Lajoie. 

"^Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Brock (USA). OSIA. and Lieutenant 
Colonel Paul Nelson (USA). OSIA. November 13. 1989. 

Brigadier General Roland Lajoie. in INF and the On-Site Verification Process." 
Defense Issues < Pentagon: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. July 14. 
1988). Vol. 3. No. 39. pp. 1-3. 

As quoted in a conversation with Brigadier General Lajoie. June 26. 1988. 



CHAPTER 3 


INF TREATY PROCESS 


I 


■ 



At the opening of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, one of two INF Treat)' communications centers. Secretary of State 
George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were joined by U.S. Senators John Warner and Sam Nunn. 


T he INF Treaty, with its new provisions for scheduled missile 
eliminations and on-site inspections, placed both the United 
States and the Soviet Union squarely into an active arms reduction process. 
That process included the mandatory use of new U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers (NRRCs) for communicating all official treaty data and 
notifications. It also included, in specific treaty language, the right of both 
nations to use national technical means (NTM) of verification. Further, the 
treaty required the two parties to establish a Special Verification Commission 
(SVC) to resolve questions relating to compliance and to agree on measures 
that could improve the "viability and effectiveness" of the treaty. 


33 








On-Site Inspection Agency 


These three components—NRRCs, NTM, and SVC—had specific 
functions in the process of carrying out and monitoring the treaty. The 
missile systems, themselves, were owned by the respective military serv¬ 
ices. These services—the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, the U.S. Army, 
and the U.S. Air Force—operated the intermediate-and shorter-range mis¬ 
siles. They were responsible, on orders from their national command 
centers, for decommissioning, transporting, and eliminating the INF mis¬ 
siles. In all, nearly 2,700 missiles, including some of the most modern, 
accurate missile systems of the Soviet Union and the United States, would 
be eliminated. It was the destruction of these weapons,along with the un¬ 
precedented on-site inspection and cooperative measures rights, that gave 
the INF Treaty its historic significance. 


The Soviet SS-20 Threat and NATO’s Dual Track Response 


The Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range 
missile system had a solid-rocket mo¬ 
tor, inertial guidance, and a warhead 
capable of carrying three nuclear 
weapons. By 1987 the USSR had de¬ 
ployed 654 SS-20 missiles. 


Between 1977 and 1987, the Soviet Union deployed 654 SS-20 
missiles and 509 launchers in 48 Strategic Rocket Forces regiments. 1 The 
SS-20 was a modern intermediate-range missile, with a solid-rocket motor, 
inertial guidance, and three independently targeted reentry vehicles. The 
missile had the capability of delivering three nuclear weapons of up to 250 
kilotons each. It was also mobile. Mounted on a large, 12-wheeled truck 
that functioned as a missile transporter, erector, and launcher, the SS-20 
missiles operated away from fixed missile bases. In comparison with older 
Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems, the SS-20s had much greater 
mobility, higher readiness, and significantly increased firepower. Late in 
1977, the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 regiments in the western 
republics; later, on missile operating bases throughout the USSR. Because 



34 







these were intermediate (less than 5,500 kilometers) and not strategic 
missiles, the SS-20 deployments threatened to change the nuclear balance 
of power in Europe. 2 

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt led NATO leaders in 
examining the new threat throughout 1978 and 1979. Their assessment 
concluded that the SS-20's mobility, multiple warheads, readiness, and 
accuracy (estimated 300 meters at 5.000 kilometers), when coupled with 
the Soviets’ simultaneous deployment of new Backfire bombers, was cause 



The U.S. Air Force developed and fielded the Ground-Launched Cruise-Missile 
(GLCM) in the 1980s. Based in Western Europe , the deployment of these intermediate 
range American missiles created a major crisis in the NATO alliance. 


for a fundamental reexamination of the NATO alliance. As a direct result, 
NATO’s foreign and defense ministers in late 1979 adopted a "dual track" 
strategy of modernizing the existing European-based, ground-launched 
tactical nuclear missle systems while simultaneously pursuing arms control 
treaties to reduce the SS-20 threat. Throughout Western Europe in the 1980s 
this strategy became one of the most divisive public issues in the 40-year 
history of the alliance.' Huge crowds demonstrated against deploying the 
American missiles. NATO nations remained resolute. 

The first element of NATO’s new strategy proposed stationing 677 
American Pershing II and BGM-109Gs in Western Europe. The Pershing 
II was a modem, highly accurate, ground-based intermediate-range ballistic 
missile with a maximum range of 1,800 kilometers. Developed and tested 
by the U.S. Army in the late 1970s, it had a two-stage solid-fuel rocket 
motor, both an inertial guidance and a terminal guidance radar system, and 
a single reentry vehicle. The Pershing II was mobile; it was carried on and 
fired from a missile erector launcher towed by a large tractor truck. The 
Pershing II succeeded the Pershing I and IA missiles, two earlier tactical 
missile systems that had been based with U.S. Army forces in West 
Germany. 4 The NATO ministers approved replacing the three U.S. Army 
battalions of 108 Pershing IA missiles with an equal number of Pershing II 


INF Treaty Process 



GLCM launch. 


35 





On-Site Inspection Agency 


Nitze on INF Terminology 

"Behind the eventual name of the talks—the Inter¬ 
mediate-range Nuclear Forces, or INF, negotiations — 
there is an interesting story. Shortly before being 
designated as chief INF negotiator, I flew to Europe 
for preliminary consultations with our allies. At that 
time nearly everyone in the press and in the United 
States government was referring to the upcoming talks 
as either the 'Euromissile talks' or the 'theater nuclear 
forces negotiations.' During my trip it became clear 
that our allies disliked this terminology. They thought 
the phrase "theater nuclear weapons" gave the wrong 
impression in that it suggested a disassociation of a 
nuclear war in Europe from one involving an exchange 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. What 
the allies wanted was a coupling of the relatively weak deterrent in Europe to the stronger 
U.S. intercontinental deterrent. I thought they had a valid point with respect to the name 
to be given the negotiations and raised the issue at one of our subsequent delegation 
meetings in Washington. After we had examined the problem from a variety of perspec¬ 
tives, I finally proposed that we call the talks the'intermediate-range nuclear force' 
negotiations instead of 'theater nuclear force' negotiations to establish the concept that 
the weapons we were to deal with were determined by their range, not by their geographic 
place of deployment. That was consistent with the line we had taken in SALT, and it seemed 
to me equally proper in connection with these negotiations." 

Source: Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 369. 



battalions and missiles. Full-scale development began in 1979, with the first 
battery achieving operational status in Europe in December 1983. When the INF 
Treaty was signed in December 1987, the U.S. Army had 120 Pershing II missiles 
and 108 launchers in operational battalions in West Germany" 

The American BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) 
was the second intermediate-range missile to be authorized for deployment 
in Europe by the NATO ministers in December 1979. Developed and fielded 
by the U.S. Air Force, this cruise missile relied on revolutionary turbofan-jet 
technology to propel it over a 2,500 kilometer range in a low flight trajectory 
that avoided radar detection. The missile was capable of carrying a nuclear 
warhead. The basic combat unit, called a flight, consisted of 16 cruise 
missiles loaded on four transporter-erector-launchers, with two mobile 
launch control centers. Flights were grouped into combat wings. The entire 
missile wing was mobile.' Between 1983 and 1987, the Air Force deployed 
these cruise missiles on bases in five NATO nations: Great Britain, West 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. The United States, acting in 
concert with its NATO allies, had deployed 309 GLCMs by the time of the 
INF Treaty in 1987. 

The second part of NATO's dual track strategy concerned initiating 
diplomatic negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. 


36 












INF Treaty Process 


Shevardnadze on Verification 

"Throughout the postwar history, the question of 
verification occupied a central place in Soviet-American 
relations... One of the main achievements of recent years 
was the universal recognition of the idea of verification, 
whereby confidence-building measures and the possibil¬ 
ity of monitoring are organically combined as an uncon¬ 
ditional norm of political reliability... In recent years 
great strides have been made in understanding that 
openness is the principal factor in any sort of progress — 
intellectual, material, or social. Security, long an arena 
for a two-sided game of hide-and-seek, has not been 
overlooked in this process. A historical threshold was 
crossed when all the European governments accepted 
the principle of on-site inspection at the Stockholm talks. 

Now this principle is being applied in practice through monitoring the destruction of 
nuclear missiles and other confidence building measures. So far, not a single complaint 
has been heard that the inspections and verification have compromised anyone's security. 
The success and usefulness of verification are so certain that its application has markedly 
increased. If we intend to continue on this path we have taken thus far-reducing troops 
and weapons, dismantling the enormous structures of military antagonism...then we need 
an even more effective, versatile, and reliable system of verification." 

Source: Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, pp. 89-91 



The NATO ministers acted in mid-December 1979. However, two weeks 
later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This development, which 
hardened U.S.-Soviet relations for several years, halted all treaty negotia¬ 
tions. Not until October 1981 did negotiations resume on reducing European 
ground-based intermediate nuclear weapons. After President Reagan as¬ 
sumed office in January 1981, the United States put forth in November 1981 
a new negotiating position, the "zero option": no U.S. tactical nuclear 
missiles would be deployed in Europe in exchange for the Soviet Union’s 
eliminating its deployed INF missiles, including the modern SS-20s and the 
older SS-4s and SS-5s. s 

Announced publicly on November 18, President Reagan's zero option 
proposal was countered a week later by General Secretary Leonid Brezh¬ 
nev’s public announcement calling for a bilateral freeze on INF missile 
deployments in Europe. The ultimate goal, Brezhnev declared, would be 
the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe. Because the Soviet 
Union’s and the Warsaw Pact nations’ conventional military forces far 
outnumbered NATO’s conventional forces, the idea of no nuclear weapon 
systems defending Western Europe was unacceptable to NATO leaders. On 
the other hand, the idea that the Soviet Union might accept the zero option 
proposal was unacceptable to Soviet military and political leaders. Given 
these public positions, the INF negotiations stalled for several years.' 1 


37 












On-Site Inspection Agency 


Two developments revived treaty negotiations. First, in late 1983 and 
throughout 1984 American Pershing II and GLCM operational units began 
deploying to Western Europe. With these deployments (which were carried 
out over considerable public opposition in West Germany and Great Brit¬ 
ain), NATO’s theater nuclear forces added a significant new military force. 
Highly accurate, constantly ready, and operationally mobile, the Pershing 
II and GLCM missile systems set the stage for renewed treaty negotiations. 
The second development was Mikhail Gorbachev’s selection in March 1985 
as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev reversed or altered many of the Soviet Union’s negotiating 
positions on the INF Treaty. 1 " 

The ins and outs of treaty negotiations over the next two years were 
extremely complex. The INF Treaty played a prominent role in the Reagan- 
Gorbachev Geneva Summit of November 1985 and the Reykjavik Summit 
in October 1986. At these summits and other meetings, Gorbachev agreed 
that any INF Treaty would be bilateral and that the final objective was zero 
missiles. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev offered to expand the INF Treaty to 
include shorter-range as well as intermediate-range ground-based missile 
systems. This was Gorbachev's "double-zero" offer, proposing a freeze in 
Soviet shorter-range missile deployments in exchange for a commitment 
from the United States and West Germany to eliminate all their shorter- 
range missiles (Pershing IAs). President Reagan rejected this offer because 
it was linked to a halt in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Six months 
after the Reykjavik Summit, Gorbachev influenced the INF Treaty negotia¬ 
tions once again, offering to eliminate, not freeze, the Soviet Union’s 
European-based shorter-range nuclear missile systems (SS-23s and SS- 
12s). The Soviet leader dropped his demand for eliminating the SDI 
program, but he insisted that the United States and West Germany must 
destroy the Pershing IA missiles." 

On April 23, 1987, Soviet negotiators in Geneva placed a draft INF 
Treaty on the table incorporating these provisions as well as a verification 
regime that included on-site inspections. Three months later, in July, Gor¬ 
bachev offered to eliminate all of the Soviet Union’s Asian-based shorter- 
range missiles in exchange for West Germany’s pledge to eliminate its 
Pershing IAs after the elimination of the U.S.-Soviet INF missiles. In 
August, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed. " In September, 
American and Soviet negotiators in Geneva began working out the last 
details of the treaty text and protocols. One aspect of the completed treaty 
was a requirement for both parties to use the recently established U.S. and 
Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for communicating the mandatory 
treaty notifications and biannual data exchanges. 


The New Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 


In the early 1980s two U.S. Senators, Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and John W. 
Warner (R-Va.), advocated that the United States and the Soviet Union 
establish "crisis control centers" to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. These 
centers would not duplicate the existing U.S.-Soviet "Hot Line" established 
in 1961 through a bilateral agreement. The Hot Line was reserved for heads 


38 





INF Treaty Process 


of state to communicate in writing or by fax in times of emergency or crisis. 
The proposed new Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), according to 
Senators Nunn and Warner, would communicate information in such areas 
as impending ballistic missile launches, notifications of any nuclear acci¬ 
dents, or reports of naval incidents on the high seas. They believed that the 
U.S.-Soviet nuclear centers might provide critical information in normal 
times and could serve as an additional communications channel in times of 
crisis. 1 ' 


The Reagan administration, after considerable discussion, refined this 
concept. Then they formally presented it at the Geneva Summit in Novem¬ 
ber 1985. There, Reagan and Gorbachev signed an agreement establishing 
a joint experts study group to determine the feasibility of setting up perma¬ 
nent national nuclear crisis communications centers. 14 Out of these experts 
meetings, the two nations agreed to set up the centers, which would be 
equipped with direct, reliable, high-speed communications links. Their 
principal function would be to exchange information and notifications 
required under current and future amis control agreements and treaties. On 
September 15, 1987, the centers became a reality as U.S. Secretary of State 
George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in a 
formal White House ceremony, signed the agreement establishing the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.'" President Reagan attended, charac¬ 
terizing the agreement as "another practical step in the [two nations'] efforts 
to reduce the risks of conflict." Ih 



EUCOM 


BASING COUNTRIES 


NRRC 

(MOSCOW) 


NOTIFICATIONS 

• 16 HOUR NOTICE 
/ • AIRCRAFT MANIFEST 
1 • TIME OF SITE DECLARATION 

^/•FLIGHT PLAN 


ARMY. NAVY 
& AF OPS 


3 OSIA 

L 


r 

/ 


NMCC 

1 

mmm. 


MAC 

PACOM 

OTHER AGENCIES 1 


"another practical step in 
the (two nations') efforts 
to reduce the risks of 
conflict." 


President Reagan 


Essentially, the NRRC Agreement established communications, not 
crisis management, centers with permanent status. Located in the respective 
capitals, equipped with modern computers and fax machines, staffed with 
communications and language experts, the NRRC facilities were authorized 
for an unlimited duration. 1 


39 




















On-Site Inspection Agency 


At first, the function of the two NRRCs was to communicate notifica¬ 
tions of ballistic missile launches in accordance with a 1971 Agreement on 
Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, the new centers were 
assigned the role of communicating information stemming from the 1972 
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the 
High Seas. However, only three months after the agreement establishing 
the new NRRCs went into effect, the INF Treaty was signed in the White 
House on December 8, 1987. ls 

The INF Treaty’s communications demands were enormous. Article 
XIII. paragraph 2, specified that the parties would use the NRRCs for 
"continuous communications" regarding official treaty matters. Specifi¬ 
cally, these matters included exchanges of data detailed in the INF Treaty 
Memorandum of Understanding; notifications of the arrival time at the point 
of entry for all on-site inspection teams; notifications of INF missile system 
movements and eliminations; notices requesting cooperative measures for 
initiating national technical means of verification; notices of lists of pro¬ 
posed inspectors and aircrews, flight plans, aircrew lists; and clarifications 
necessary under the treaty’s inspection and elimination protocols. 1 ' These 
INF Treaty requirements caused a major increase in the day-to-day treaty- 
related communications between the United States and the Soviet Union. 

Specific formats for the INF Treaty notifications, lists, and messages 
were developed during a series of joint U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty Technical 
Talks held in Washington. Moscow, and Vienna in the spring of 1988. These 
talks focused on the practical requirements for carrying out the on-site 
inspections in accordance with the treaty and its protocols. 20 In April 1988, 
the directors of the Soviet and American NRRCs met in Washington at a 
separate U.S. State Department conference, which produced specific INF 
Treaty message formats and procedures for communicating between the 
two centers. 21 In all, the two parties agreed to use more than three dozen 
official INF Treaty-formatted messages. When the treaty entered into force 
on June 1, 1988, the level of communications activity began at a high pitch. 
It accelerated in July, August, and September, as the United States and the 
Soviet Union began their INF baseline, continuous portal monitoring, 
elimination, and closeout inspections. With the addition of these INF Treaty 
responsibilities, the NRRCs emerged in their first year as significant new 
diplomatic communications centers. 

The U.S. Department of State was assigned responsibility for operat¬ 
ing the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. The first NRRC director, H. 
Allen Holmes, held the rank of assistant secretary of state. He was assisted 
by a staff director, David H. Swartz, an experienced Foreign Service 
Officer, and a deputy staff director. Colonel Harold W. Kowalski, USAF, 
a senior communications officer. They directed the 17-member staff that 
operated the 24-hour-a-day communications center from a seventh-floor 
room in the Main Building, U.S. Department of State. Equipped with 
high-speed computers—two for transmitting, one for receiving, and one in 
reserve—and facsimile machines, the NRRC communicated with its Soviet 
counterpart via satellite. Full texts of messages and graphics could be 
transmitted rapidly. For each tour of duty, the American center was staffed 
with both communications specialists and Russian language experts. 22 


40 



INF Treaty Process 


On the Soviet end of these special govemment-to-government com¬ 
munications links was the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Directed 
by General Major Vladimir I. Medvedev and his deputy. Colonel Nikolay 
B. Shabalin, the Soviet center was located in the Ministry of Defense in 
Moscow. Although its initial mission stemmed from the same Soviet- 
American bilateral agreements governing ballistic missile launches and 
incidents on the high seas as the American NRRC, the INF Treaty altered 
the Soviet NRRC in a fundamental way. According to an interview with 
General Medvedev in Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow) in 1989, the Soviet 
NRRC was the direct result of "new political thinking." He indicated that 
the agreement was prepared and signed "quickly" in late summer 1987. In 
the fall of 1987, Medvedev stated, the Soviet NRRC was assigned respon¬ 
sibility for conducting all official communications for the INF Treaty, then 
in the final stages of negotiations. At the same time, he explained, the Soviet 
center was given the mission of conducting all on-site inspections and 
escorts associated with the treaty. It was a "new and considerable task," he 
indicated, because it meant that the Soviet NRRC would combine in one 
organization the official INF Treaty communications functions with the 
treaty’s inspection and escort functions. "In our view," General Medvedev 
concluded, "this structure is better as far as implementation of the treaty 
tasks is concerned...." 2 ' 



GeneraI Vladimir /. Medvedev, Di¬ 
rector, Soviet NRRC. 


National Technical Means and Treaty Constraints 


The INF Treaty stipulated that each party would recognize and facili¬ 
tate through "cooperative measures" the use of national technical means 
(NTM) of verification. Essentially, these treaty provisions formally recog¬ 
nized the use of reconnaissance satellites and remote sensing equipment as 
national technical means to monitor areas and systems to help make deci¬ 
sions about verification. Verification was the policy process that one nation 
used to judge whether the other nation was complying with an arms control 
treaty or agreement. 24 

The U.S. verification regime for the INF Treaty began with the treaty 
itself. Specific obligations were placed into the language of the treaty, 
making it explicit what constituted compliance in terms of eliminating the 
INF missile systems, closing or converting missile operating bases, con¬ 
ducting on-site inspections, and carrying out collateral constraints. Collat¬ 
eral constraints included restrictions on either party’s using concealment 
measures to impede verification by NTM. These constraints included the 
obligation to cooperate with a request for use of NTM to monitor certain 
non-INF missile bases. No later than six hours after a request, the inspected 
party had to open the roofs of all fixed structures and move the missiles and 
their launchers out of the shelters. 2 " 

Other constraints were written into the treaty. For example, one 
constraint specified a set of obligations restricting the movement of INF 
missiles and launchers from their missile operating bases to elimination 
sites without prior notification. When proper notification had been given 
through the NRRCs, the movement could occur. Treaty language further 
constrained either party from moving or transporting the INF missiles on 
their launchers. This distinction was significant. The SS-20s, SS-23s, 


41 







On-Site Inspection Agency 



Soviet SS-I2 launchers went hy rail from Bischofswerda, East Germany to the Soviet elimination facilities 
at Stan' kovo. The treaty required prior notification before the movement of any missiles, launchers, or 
support equipment. 


SS-12s, SS-4s, Pershing IIs, and BGM-109Gs (GLCM) were mobile missile 
systems in which the missiles were mounted on mobile launch vehicles. By 
separating the two as they were moved from the missile sites to the 
elimination sites, the capability, however remote, for a sudden launch was 
eliminated. 11 

Another collateral constraint specified that during the first three treaty 
years each party would carry out certain "cooperative" measures to enhance 
the use of national technical means of verification. Specifically, these 
measures required the inspected party (in this case the Soviet Union) that 
possessed road-mobile, ground-launched, ballistic missiles with a range 
greater than 5,500 kilometers (and thus not limited by the INF Treaty) to 
open, within six hours of receiving a request, the roofs of all fixed structures, 
and to remove from those structures the missiles and launchers. The missiles 
and launchers had to be displayed in the open without concealment and the 
shelter roofs had to be left open and the missiles and launchers in place for 
up to 6 hours. Each party had the right to make up to six requests for these 
cooperative measures each year. 27 

Essentially, national technical means of verification were used in the 
INF Treaty process to monitor all facets of activity associated with treaty 
compliance. By contrast, INF Treaty on-site inspections were limited to 
monitoring activity within a prescribed area during a specific period of time. 
Both, however, were part and parcel of the monitoring function of the INF 
Treaty. The information that they gathered was one part of the verification 
regime. Analysis, evaluation, and, finally, judgment on treaty compliance 
and verification by national political leaders constituted the other parts. 


42 



INF Treaty Process 



The U.S. notified the Soviet government thirty days in advance of the movement of this GLCM launcher. 
On April 11, 1990, the launcher was loaded onto an Air Force C-5A transport aircraft.The flight went 
from Hahn Air Base, West Germany to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. 


Special Verification Commission 


When the INF Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, so too did 
the Special Verification Commission (SVC). Meeting in Geneva, Switzer¬ 
land, the commission held its first session from June 6, 1988, to July 15, 
1988. Its charter was to resolve questions relating to treaty compliance and 
to agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness 
of the INF Treaty." s Essentially, this charter meant that the Soviet and 
American commission members would address questions relating to treaty 
compliance and develop joint statements, usually referred to as memoranda 
of agreements, on the procedures necessary for carrying out the provisions 
relating to inspections under the treaty. In the first SVC session, the 
commissioners agreed to apply "provisionally" those INF inspection and 
escort procedures relating to equipment and methods that had been devel¬ 
oped before the treaty’s entry into force on June 1, 1988. In the spring of 
1988, U.S. and Soviet delegations had met in Moscow, Washington, and 
Vienna in a series of INF Treaty Technical Talks. One product of those 
technical talks was a set of on-site inspection procedures that the two parties 
agreed would apply "provisionally" until a joint U.S.-USSR memorandum 
of agreement on the inspection/escort provisions could be fully developed 
and signed by the Special Verification Commission."' 


The commission’s procedures and processes were not specifically 
defined in treaty language. Consequently, one of the first items of business, 
concurrent with the development of inspection procedures, was to negotiate 


43 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


a memorandum of understanding for the commission itself. While these 
deliberations were under way in the summer and fall of 1988, Soviet and 
American on-site inspectors were carrying out more than 200 baseline, 
continuous portal monitoring, elimination, and closeout inspections. Seven 
months after the INF Treaty went into effect, on December 20, 1988, the 
U.S. representative to the SVC, Ambassador Steven E. Steiner, and the 
Soviet representative. Ambassador Mikhail N. Strel'tsov, signed the SVC 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

This memorandum reiterated the commission’s two principal pur¬ 
poses as spelled out in the treaty: to resolve compliance issues and to agree 
upon measures for improving the effectiveness of the treaty. SVC commis¬ 
sion membership would consist of a national representative, a deputy 
representative, and other advisors and experts "as necessary." Communica¬ 
tions regarding meeting dates, agenda, and documents would be conveyed 
through the two Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. SVC meetings would be 
held in Geneva, Switzerland, unless both parties agreed to meet elsewhere. 

Once an SVC meeting had been convened, the operating rules were 
relatively straightforward. The senior representatives of the two nations 
would preside over the meeting on an alternating basis. The commission 
could, if appropriate, divide itself into operational working groups consist¬ 
ing of advisors and experts for addressing particular questions. The work 
of the commission was to be conducted in a confidential manner. However, 
documents that recorded the results of the commission would not be 
confidential, unless agreed to by both parties. In the brief history of the INF 
Treaty, the Special Verification Commission's most significant document 
was the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the 
Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty. 

Signed by U.S. Representative Steiner and Soviet Representative 
Strel’tsov on December 21, 1989, this memorandum and its six annexes 
contained detailed agreements between the two parties on inspection noti¬ 
fications; inspection equipment; logistics relating to housing, feeding, and 
transporting of inspectors and equipment; and a variety of other measures. ’ 1 
Procedures for conducting the continuous portal monitoring on-site inspec¬ 
tions at Votkinsk and Magna were reviewed, refined, and codified in this 
new memorandum of agreement. When this SVC document was signed and 
published, it became one of the INF Treaty basic documents. 

These documents included: the INF Treaty; the Memorandum of 
Understanding Establishing a Data Base; the Protocol on Eliminations; and 
the Protocol on Inspections. The Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the 
Implementation of Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty was signed on 
December 21,1989. Subsequently, this MOA has been amended to incorporate 
additional implementation agreements. 


44 




INF Treaty Process 


NOTES: CHAPTER 3 

Jane’s Weapon Systems: 1985-1986 (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, Ltd., 
1986), pp. 9-10. See also: Cochran, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, pp. 209-211. 

"Jonathan Dean, "The INF Treaty Negotiations," S1PR1 Yearbook 1988, pp. 
375-394. See also: Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," Survival 
(May/June: 1983), Vol. XXV, No. 3; Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the 
Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969-87 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990); Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (New York: 
Random House, 1989); Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administra¬ 
tion and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Vintage Books, 1985); 
U.S. Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980), pp., 250-251. 

3 Ibid. See also: Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: 
American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brook¬ 
ings Institution, 1985). 

4 Jane’s Weapons Systems: 1985-1986, p. 44. 

''Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 104-105. 

6 Jane’s Weapons Systems: 1985-1986, pp. 42-43. 

1 INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding and MOU Update. 

8 Talbot, Deadly Gambits, pp. 56-91. See also: Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 
Decision," Survival, Dean, "Negotiations," Yearbook , pp. 375-394. 

4 Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 101-105. See also: Dean, "Negotia¬ 
tions," Yearbook, pp. 375-394. 

l() Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 
pp. 366-399. See also: Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 147-174. 

"Strobe Talbot, "The Road to Zero," Time, December 14, 1987, pp. 18-30. See 
also: Nitze, Hiroshima, pp. 421-462. 

12 AC A, "Germany, US Remove Last Obstacles to INF Agreement," Arms Control 
Today (Washington, D.C.), September 1987, pp. 30-31. See also: Talbot, "Road to 
Zero," Time, pp. 18-30. 

' Tor additional information, see: Barry M. Blechman and Michael Krepon, 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, in the Significant Issues Series (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), Vol. 8, No. 1; Barry M. 
Blechman, ed., "Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach," International 
Security Yearbook (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). 

l4 Barry M. Blechman, "A Minimal Reduction of a Major Risk,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (Chicago: The Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 
April 1988), pp. 44-46. 

I5 U.S. Anns Control and Disarmament Agency, "Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment 
of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers," Arms Control and Disarmament Agree¬ 
ments: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern¬ 
ment Printing Office, 1990), pp. 336-344. 


45 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


'^President Ronald Reagan, as quoted in "Remarks by the President at the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center Signing Ceremony," Press Release (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 15, 1987). 

I7 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Risk Reduction Centers," Disar¬ 
mament Agreements. 

ls Stephen I. Griffiths, "The Implementation of the INF Treaty," in SIPRI Yearbook 
1990: World Armaments and Disarmaments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), pp. 443-458. See also: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Brothers in Arms Control Off to 
a 'Smooth’ Start," Washington Post , September 15, 1988, p. 16; U.S. State 
Department, Fact Sheet : "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center," September 1988; 
Interview with Colonel Harold Kowalski (USAF), US NRRC Staff Director, 
November 30, 1990. 

]9 INF Treaty , Article XIII, Paragraph 2. 

TO 

Reports of Technical Consultations. See also: Washington Times, March 15, 
1988, p. 5; Washington Post , May 13, 1988, p. Al; Schultz, Testimony , pp. 6-9; 
Anns Control Association, Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), July/August 
1988, pp. 22-23. 

2i 

“ Interview, Kowalski. 

11 

“U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: "Risk Reduction." See also: Smith, "Brothers" 

V. Gan, "US Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Described," Pravda , September 15, 
1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet 
Union (Washington, —hereafter, FBIS-SOV) (September 20, 1988), p. 6. 

IT) 

' "Risk Reduction Center Interviewed," Krasnaya Zvezda , August 2, 1989, trans. 
in FBIS-SOV , August 9, 1989, p. 4. The Soviet NRRC had no role in escorting U.S. 
inspectors at Votkinsk. That responsibility fell to the Ministry of Defense Industry. 

" 4 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-11, pp. 
24-25. See also: Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D. Mertz, 
The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms 
Control Verification (Boston: Birkhauser, 1985), pp. 47-66; Kosta Tsipis, David 

W. Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, eds.. Arms Control Verification: The Tech¬ 
nologies That Made It Possible (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986). 

2"S j 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. See also: U.S. Senate, Treaty 
Document 100-11. 

J fNF Treaty, Article VIII, Paragraph 8. 

27 Ibid„ Article XII. 

" X Ibid., Article XIII. 

?9 

Ibid. See also: Arms Control Disarmament Agency, "Special Verification Session 
Ends," Press Release, July 15, 1988. 

30 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Regarding the Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commis¬ 
sion, December 20, 1988. 

31 Memorandum of Agreement on the Implementation of the Verification Provi¬ 
sions of the INF Treaty, December 21, 1989. 


46 



CHAPTER 4 


INF BASELINE INSPECTIONS 



Jp 


Following an inspection ofSS-23 missiles at Saryozek, USSR, Commander John C. Williams, U.S. Navyjr) the American team 
leader, shakes hands with Nikolai Golovatsky, a Soviet observer. 


P resident Reagan stood next to General Secretary Gorbachev in 
the Kremlin on June 1, 1988. As the two leaders exchanged the 
INF Treaty and the instruments of ratification. President Reagan made a 
brief formal statement. Setting the treaty into the context of recent Soviet- 
American relations, he praised the negotiators and concluded, "These are 
historic moments. As we exchange these documents, and the instruments 


47 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


of ratification, this treaty—the terms of which we formally agreed to last 
December in Washington—enters into force." 1 

On that day, all parts of the INF Treaty entered into force. They 
included the treaty (preamble and 17 articles), Protocol on Eliminations, 
Protocol on Inspections, the Special Verification Commission, the require¬ 
ment to communicate through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the 
requirement to establish a treaty data base using the Memorandum ot 
Understanding (MOU). : This memorandum became immediately the focus 
of attention. It was the starting point for critical treaty data on the INF missile 
systems (numbers and types of INF missiles and support equipment at each 
site, technical specifications, photographs of each type of missile and 
support equipment, and geographical coordinates for each site) that had to 
be exchanged before any inspections could be conducted. 

On June 1, the United States and the Soviet Union provided a revised 
and updated MOU, listing deployed and nondeployed missiles, launchers, 
support equipment, and missile structures.' It described the location of these 
treaty items according to degrees, minutes, and seconds of longitude and 
latitude. It listed the mutually agreed upon technical characteristics for each 
missile system, including number of warheads per missile, length of first 
and second stages, diameter by stages, weight by missile stage, and weight 
by canister. Other MOU technical data described missile launchers, launch 
canisters, support equipment, and support structures. 

Finally, the updated MOU contained corrected site diagrams, outlin¬ 
ing the perimeter of the areas subject to on-site inspection. In this memo¬ 
randum the United States certified it had 2,332 treaty-limited items, 
including 846 missiles and 289 launchers, located at 31 current and former 
INF missile sites and missile-related facilities. The Soviet Union declared 
it had 5,439 treaty-limited items, including 1,846 intermediate- and shorter- 
range INF missiles and 825 launchers, located at 130 INF missile sites. 


INF Baseline Inspections Defined 


The first INF Treaty on-site inspections, called baseline inspections, 
had to be conducted between 30 and 90 days after the treaty entered into 
force. Both the United States and the Soviet Union initiated baseline 
inspections on July 1, 1988, and completed them by August 29. Every INF 
missile site and missile-related facility authorized by the treaty was inspected. 

The function of the baseline inspections was "to verify the numbers 
of missiles, launchers, support structures and equipment, and other data, as 
of the date of entry into force of this Treaty." 4 Physical observation by the 
on-site inspectors had to confirm or, if necessary, correct the data published 
in the MOU. According to the treaty’s Protocol on Inspections, the inspect¬ 
ing party had the right to "inspect the entire inspection site, including the 
interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, 
whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in 
Section VI (Technical Data) of the Memorandum of Understanding...." 
Those dimensions described the length, diameter, and weight of the missiles 


48 






INF Baseline Inspections 


and stages; as well as those of launchers and support equipment for the INF 
missile systems. 

From an operational viewpoint, this concept of implementing the 
treaty with baseline inspections had several implications. First, it meant that 
the most intensive period of on-site inspection operations during the entire 
treaty would be during the first 90 days. American inspection teams had to 
be ready to go to two or three sites a week for eight consecutive weeks in 
order to inspect all 130 Soviet sites. Soviet teams would have to inspect all 
31 U.S. INF missile sites and facilities during the same period. Escorting 
teams had to be prepared to conduct the inspection teams to each and every 
INF site. Transportation, specifically military airlift, had to be ready for a 
maximum effort in the initial 90 treaty days. Communications centers also 
would be operating at peak effort. Assimilating information about the on-site 
inspections would be particularly intense. Thus, from both an operational and 
a logistical point of view, the baseline inspections were critical. 



The ISO Soviet INF sites included missile main operating bases, deployment areas, and launcher production facilities, 
missile and launcher storage facilities, repair facilities, test ranges, training sites, and elimination facilities. U.S.on-site inspectors 
went to all of these sites and conducted baseline inspections in July - August 1988. 


Both the Soviet and American military services had committed 
considerable time, money, and people to preparing each and every site for 
a baseline inspection. The Soviets conducted mock inspections to train 
inspectors and escorts. At many Soviet missile sites, temporary living 
quarters were rehabilitated in preparation for American inspectors. At six 
Soviet elimination sites new facilities were constructed for the American 
inspection teams. At U.S. military bases in Europe and the United States, 
special sections of temporary housing quarters were set aside for the Soviet 
inspection teams: 


49 













On-Site Inspection Agency 


First American Inspections 


On July 1, 1988, exactly 30 days after Reagan and Gorbachev had 
exchanged the instruments of ratification. American and Soviet inspection 
teams boarded aircraft and flew to designated points of entry to begin the 
INF Treaty's first baseline inspections. The treaty specified that each nation 
could have only 200 INF inspectors on an approved list at any one time. 
Two other lists contained the names of 200 INF portal monitoring inspectors 
and 200 aircrew members. These lists had to be exchanged "no later than 
one day after entry into force of the Treaty.”' 1 

The treaty further specified that each inspection team could have no 
more than 10 members. To carry out the U.S. baseline inspections. OSIA 
had selected, organized, and trained 20 inspection teams. In late June, eight 
of these teams flew from Washington to the agency's gateway field office 
in Frankfurt, while another four teams went to Yokota Air Base, the site of 




The first American inspectors under the 
INF Treaty began their flight to the Mos¬ 
cow point of entry from Frankfurt, West 
Germany. General Lajoie, with the mem¬ 
bers of the first teams standing on the 
runway, speaks to the press. July 1.1988. 



the agency’s gateway field office in Japan. The remaining teams would be 
deployed later during the 60-day baseline period. 


General Lajoie was a member of the first American team to conduct 
an INF on-site inspection in the Soviet Union." Led by Lt. Colonel Lawrence 
G. Kelley, USMC, the team consisted of the team chief, deputy, linguists, 
missile operations specialists, and other specialists skilled in specific areas 
of operations. In the weeks leading up to the initial baseline inspections. 
General Lajoie remembers speaking to team chiefs, field office escort 
officers, linguists, noncommissioned officers, team members, and head¬ 
quarters staff. "I gave a lot of briefings and I tried to establish a tone, [but] 


50 









INF Baseline Inspections 


I had trouble finding the words." He stressed that American inspectors and 
escorts had to be professional and businesslike. "They represented the U.S. 
government; I wanted them to be polite, but I wanted them to be firm and 
follow their plan." 4 Lajoie emphasized that the on-site inspection mission 
was not a clash between two conflicting world systems; rather, it was a 
limited, specific job, carefully defined within a single treaty. 



American inspectors began their inspection by counting and examining the missiles to see if they matched the number and type 
specified in the NRRC notification. This inspection was ofSS-23 missiles at Saryozek, USSR. 


Colonel Kelley’s team flew from Frankfurt to Moscow on July 1, 
1988."’ They followed the procedures outlined in the treaty’s Protocol on 
Inspections. Sixteen hours before the team’s anticipated arrival at the point 
of entry (Moscow), the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Washington 
sent a message to the Soviet NRRC, giving the date and time of the team’s 
arrival, names of team members and aircrew, and the date and time when 
the team chief would specify which INF site would be inspected. Colonel 
Kelley’s team arrived at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport on 
the morning of July 1. 

They were met by a Soviet INF Treaty escort team. Also present at 
the team’s arrival were OSIA officials attached to the American embassy 
in Moscow. Their function was to serve as a diplomatic aircrew escort. For 
the inspection team, the treaty’s inspection protocol stipulated that the 
movement of inspectors and aircrews "shall be at the discretion" of the 
in-country escorts." This meant that Kelley’s team and all subsequent 
American inspection teams would be escorted continuously while they were 
in the Soviet Union. Passage through customs, transportation, hotel accom¬ 
modations, meals, and the on-site inspection itself would be done under 
Soviet escort. 


51 














On-Site Inspection Agency 


The process began at the airport, where Colonel Kelley and the team 
were met by Colonel Ivan Y. Abrosimov, the Soviet escort leader, and his 
team members. Representing the agency in Moscow were Lt. Colonel Ken 
Keating, U.S. Army, Eileen Malloy, U.S. State Department, and Sergeant 
First Class John Steinmetz, U S. Army. They met the American inspection 
team at the airport, and along with the Soviet escort team, they accompanied 
the aircrew to customs, and then to their overnight accommodations in 
Moscow. After a treaty-specified four-hour minimum period, Kelley de¬ 
clared the American inspection team’s intention to inspect the Soviet SS-20 
missile operating base at Rechitsa in Byelorussia. From the time of that 
declaration, the Soviet Union had nine hours to get the U.S. inspection team 
to the site. 

The Soviets met the treaty deadline. The U.S. inspectors and their 
Soviet escorts Hew from Moscow to Byelorussia and then were taken by 
bus to the SS-20 missile base. When Kelley’s team arrived at the site, they 
proceeded immediately to a pre-inspection briefing by the Soviet missile 
site commander. Required by the treaty, this briefing ran approximately an 
hour and included a presentation of a site diagram describing the location 
of the missiles, stages, launchers, support equipment, and support struc¬ 
tures. The diagram also included data on the exact number of treaty items. 
At this time, the American inspectors were provided with information on 
safety and potential hazards at the site. Following this briefing, Kelley and 
his team commenced their baseline inspection at 0001 hours GMT (0401 
local), July 2. They made a thorough inspection of the entire site, escorted 
throughout by Soviet INF officials knowledgeable about the treaty. The 
inspecting party had the treaty right of conducting a 24-hour inspection; 



During the baseline inspection period (July - August 1988), Colonel Kelley and his team conducted many 
inspections. Here the American inspectors together with their Soviet escorts assembled in front of a 134 
tank at Vyru, an SS-4 missile operating base in Estonia. 


52 



INF Baseline Inspections 


however, approximately eight hours after the inspection began, Kelley declared 
it completed. Assisted by the linguists and other inspectors. Colonel Kelley 
prepared the treaty inspection report in English and Russian. 12 

According to the INF Treaty’s Protocol on Inspections (Article 11, 
Paragraph 1), the inspection report had to be "factual" and had to record the 
type of inspection, name of the inspection site, number of missiles, stages 
of missiles, and the number of launchers and support equipment at the site. 
Essentially, the inspection report certified what treaty-limited items had 
been observed and counted during the inspection. At a brief concluding 
ceremony held at the missile site, Kelley and Abrosimov signed two copies 
of the inspection report, one for each party. Following this ceremony, the 
American inspection and Soviet escort teams departed promptly, returning 
to Moscow the same day. From Moscow, the American team returned to 
Frankfurt, where preparations were undertaken for conducting another 
baseline inspection mission in a few days. General Fajoie left the team, 
returning to Washington for a series of briefings and press conferences on 
the treaty and the on-site inspections. Colonel Kelley and the other team 
members remained in Frankfurt. 



During baseline, the first SS-20 elimination took place at Kapustin Yar. Here, a group of Soviet escorts 
and a single American inspector. General Lajoie, (fifth from left) paused for a photograph in front of a 
SS-20 missile canister. 


Throughout the summer of 1988 all of the American INF teams 
conducting baseline inspections followed similar procedures and processes, 
although inspecting some of the larger Soviet sites required considerably 
more of the 24-hour time period. By July 5, 10 American teams had 
deployed and were carrying out baseline inspections of Soviet INF sites. 
These teams flew from Frankfurt to Moscow or from Yokota Air Base to 
Ulan-Ude. By July 10, the initial teams had returned, received new briefings 
and redeployed to the USSR. By July 22, another 14 baseline inspections 
were under way. During this intense period continuous portal monitoring 


53 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


inspections were begun, along with two other types of INF inspections: 
eliminations and closeouts. 

The first Soviet INF missile eliminations began on July 22 at Kapustin 
Yar. An American inspection team monitored this elimination, as they did 
all subsequent scheduled eliminations. The treaty also granted the inspect¬ 
ing party the right to conduct closeout inspections of INF missile bases and 
facilities that had been declared to no longer have any INF missile systems 
or INF related activities. During the eight-week baseline period, American 
inspection teams conducted 16 closeout inspections.* By the end of July 1988, 
four of the five types of on-site inspections were under way: baseline, continu¬ 
ous portal monitoring, elimination, and closeout. In July and August, there were 
so many U.S. inspections of Soviet INF sites that the U.S. Air Force had Bights 
into and out of Moscow every day and flights every other day to and from 
Ulan-Ude. It was an intense, exciting time; it set the tone for all subsequent 
treaty on-site inspections. 

In the summer of 1988, the international media contributed to the 
excitement. In the United States, Soviet Union, and Europe, journalists and 
television reporters focused on the INF Treaty and the men and women 
involved in the new on-site inspections. They interviewed team chiefs, 
inspectors, and senior escorts at the aiiports, in the cities, and, on occasion, 
at the sites. Colonel Kelley, for instance, was approached by a TASS reporter 
and asked about his experience in leading the first American on-site inspec¬ 
tion. Speaking in fluent Russian, Kelley remarked, "It is clear to us that the 
Soviet side is interested in facilitating our inspections. Excellent conditions 
were created for our work and we are quite satisfied." 13 This interview was 
conducted on July 7 at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Aiiport. 



During the baseline inspection period (July - August 1988), the media observed the first eliminations of 
missiles. On August 1, 1988, dozens of Soviet and international media were at the Saryozek Elimination 
Facility where they were briefed by a Soviet officer on the SS-12 missile elimination process. 


The treaty stipulated that during the baseline period, that baseline 
inspections would constitute closeout inspections. 


54 








INF Baseline Inspections 


Kelley's team had just arrived from Frankfurt for another inspection. 
Reflecting on the first inspection a week earlier, he said, "Your officers have 
produced a positive impression on me—they are capable commanding 
officers who have good knowledge of the provisions of the treaty. They are 
also very hospitable." 14 

During the 60-day baseline period, the pace of inspecting and escort¬ 
ing was brisk, intense, and continuous. Twenty American on-site inspection 
teams had been organized and trained; these teams conducted the INF 
inspections in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The 
following U.S. military officers served as team chiefs: 


U.S. INF On-Site Inspection Team Leaders 

July 1-August 29,1988 

Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Edward H. Cabaniss 

U.S. Armv 

Lt. Colonel Terry C. Corneil 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Andrew F. Gothreau 

U.S. Armv 

Lt. Colonel Douglas C. Guiler 

U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Michael J. Hritsik 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Lt. Colonel Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 

U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel John R. Lohmann 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Robert B. McConnell 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Paul H. Nelson 

U.S. Army 

Captain David E. Olson 

U.S. Navv 

Colonel Arthur J. Parr 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Carl W. Reddel 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Kenneth A. Rogers 

U.S. Air Force 

Major Bruce D. Slawter 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Nicholas Troyan 

U.S. Army 

Commander John C. Williams 

U.S. Navy 

Colonel Nils L. Wurzburger 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Thomas G. Wyckoff 

U.S. Army 


Soviet Baseline Inspections 


At 7 P.M. on July 1, 1988, a Soviet IL-62 Aeroflot jet arrived at Travis 
Air Force Base, California, with 72 Soviet on-site inspectors and 10 aircrew 
members on board. 1 " Colonel Vyacheslav Lebedev, the senior Soviet in¬ 
spector, spoke with American reporters: "The Treaty creates a relatively 
new atmosphere of trust between our two nations." 1 '' Colonel Thomas E. 
Smalls, U.S. Army, head of OSIA’s San Francisco field office, led the 
American escort teams that met and accompanied the Soviet inspectors 
throughout these initial baseline inspections. Also on hand to meet the 


55 









On-Site Inspection Agency 


Soviet inspectors was Boris Vasev, an official from the Soviet consulate 
general in San Francisco. 

The 72 Soviets included a 22-person inspection team that would be 
establishing the Soviet Union’s continuous portal monitoring inspection 
activity at Magna, Utah, site of the Hercules Plant No. 1. The other 50 
Soviet inspectors were divided into five 10-man inspection teams. They 
would conduct baseline inspections of U.S. INF missile sites and facilities 
in the western United States. 

For their initial baseline inspections, the Soviets selected a former INF 
launcher production facility, two INF training sites, a missile storage depot, 
and a testing ground. They inspected Air Force Plant 19 in San Diego; a 
training site at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona; another at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona; a missile storage depot at Dugway Proving Ground, 
Utah; and the testing ground at Pueblo Army Depot in Colorado. The 
Soviets followed the notification procedures and timelines outlined in the 
treaty. At the conclusion of each inspection, the Soviet team chief prepared 
the required report. Signed by the senior Soviet inspector and American 
escort, the factual treaty report detailed the results of the inspection. Two 
copies were made; each team retained a copy for the record. Twenty-four 
hours after the inspections began, the five Soviet inspection teams had 
returned to Travis Air Force Base and were preparing to depart for the Soviet 
Union." On July 4,1988, Soviet inspectors made their first baseline inspec¬ 
tions in Europe, at a ground-launched cruise missile site at Wueschheim, 
West Germany, and a Pershing II missile installation at Schwaebisch 
Gmuend, West Germany. 



On July l, 1988, the first day of the baseline inspections, 72 Soviet inspectors (6 teams) arrived at Travis 
Air Force Base, California. This base was the western point of entry for all Soviet INF inspectors entering 
the United States. All inspection team members wore civilian clothes and distinctive badges upon arrival. 


56 




INF Baseline Inspections 


General Major Vladimir I. Medvedev was chief of the USSR’s Nu¬ 
clear Risk Reduction Center, the Soviet Union’s INF on-site inspection 
agency. A senior officer with experience on the Soviet General Staff, 
General Medvedev had been actively involved in treaty negotiations, work¬ 
ing with the Soviet group in Geneva that prepared the final treaty docu¬ 
ments. When General Medvedev was interviewed by Krasnaya Zvezda , the 
Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper, he described the type of person 
selected as a Soviet INF inspector and what the job entailed: 

"First and foremost they are highly skilled specialists, mainly mis¬ 
silemen, with long service and life experiences.... They are mainly senior 
officers. But there are young people too — translators.... And the average 
age of the center's personnel is a little over 40.... Fie [the Soviet INF 
inspector/escort] strictly abides by the provisions of the treaty and the 
protocol on inspections—they lay down the rights, duties, and procedures. 
The inspector arrives at the point of entry into the country...where he is met 
by the U.S. officials who will accompany him. The inspector can stay, as a 
rule, no more than 24 hours. During that time he has to announce the site 
of the inspection—it is not announced in advance. Then the hosts have no 
more than 9 hours to get him to the requisite site. The inspection lasts for 
up to 24 hours. The inspector checks whether the facility has the number 
of weapons it is supposed to have and makes a report. It is unusual work, 
and there is a great deal of interest in it." 2 ' 

On the last day of July 1988, General Lajoie was in Ulan-Ude with 
two American inspection teams. Ulan-Ude, 3,430 miles east of Moscow, 
was the point of entry for American teams arriving in the eastern Soviet 
Union. Lajoie had been a member of the first American inspection team in 
the Soviet Union on July 1, 1988. Now, nearly a month later, he was in this 
eastern Siberian city enroute to another inspection. At the airport, he 
discussed the status of the INF treaty with Soviet reporters: "All the initial 
inspections have gone very well. On our side, we have completed about 50 
inspections of Soviet bases in the USSR, the GDR [East Germany] and the 
CSSR [Czechoslovakia]. Your inspectors have not been wasting time either. 
They have carried out 13 inspections in the United States and at U.S. bases 
in Western Europe." Lajoie complimented the Soviets on their organization 
and reception of U.S. inspection teams. ” 



Leaders of the Soviet Union’s inspec¬ 
torate, Colonel Shabalin and General 
Medvedev. 


Two weeks later, on August 18, Colonel Shabalin, deputy director of 
the NRRC center, spoke with TASS reporters about the reciprocal nature of 
the INF inspections. Shabalin said that the American inspection teams had 
conducted 108 on-site inspections of Soviet INF sites in the first six weeks. 
Soviet teams, he continued, had checked 26 of the 31 INF sites in Western 
Europe and the United States. In addition, by mid-August, he stated, the 
United States had four teams of on-site inspectors observing INF missile 
eliminations—in Saryozek,Stan’kovo,Samy, and Lesnaya—and one group 
of resident inspectors conducting portal monitoring inspections in Votkinsk. 
This unprecedented, intense activity had produced, he believed, good work¬ 
ing relations. Looking to the future. Colonel Shabalin concluded, "The 
acquired experience of the [ INF] inspections proved their high effectiveness 
as a means of control. It could be used in the future for control over strategic 
offensive armaments."” 3 


57 




On-Site Inspection Agency 



An American escort officer assists a 
Soviet inspector in a measurement at 
RAF Molesworth, Great Britian. 


Escorting the Soviet inspectors were teams of American officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and civilian officials. In the spring of 1988, 
OSIA selected and trained escort teams. They participated in the mock 
training exercises in April and May. Led by senior military officers, the 
teams were assigned to one of the field offices—San Francisco, Washing¬ 
ton, or Frankfurt. 4 Each team consisted of a team chief, deputy, linguists, 
missile specialists, and other specialists. During the period of the INF baseline 
inspections, the following officers served as U.S. INF escort team chiefs: 


U.S. INF On-Site Escort Team Leaders 

July 1-August 29, 1988 

Lt. Colonel Stephen B. Boyd 

U.S. Air Force 

Colonel John Fer 

U.S. Air Force 

Colonel Ronald P. Forest 

U.S. Army 

Captain Albert G. Graham 

U.S. Navy 

Lt. Colonel James E. Kealey 

U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Scott G. Lang 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Thomas E. Smalls 

U.S. Army 

Colonel Gerald V. West 

U.S. Air Force 

Lt. Colonel Claesen D. Wyckoff 

U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Robert Yablonski 

U.S. Air Force 


The 60-Day Record 


For 60 days American and Soviet teams conducted baseline inspec¬ 
tions, setting precedents, and establishing a tone for future inspections. The 
record is impressive. U.S. teams went to 79 Soviet INF missile operating 
bases, 19 missile and launcher storage facilities, 6 training facilities, 2 test 
ranges, 12 repair facilities, 3 production facilities, and 8 elimination facili¬ 
ties in those 60 days. They conducted 114 inspections covering 129 Soviet 
INF sites in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. There 
was no baseline inspection at Votkinsk. At Votkinsk,U.S. portal mon¬ 
itoring inspectors took up their posts during the baseline period; in July they 
began continuous portal monitoring of the Soviet missile final assembly 
plant. Soviet on-site inspectors went to 21 U.S. missile sites and missile-re¬ 
lated facilities and conducted 31 baseline inspections. 2 " The Soviet inspec¬ 
tors established their portal monitoring team at Magna, Utah, in early July. 
During the baseline period, American and Soviet on-site inspectors ob¬ 
served and recorded a total of 7,681 treaty-limited items listed in the official 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

Another part of the record established during the baseline period was 
the verification of the technical data in the MOU. These data established 
the standard length, diameter, height, and weight for INF missiles, launch¬ 
ers, and associated equipment. It was important data; both inspecting and 
inspected parties needed to have standard technical references for the 
missile systems to distinguish treaty items from nontreaty items and nonin- 
spectable storage areas. 


58 









INF Baseline Inspections 



AN AMERICAN MILITARY LINGUIST 

Lieutenant Tamara Suwalow McKenna, U.S. Coast Guard, was an 
American military linguist during the first two years of the INF Treaty. 

Educated at the U.S.Coast Guard Academy and holding an advanced degree 
from George Mason University, Lt. McKenna served as a linguist on Ameri¬ 
can inspection teams conducting on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. In 
two years she participated in 34 inspections. 

On the initial inspections: "I was very apprehensive, even though 
l had participated in two mock inspections in the United States, I knew it 
would he much different in the Soviet Union. I thought that the translating 
would he very difficult. / was very worried there would he times that l 
didn't know the terminology ... I didn tfeel very confident. Our team was 
the third team to go into the Soviet Union (July 1988). We really didn't 
know what had happened with the first two teams that had gone in. We 

went to an INF training facility, to Serpukhov, which was just outside of U .Tamara Suwalow McKenna U.S. 
Moscow. Coast Guard, receives a promotion 

from General Lajoie. 

"1 thought they treated us very well. I was expecting it to he much 
more formal. I was really surprised at the way the Soviets went out of their way to show us everything and to 
satisfy us that they were complying with the treaty. They were definitely prepared and everyone knew an 
important event was taking place. They wanted to make sure that things went well, especially in the beginning 
they paid attention to the small details, and made sure that no mistakes occurred." 

On linguistic preparations: "It turned out to he adequate. It turned out that there weren' t quite as many 
technological terms as I thought there would he. Our relations with the Soviet interpreters were very good." 

On the pace of the initial inspections: "There was a time when everyone would get tired. In the 
beginning there was a lot of adrenaline, and even if you did have a long day, it might not affect you that much. 
But towards the end of baseline, teams would get tired. Because people might he away from home for two 
or three months, it could he very difficult. " 

On the difficult aspects of inspections: "[There were several]... a large area, had weather, many things 
to look at, difficult travel to the site. You knew you would always he waiting. The inspectors became very 
patient people. You just had to learn how to sit in an airport and read or do something, knowing that eventually 
you'll leave, hut also knowing that you really had no control of when you would go. It was tiring travelling 
on the busses. The weather was very hot [July 1988], it was very dusty." 

On being an American woman in the Soviet Union: "First, let me say something about the Soviet women. 
I was amazed at how poorly they were treated.. They have very difficult lives. They do all of the hard work. 
They work on the railroads and the little old ladies sweep the streets. I remember during the first inspection, 
my Soviet escorts asked me, 'Why are you doing this? This is a man's job, it's not a job for women.' They 
were just saying, women weren't meant for military work. Soviet women have some of the hardest jobs, and 
yet these Soviet men were telling me that women were fragile flowers that shouldn’t do difficult work." 

On Soviet attitudes towards destroying modern weapons: "We discussed it with them. A lot of them 
said, well this is the way it has to he because of the treaty, and it’s for the good of man. Others were sad. It 
was equipment that they were taking care of for such a long time, and after being so painstakingly careful, 
they had to destroy it. From my perspective, they were very professional. We talked about the INF Treaty. 
I never felt that any of the Soviet soldiers or officers thought that the treaty was a bad decision. They all 
supported it; they thought it would bring about peace." 


Source: Interview, September 


1990 


59 




















On-Site Inspection Agency 


To verify the technical data, one American and one Soviet team went 
to the elimination sites and took measurements of the INF missiles and 
systems. Their measurements were independent of the treaty’s Memoran¬ 
dum of Understanding technical data. During the technical talks that were 
held in the spring of 1988, the issue arose; it was resolved during the meeting 
between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze in Geneva on May 11-12, 
1988. Subsequently a joint statement, called an agreed minute, became part 
of the treaty itself, and it authorized one American and one Soviet inspection 
team to travel to the designated elimination sites and verify for each INF 
missile system the technical characteristics listed in the official MOU." 

Another part of the diplomatic note specified which stages and equip¬ 
ment of the U.S. and Soviet missile systems would be used officially as the 
smallest inspectable treaty items. The dimensions of these items, which 
were critical to all on-site inspections, were published in the June 1, 1988, 

27 

Memorandum of Understanding Data Update." 



This American inspection team at Saryozek . USSR, examined these SS-12 missiles. In conducting their 
inspection, the inspectors used the standard measurements recorded by Commander John C. Williams 
and his team. 


For the United States, U.S. Navy Commander John C. Williams led a 
team of INF specialists to six Soviet elimination sites—Sarny, Stan’kovo, 
Lesnaya, Kapustin Yar, Saryozek, and Jelgava—where they selected ran¬ 
domly from each Soviet INF missile group one missile, one launcher, and 
one item of associated equipment to measure. During these special inspec¬ 
tions, they measured the length, width, height, and weight of the SS-20, 
SS-4, SS-5, SSC-X-4, SS-12, and SS-23 missiles. For the same missile 
systems they also measured the dimensions of the missile launchers, canis¬ 
ters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, and 
designated support structures. These measurements became the standard for 
all American INF inspection teams. During the same period, the Soviet 
Union’s technical data inspection team took measurements of the Pershing 
II, Pershing IA and IB, and BGM-109G missiles, launchers, associated 
equipment, and structures. These measurements became the standard for all 
Soviet INF inspections. 


60 






INF Baseline Inspections 


Critical Logistical Infrastructure 


To complete the INF Treaty baseline inspection record that far ex¬ 
ceeded in number and scope the on-site inspections used to monitor any 
other recent arms control treaty or agreement, the U.S. government relied 
on the Air Force to transport American and Soviet inspection and escort 
teams. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) used dedicated aircraft to fly 
American inspection teams to the treaty-designated points of entry in the 
Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The Air Force also 
transported Soviet inspectors and American escort teams from points of 
entry in the United States and Europe to declared INF missile operating 
bases and facilities. :s 

The flights to and from the Soviet Union were the most frequent and 
challenging. Because of the short time period for completing the baseline 
inspections (60 days), the number of Soviet sites (130), and a simultaneous 
requirement to establish a U.S. portal inspection team in Votkinsk, the Air 
Force flew transport flights almost daily to and from the Soviet Union. 
Beginning on July 1, 1988, there were 54 missions in 60 days from Frankfurt 
to Moscow and 31 missions from Yokota to Ulan-Ude. The Air Force also 
flew Soviet inspection teams and their American escorts to INF bases and 
missile sites in the United States and Europe. At OSIA headquarters, Lt. 
Colonel Gerald Heuer, USAF, and Master Sergeant Wilbur Lewis, Jr., 
US AF, provided the expertise to initiate, coordinate, and track these military 
flights. At the culmination of the baseline inspections, the Military Airlift 
Command had flown 185 INF teams on 114 baseline inspection missions, with 
a reliability rate of 98.1 percent. This rate meant that only five flights could not 
be flown as scheduled. The United States met all of its treaty obligations to 
transport Soviet teams within mandated timeframes. The performance record 
also established precedents for future arms control treaties."'’ 


In Washington, a Soviet team departs for 
an inspection at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. 



61 






On-Site Inspection Agency 


Another important precedent set during the INF baseline period was 
the establishment of small offices in U.S. and Soviet embassies to assist INF 
inspection teams and aircrews. In the U.S. embassy in Moscow, the office 
was called the Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU). 30 This unit 
supported three arms control treaties and agreements: the 1986 Stockholm 
CDE Agreement, the 1987 INF Treaty, and the 1988 U.S./USSR Joint 
Verification Experiments on Underground Nuclear Explosions. For imple¬ 
mentation of these agreements, treaties, and technical experiments, this new 
embassy office served as the point of contact with the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and other Soviet 
government agencies. 

Under the INF Treaty the office had another significant function. The 
treaty's Protocol on Inspections stipulated that the inspectors "shall have 
the right through the period of inspection to be in communication with the 
embassy of the inspecting party...."' 1 During the technical talks, this treaty 
provision was determined to mean communicating by telephone. When the 
baseline inspections were underway in July and August 1988, several U.S. 
inspection teams were in the Soviet Union simultaneously. Each had the 
right to communicate by telephone with the U.S. embassy. Other provisions 
in the treaty’s Protocol on Inspections permitted embassy officials to meet 
and assist INF aircrews and inspection teams upon their arrival at the point 
of entry. This assistance was especially important during and after baseline 
to provide logistical support to the American and Soviet portal monitoring 
teams establishing operations in Votkinsk and Magna. 


In June 1988, the U.S. State Department activated the ACIU in the 
U.S. embassy in Moscow and a subunit in Ulan-Ude. In Moscow, the ACIU 
staff consisted of Lt. Colonel Ken Keating, U.S. Army; Eileen A. Malloy, 



In Moscow \ an American team departs for Frankfurt, West Germany. 


62 




INF Baseline Inspections 


State Department; Major Stephen E. Freeman. U.S. Army; and Sergeant 
First Class John M. Steinmetz, U.S. Army. In Ulan-Ude, Captain James 
Connell, U.S. Navy Reserve, and later John Floyd, U.S. Navy, and his wife, 
Jane, U.S. State Department, established a small office and residence in a 
city hotel and assisted American INF teams inspecting in that sector.' ; The 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs established similar arms control imple¬ 
mentation units for Soviet INF inspectors in the Soviet embassy in Wash¬ 
ington and the consulate general in San Francisco. 

A third aspect of this critical logistical infrastructure was the people 
who were deployed from OSIA headquarters in Washington to work at the 
agency's gateway field offices in Frankfurt and Yokota. In the final week 
of June 1988, Ft. Colonel Jerome E. Johnson, USAF, went from Washing¬ 
ton to Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt. Working with Colonel John Fer, 
USAF; Lt. Colonel Scott G. Lang, U.S. Army; and the staff of the European 
field office over the next two months, he assisted arriving and departing 
American inspection teams that carried out all of the INF baseline inspec¬ 
tions in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. At Yokota, 
Captain Michael W. Slifka, USAF, helped the American teams deploying 
to conduct baseline inspections in the eastern Soviet Union. Thirty-six teams 
went from Yokota to Ulan-Ude in July and August. In fact, during baseline 
so many agency people participated directly as inspectors, escorts, or as 
operational and logistical staff that headquarters was nearly empty. At 
times, fewer than 15 of the 120 people assigned to OSIA were in Washing¬ 
ton. It was, without question, the busiest phase of the INF Treaty. 


Evaluation 


The record of the first 90 days of the INF treaty was extensively 
evaluated. Public interest was at a peak as Soviet, American, and European 
television and print media covered the treaty and the initial on-site inspec¬ 
tions. The news bureaus of the major television networks—ABC, NBC, 
CBS, CNN, PBS, the BBC, and Soviet television—ran feature stories on 
the INF Treaty during the Moscow Summit of June 1988 and the first 
baseline inspections in July 1988. National, local, and foreign press—in¬ 
cluding the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, Chris¬ 
tian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, London Times, Pravcla, Time, 
Newsweek, and the world press—reported on the treaty and the initial 
inspections. For nearly six weeks—from early June to mid-July—the inter¬ 
national media fixed their attention on the INF Treaty and the first groups 
of Soviet and American inspectors and escorts. Their evaluations, which 
formed an important part of the public’s perception, focused to a large 
degree on the historical precedents of the treaty and the role of the on-site 
inspectors who were examining treaty missiles and equipment scheduled 
for destruction.'' 

Three weeks after the baseline phase ended on August 30, General 
Lajoie discussed these precedent-setting inspections in a lengthy interview. 
He explained the inspection process, related some of the American inspec¬ 
tors’ experiences, and summarized his thoughts up to that point: 



Soviet Major Igor Kirichenko and 
American Lt. Colonel Vitali Mostovoj 
at Saryozek, USSR. 


63 





On-Site Inspection Agency 


On-site inspection has limits; we can go to specific sites in search of 
specific information and return with more confidence than before concern¬ 
ing compliance at that particular site. But it’s not an anytime/anywhere 
regime, certainly not for INF.... On-site inspection under the INF Treaty 
has given the U.S. government increased confidence. We now have more 
knowledge about Soviet forces, and with that knowledge comes perhaps a 
somewhat better understanding and maybe eventually more predictability 
in our relationship. It's still early in the game, but I think on-site inspection 
has a very positive role to play in arms control . 34 



At the conclusion of every INF Treaty on-site inspection, the respective team leaders, in this case Colonel 
Gerald V. West, senior escort, and Colonel Vladimir A. Akimenkov, co-signed the official inspection 
report. This report detailed the time, place, treaty article and paragraph, inspection activity, and any 
comments concerning the inspection. 


64 













NOTES: CHAPTER 4 


1 President Ronald Reagan, "Remarks Made at the Exchange of Ratification Instru¬ 
ments for the INF Treaty,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Wash¬ 
ington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, June 6, 1988), Vol, 24, pp. 715-717. 

2 

~INF Treat}', Protocol on Eliminations, Protocol on Inspections, and Memoran¬ 
dum of Understanding, June 1, 1988. 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding Data Update, June 1, 1988. 

4 /NF Treaty, Article 11, Paragraph 3. 

Interview with Lajoie, "Insights," Arms Control Today, pp. 4-6. See also: Briefing 
by Brigadier General Lajoie in Defense Issues (July 1988), Vol. 3, No. 39, pp. 1-6. 

6 INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 3, Paragraph 2. 

7 For additional information, see: Reuters, July 1, 1988; Associated Press, July 1, 
1988. 

8 Ibid. 

interview, Lajoie. 

l() Lajoie in Defense Issues, p. 6. See also: U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, "State¬ 
ment by Brigadier General Roland Lajoie," March 2, 1989, in Hearings and 
Markup, HR 1495 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 
p. 45. 

11 INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 6, Paragraph 5. 

“Lajoie in Defense Issues, pp. 5-9. See also: Interview with Lajoie, "Insights," 
Arms Control Today; INF Treat}’ Protocol on Inspections. 

l3 Gennadiy Talalayev, "US INF Inspection Team Arrives in Moscow," TASS, 
July 7, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, July 8, 1988. 

14 Ibid. 

^Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1988. See also: Oakland Tribune, July 2 and 3, 1988; 
San Diego Union, July 4, 1988; Theresa M. Foley, "US. Soviet Missile Experts 
Begin INF Treaty Inspections," Aviation Week & Space Technology, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, July 1 1, 1988), pp. 25-26; Lajoie in Defense Issues, pp. 2-3. 

l6 Colonel Vyacheslav Lebedev as quoted by Kevin Drew in Fairchild Daily 
Republic, July 2, 1988. 

17 Washington Post, July 2, 1988. See also: Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1988; 
Washington Times, July 5, 1988. 

18 

Lajoie in Defense Issues, pp. 2-7. 

14 Washington Times, July 5, 1988, p. 3. See also: Bob Minzesheimer and Lance 
Gurwell, "In Utah, Soviet Inspectors March on Different Mission," USA Today, 
July 5, 1988, p. 7A; Washington Post, July 5, 1988. 

2(, Ibid. See also: "Sowjetische INF-Inspektionen in der Bundesrepublik Beendet," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 8, 1988, trans. by OSIA; Lajoie in Defense 
Issues. 

21 Krasnaya Zvezda, August 2, 1989, p. 2, trans. in FBIS-SOV, August 9, 1989, p. 4. 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


~Moscow Domestic Service, July 27, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, July 28, 1988, p. 1. 

~^Vremya (Moscow), August 16, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, August 17, 1988, p. 1. 

“ U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
International Security and Science, "Statement by Brigadier General Roland La- 
joie." 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding Data Update. See also: Interview 
with Lajoie, "Insights," in Arms Control Today, pp. 3-10. 

~^INF Treaty Diplomatic Minute, May 12, 1988, pp. 1-6. See also: Schultz, 
Testimony, pp. 6-9; NBC News , May 10, 1988; New York Times, May 12, 1988; 
Washington Post, May 13, 1988. 

27 Ibid. 

98 

“ Foley, "US, Soviet Missile Experts," p. 25. See also: Brigadier General Roland 
Lajoie, "Statement Before the House of Representatives Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee," April 18, 1990, pp. 1-3. 

99 

Kennedy, Supporting the INF Treaty, pp. 29-41. 

20 Lajoie, "Defense Appropriations," pp. 1-4. 

''//V/ 7 Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 6, Paragraph 7. 

32 

"Americans in Siberia," Izvestiya, August 26, 1988, p. 1, trans. by OSIA. See 
also: "Americans Live in Ulan Ude," Youth of Buryatia, October 7, 1988, p. 13 
(Panorama Section), trans. by OSIA. 

3 Smith, "Brothers in Arms Control." See also: Peter Grier, "Hunting for Hidden 
Missiles," Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1988, p. A3; Washington Times, July 
4, 1988; John Fialka, "Russian Outhouse Marked for Women Sign of New Era," 
Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1988; Andrew Morgan, "Russians Land at Green- 
ham," Times (London), July 20, 1988; David Fairhall, "Soviet Team Flies Into 
Greenham," Manchester Guardian, July 20, 1988; International Herald Tribune, 
July 20, 1988. 

34 

Lajoie in "Insights," Arms Control Today, p. 10. 


66 



CHAPTER 5 


INF CONTINUOUS PORTAL 
MONITORING INSPECTIONS 



The United States continuous portal monitoring inspections were conducted at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, located in 
the Udmurt, USSR. Here Inspector Anne Mortensen operates the inspection monitoring system from the Data Collection Center. 


T hirty days after the INF Treaty went into effect on June 1, 1988, 
the United States and the Soviet Union had the right to station 
up to 30 resident on-site inspectors at one former INF missile final assembly 
plant or INF missile production facility. Both nations did so. The United 
States sent its inspectors to monitor a former INF missile final assembly 
plant at Votkinsk, USSR, and the Soviet Union directed its inspectors to 
observe a former INF rocket motor production plant at Magna, Utah. 


67 





On-Site Inspection Agency 


t 





Perimeter road around the continuous 
monitoring inspection area at Magna. 


On July 2, Colonel Douglas M. Englund, U.S. Army, led the first team 
of 24 American inspectors to Votkinsk. On the same day. Colonel Anatoly 
Y. Samarin arrived in Magna with 21 Soviet inspectors. These inspectors 
had the right to monitor continuously—24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for 
up to 13 years—the missile plant’s portals and to patrol the perimeter. The 
plant itself could not be entered.' 

This type of on-site inspection had a special place and purpose in the 
operation of the INF Treaty. Article 6 stipulated that "upon entry into force" 
neither party shall "produce" any banned intermediate-range or shorter- 
range missile, missile stage, or launcher." To verify one aspect of this 
prohibition, each party had the right to station up to 30 on-site inspectors at 
the portals, and perimeter of a designated former INF final missile assembly 
or production plant. During treaty negotiations, the Soviets declared that 
they intended to continue producing some non-INF missiles that were 
"outwardly similar, but not interchangeable" with the SS-20 missiles in¬ 
cluded in the INF Treaty. These non-INF missiles, specifically the SS-25 
missiles, were being assembled at Votkinsk. Soviet negotiators designated 
Votkinsk as the final inspection assembly plant subject to portal monitoring 
inspections. 

When the INF Treaty entered into force in June 1988, Votkinsk was 
a closed city of 100,000 people located in the Ural Mountains, approxi¬ 
mately 1,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Three INF missiles had been 
assembled there: SS-12s, SS-20s, and SS-23s. The Votkinsk plant still 
assembled some of the Soviet Union’s most modern ballistic missiles, 
specifically the SS-25 missile. 3 

Encased in large missile canisters, SS-25 missiles were shipped from 
the plant in special railroad cars to operational military units. The SS-25 
was not banned under the INF Treaty. However, the missile’s first stage 
was physically similar to the SS-20 first stage; its missile canister was 
similar in size and weight; and its railcar exiting the assembly plant was 
similar to those used to transport SS-20s. The major difference in the two 
missiles was that the SS-20 was a two-stage missile in which the second 
stage was 2.87 meters long, while the SS-25 was a three-stage missile, with 
a second stage 3.07-meter-long. 4 Given these similarities and differences, 
treaty negotiators had to agree upon an inspection process that would allow 
U.S. inspectors to be sure that no SS-20 missiles or missile stages were 
leaving the plant. 

In Geneva Soviet negotiators proposed that U.S. on-site inspectors at 
Votkinsk would have the right to operate certain approved sensors and 
nondamaging imaging devices. These devices would weigh, measure, and 
image rail cars leaving the plant that were large enough and heavy enough 
to hold a missile container with an INF missile inside. Using these imaging 
devices, on-site inspectors could scan the railcars and determine the length 
and diameter of the missile inside its canister." 

After extensive negotiations this continuous portal monitoring inspec¬ 
tion right was written into the treaty. In addition, treaty negotiators agreed 
that eight times per treaty year U.S. inspectors at Votkinsk had the right to 
visually inspect a missile inside its launch canister to make sure it was not 
a banned INF missile. The purpose of this intrusive on-site inspection right 


68 



















Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



At Votkinsk, the U.S. compound contained a shelter for missile rail cars that had exited the Soviet plant 
and were awaiting connection to the U.S. Radiographic Imaging System. This rail car will he attached to 
a cable and he pulled through the system. 


was to allay U.S. concerns that an SS-20 missile might be placed inside an 
SS-25 missile canister. By allowing the inspecting party to randomly select 
and inspect a missile, with the canister cap opened, eight times a year, treaty 
negotiators erected a deterrent to cheating. Visual inspection of the open 
missile canister inside the railcar would allow the American inspector to 
determine if the missile was an SS-20 missile or not.' 1 

For reasons of reciprocity, the United States designated Hercules Plant 
Number 1, at Magna, Utah subject to INF Treaty continuous portal monitoring 
inspections. The treaty stipulated that if a party did not assemble a missile with 
a stage that was "outwardly similiar" to a treaty-limited missile, then the 
inspecting party would have the right to carry out portal monitoring inspections 
at one "agreed" former missile production facility where INF missiles had 
been produced. 7 Rocket motors for the Pershing II missiles had been 
produced at Hercules Plant No. 1 from 1982 to 1987. Reciprocal treaty 
rights allowed Soviet portal monitoring inspectors the right to stop, meas¬ 
ure, and weigh all vehicles that exceeded certain dimensions as they left the 
plant. 


By the time that the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987, both 
nations had designated their portal sites. Both parties had continuous portal 
monitoring inspection rights for 13 years, with one important reservation. 
If, after the end of the second treaty year, the USSR stopped assembling 
ground-launched ballistic missiles that were "outwardly similar" to a banned 
INF missile for 12 consecutive months, then neither party would have the right 
to conduct portal monitoring inspections. If assembly resumed, so too would 
the continuous portal monitoring inspections." 


69 













On-Site Inspection Agency 


U.S. Preparations for INF Portal Monitoring Inspections 


With the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987 and the 
establishment of the On-Site Inspection Agency in January 1988, prepara¬ 
tions for the continuous portal monitoring inspections began in earnest, as 
part of the larger effort to plan and organize the entire INF Treaty mission. 
With the portal monitoring inspections, two factors complicated the plan¬ 
ning effort. First, this type of on-site inspection was unprecedented. Before 
the INF Treaty, neither nation had entered into any arms control agreement 
that required its armament plants to be placed under 24-hour-a-day on-site 
inspection. Plant managers, inspectors, escorts, the national governments— 
no one had any experience with this type of intrusive, continuous on-site 
inspection. The second complicating factor concerned a concept imbedded 
in the treaty: Virtually all rights and obligations were reciprocal; hence, 
what was done at Votkinsk influenced what was done at Magna and vice 
versa. More than with any other type of INF inspection, the issue of 
reciprocity complicated the operation of these inspections. 


In February 1988, General Lajoie set up a separate directorate specifi¬ 
cally dedicated to managing and planning for the continuous portal moni¬ 
toring escort and inspection missions. Colonel Douglas M. Englund, U.S. 
Army; Colonel George M. Connell, USMC; and a small staff of officers 
constituted the original directorate. In the beginning they had two tasks; 
organize and coordinate all operational aspects of the U.S escort mission at 
Magna and organize, manage, and lead the portal monitoring inspection 
mission at Votkinsk. 



At Magna, the Soviet continuous portal monitoring inspection area contained four buildings. From left to right, the 
Soviet Warehouse. Soviet Data Collection Center. American Inspection Building, and the Environmental Shelter 
for examining vehicles exiting the rocket motor production plant. 


70 










Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



In the fall and winter of 1988-1989 at Votkinsk, construction began on the United States' permanent 
housing and continuous monitoring buildings. Here Anatoli V. Chernenko, Soviet Construction Super¬ 
visor, and Colonel George M. Connell, U.S. Site Commander, discuss construction issues. 


Magna 


Magna, Utah, was a small American industrial city of 22,000 people, 
lying 15 miles west of Salt Lake City in the foothills of the Rocky Moun¬ 
tains. It was the site of the Hercules Bacchus Works, a large industrial 
complex encompassing several rocket motor production plants. One of 
these plants, Hercules Plant No. 1, had produced Pershing II rocket motors 
from 1982 to 1987. All production of Pershing motors had ceased in June 
1987, a year before the INF Treaty entered into force. When the Soviet 
Union chose this plant as the site of its portal monitoring inspections, it 
became the only United States defense plant ever subjected to continuous 
on-site inspection by Soviet personnel. M 

The first Soviet planning delegation came to Magna in February 1988. 
On February 17 and 18, Vladimir Sadovnikov, General Director of the 
Votkinsk Production Association, and two other Soviet officials flew to 
Utah and met with George Reuckert, Principal Deputy Director of OSIA; 
Colonel Serge A. Chemay, USAF, OSIA planner; and Carey E. Cavanaugh 
of the State Department."’ They discussed site preparations, access to 
medical facilities, and other concerns. Two weeks earlier, on February 4 
and 5, Raymond F. Smith, OSIA Deputy Director for International Rela¬ 
tions, and two U.S. embassy Moscow officials had visited Votkinsk to 
discuss U.S. portal monitoring requirements. 


71 











On-Site Inspection Agency 



At Magna, the Soviet Union conducted its inspection monitoring operations from this building,the 
USSR’s Data Collection Center. 

From mid-February to late-June when site preparation teams went to 
the two plants, planning for the portal monitoring inspections was one of 
the most intensive activities associated with implementing the INF Treaty. 
For the United States, portal activities occurred on three levels: internation¬ 
ally, in bilateral meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union; 
within the U.S. government; and between the federal government and 
private contractors. 

The international meetings to implement the treaty were the INF 
Treaty Technical Talks. These bilateral talks, held in Washington, Moscow, 
and Vienna in March, April, and May 1988, were small, week-long working 
sessions that addressed practical and procedural issues associated with 
establishing the INF Treaty’s on-site inspection process. Portal monitoring 
inspections were a major topic at each session. Colonel Englund and 
Colonel Connell represented OSIA’s Portal Monitoring Directorate. They 
participated in lengthy discussions with their Soviet counterparts concern¬ 
ing portal monitoring inspection procedures, logistics of getting inspection 
equipment and housing materials to the respective sites, and arrangements for 
temporary and permanent housing for the resident inspectors. 11 

In April 1988, Colonel Connell escorted a Soviet delegation to Magna 
to see firsthand the Hercules rocket motor production plant where the Soviet 
portal monitoring facility would be located. The U.S.-Soviet delegation then 
went to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to examine a full-scale model of the 
proposed technical and scanning equipment for U.S. inspections at Vot- 
kinsk. Two weeks later. Colonel Connell, Colonel Englund, and a small 
U.S. delegation toured the future portal inspection site at Votkinsk. Included 
in their tour was an examination of the plant’s rail holding yard, where they 
observed a test of the rail scales proposed to be used at the Votkinsk portal. 
They also examined the Soviet Union’s proposed stage measuring device. 


72 


















Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 


Soon after the American delegation returned to Washington, Connell 
and Englund departed again. Connell went to Geneva, where he participated 
as a technical expert in the U.S.-USSR ministerial negotiations between 
Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. 
From there, he proceeded to Vienna for the final session of the technical talks. 
Englund traveled to Salt Lake City to review the operational planning for 
hosting the Soviet portal monitoring inspection team at Magna. 

At Magna, the OSIA detachment commander, Lt. Commander James 
L. Szatkowski, USN, worked with the Hercules Corporation to initiate 
construction of a two-mile-long, nine-foot-high, double-chain-link fence 
around the perimeter of the 185-acre former Pershing II rocket motor 
production area. This was the area that would be subject to portal monitoring 
on-site inspections. Within this fenced area, the Hercules Corporation 
operated an active, working rocket motor production plant. An average of 
400 to 500 trucks and other vehicles entered and left the fenced area each 
week. Under the treaty, Soviet inspectors would have the right to monitor 
all vehicles exiting the Hercules facility, to inspect those vehicles transport¬ 
ing cargo larger than a certain dimension (Pershing II first-stage rocket 
motor), and to conduct patrols of the perimeter fence.'" 


U.S. Team Leaders 
at Magna, Utah 
July 1988— May 1991 


Lt. Cmdr. James L. Szatkowski. 
USN 

April 1988 — September 1989 

Col. William R. McNally III. 
USAF 

September 1989 — June 1992 


Before the Soviet inspectors arrived at the site, other construction 
projects had been initiated. The United States built a single portal road 
exiting from the former Pershing II plant. According to the treaty, all 
vehicles that could contain an intermediate range ground-launched ballistic 
missile (GLBM), or the longest stage (Pershing II, first stage) of any such 
missile, had to leave the plant on this portal road. On one side of the road, 
within sight of the plant and the perimeter fence, the Soviet Union had the right 
to build up to three buildings, which would serve as a data collection center, 
inspection team headquarters, and warehouse. In fact, during the technical 



Magna, Utah , lies approximately 15 
miles west of Salt Lake City. 


73 


























On-Site Inspection Agency 


talks, the Soviet INF delegation had indicated its intention to have only a 
single building, a modular trailer flown from the Soviet Union, at its portal. 
This building would serve both as their data collection center and as site 
headquarters." 

By June 1, 1988, the date that the INF Treaty entered into force, the 
Magna site was in the final stages of preparation. All indications were that 
the first Soviet inspection team would arrive in Magna on or about July 1. 
The technical talks and bilateral portal planning meetings had already 
decided many issues. The Soviet delegation had approved the U.S. arrange¬ 
ments at Magna for temporary housing in an apartment complex in Salt 
Lake City. The Soviets also had been given site diagrams for the perimeter 
and portal roads for Hercules Plant No. 1 and photographs of the types of 
vehicles that would be leaving the plant. 14 

While these meetings and site preparations were under way. Com¬ 
mander Szatkowski pulled together a small staff of technical managers, 
contract specialists, and security people. OSIA’s initial Magna Detach¬ 
ment—Robert Erickson, Edward Dotson, Norman Olsen, and Elizabeth 
Olsen—worked closely with the Hercules Corporation, its plant managers, 
and employees. Plant security was a major concern, with training on the treaty 
and security precautions instituted for all employees and senior managers. 

For nearly seven months, the Hercules plant and OSIA’s Magna 
Detachment were the center of intense managerial and policy attention. If 
the INF Treaty itself was unprecedented, the right to conduct continuous 
portal monitoring inspections at a private industrial plant was extraordinary. 
Congress, senior administration officials, and the media wanted information 
on the planning, preparations, and readiness for the Soviet portal monitoring 
inspectors. 1 ' One week before the Soviet inspectors were expected to arrive 
in Magna, General Lajoie flew to Utah for a final review. Complimenting 
the Hercules Corporation for its "cooperation" after a difficult start, Lajoie 
characterized the previous five months as "hectic." In his remarks to the 
local press, he stressed that the Soviet inspectors would always be accom¬ 
panied by American escorts, "to make sure they do what they have to. but 

n 16 

no more. 


Votkinsk 


Preparations for the U.S. portal monitoring inspections at the Votkinsk 
Machine Building Plant differed in several major respects from those at 
Magna. First, the task of placing a group of up to 30 resident American 
inspectors with their monitoring equipment in a closed Soviet city more than 
1,000 kilometers into the interior of the Soviet Union required much greater 
attention to managerial detail. Every item needed for U.S. operations at 
Votkinsk had to be acquired, listed on official documents, packed, shipped, 
checked at the treaty-designated point of entry (Moscow), transshipped (by 
air and ground transportation) to Votkinsk, stored, unpacked, and made 
ready for use. 

Second, because of the issue of distinguishing banned SS-20 missiles 
from non-INF SS-25 missiles, the INF Treaty authorized U.S. inspectors to 


74 





Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



MOSCOW 


PROFILER 




ENVIRONMENT 
CONTROLLED 
INSP BUILDING 


1000 KM 
600 Ml 


n 


===== 


SCALE 


SCALE 


VOTKINSK 

MISSILE PRODUCTION 
FACILITY 


VOTKINSK 
PORTAL MONITOR 
TEAM (30 MAN) 


TEAM CHIEF (06) 
DEPUTY(FSO) 


install and operate at the portal a large, nondamaging, radiographic imaging 
system, known commercially as CargoScan. This equipment—together 
with infrared profilers to monitor road and rail traffic, rail and road weighing 
scales, and a data collection center—was authorized in the treaty for use by 
both Soviet and American portal monitoring inspectors. The Soviets, re¬ 
serving their treaty rights, chose not to install an imaging system at Magna, 
while the United States decided not to install rail or road weighing scales at 
Votkinsk. The United States, however, had planned all along to install and 
operate the treaty-authorized CargoScan monitoring equipment. This fact 
made the U.S. inspection operations at Votkinsk much more complex than 
Soviet operations at Magna. CargoScan was complex and, as events re¬ 
vealed, controversial in its installation and initial operations. 


When OSIA was established in January 1988, one of its functions was 
to work with other U.S. government agencies to get this portal monitoring 
equipment, at that point in research, development, and acquisition, from the 
United States to the Soviet Union in accordance with the provisions of the 
INF Treaty. At OSIA, Colonel Englund and Colonel Connell and their 
staff—especially Lt. Commander Charles N. Myers, U.S. Navy; Major 
Mark L. Dues, USAF; Major Richard A. Kurasiewicz, U.S. Army; 1st Lt. 
Stuart K. O’Neill, USAF; and 1st Lt. W. Scott Ritter, USMC—concentrated 
in the spring of 1988 on tracking all of the items associated with this portal 
monitoring inspection equipment. Again and again, portal issues arose 
during the bilateral technical talks. Decisions there influenced what equip¬ 
ment would be shipped, when it would be sent, and, to a degree, when it 
would become operational. 17 


A third factor distinguishing United States inspection operations at 
Votkinsk was the composition of the American team. The United States 
decided to use contractor personnel, under the supervision of an OSIA site 
commander and his staff, to operate and maintain the inspection monitoring 
systems in Votkinsk. In December 1987, at the time of the White House 


75 


















On-Site Inspection Agency 



The United States' Data Collection Center for conducting continuous portal monitoring inspec¬ 
tions arrived in Votkinsk in January 1989. Americans and Soviets worked together to position 
the data center on concrete foundations. 


treaty signing, a small Joint Chiefs of Staff task force made a series of 
recommendations that influenced how the United States would implement 
the treaty. One recommendation, made by the task force leader Brigadier 
General Eugene L. Daniel, U.S. Army, was to use contractor personnel to 
operate and maintain the monitoring equipment at Votkinsk. Daniel’s 
recommendation was based on specific guidance he had received to keep 
the new agency’s manpower to a minimum and on his perception of the 
resident character of the portal monitoring mission at Votkinsk. 1 " When 
OSIA was established in mid-January 1988, this decision was set; the 
agency’s task was to work with other U.S. government agencies and develop 
specifications for the contract. 

In June 1988, the Hughes Technical Services Company was awarded 
the $ 1.8 million dollar contract." This company, a subsidiary of the Hughes 
Aircraft Company, had extensive experience in operating, maintaining, and 
supporting systems for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and other government 
agencies. At Votkinsk, the company would be responsible for providing all 
of the technical, operational, and maintenance services required to manage, 
operate, and maintain the portal monitoring facility. Of the 30 American 
inspectors permitted on site at Votkinsk, the Hughes Company would 
provide up to 23. The other inspectors—the site commander, deputy, and 
treaty specialists—would be military officers and civilian personnel as¬ 
signed to OSIA. Because the contract was not awarded until June 1988, after 
the treaty had entered into force, there would be a period for interviewing, 
hiring, and training company personnel. Consequently, for the initial six to 
seven weeks, OSIA inspection teams conducted the portal monitoring 
inspections. 


76 



















Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 


The United States intended to initiate its portal inspections at Votkinsk 
as soon as possible under the terms of the treaty. General Lajoie selected 
Colonel Englund and Colonel Connell, both experienced, senior Soviet spe¬ 
cialists, as site commanders at Votkinsk. They rotated every three to four 
weeks, with one of them on site in Votkinsk at all times. Accompanying them, 
until the Hughes personnel arrived in mid-August, was an inspection team of 
approximately 25 members. Colonel Englund led the first team. 

For all INF inspectors the months of July and August 1988 were 
exciting times. The United States and the USSR conducted more than 150 
baseline inspections in eight weeks; in addition, they initiated three of the 
four other types of INF inspections—portal monitoring, closeouts, and 
eliminations. These initial on-site inspections set precedents that influenced 
all subsequent INF inspections and sent a strong signal about how the treaty 
would be carried out. 


Initial Inspections at Votkinsk 


On the morning of July 1, 29 U.S. INF inspectors arrived at Moscow’s 
Sheremetyevo Airport. The Americans comprised two inspection teams; 
one would conduct a baseline on-site inspection at Rechitsa Missile 
Operating Base, the other would initiate the continuous portal monitoring 
inspection at Votkinsk. Colonel Englund led the latter team." It was a large 
team consisting of 19 inspectors, including Englund, Lt. Colonel Douglas 
C. Guiler, U.S. Army; Ft. Commander Charles N. Myers, U.S. Navy; 



Here, American inspectors at Votkinsk begin the process of measuring the length of a rail car 
exiting the Soviet missile final assembly plant. 


77 











On-Site Inspection Agency 


Lt. Commander Andrew S. Ritchie, U.S. Navy; Major Mark L. Dues, 
USAF; Major Richard A. Kurasiewicz, U.S. Army; 1st Lt. Robin A. Ennis, 
USAF; 1st Lt. Stuart K. O'Neill, USAF; and Lt. W. Scott Ritter, USMC. 
When the American team flew from Moscow to Votkinsk, they were met 
by the advance site team that arrived in the city on June 21. This tive-person 
team had performed an initial site survey, met with the plant representatives, 
and made hotel arrangements for the full team that would arrive on July 2. 
When Colonel Englund and the team arrived, the advance party joined up 
with them, becoming official INF inspectors. 

Initially the American team stayed in a hotel in the city of Votkinsk. 
For each shift, Soviet escorts took the American inspectors by bus to the 
plant, 15 kilometers from the city. The U.S. portal compound at the plant 
was approximately 2 1/2 acres and was situated 50 yards in front of the 
plant’s main exit. A main rail line and a road emerged from the plant and 
ran next to the U.S. compound. 

On their first day at Votkinsk, Colonel Englund had the U.S. inspectors 
begin patrolling the 4.7-kilometer perimeter of the plant and monitoring all 
road vehicles and railcars leaving the missile assembly plant. Establishing 
their offices in a temporary Soviet building on the American compound, the 
inspectors rotated through round-the-clock shifts, with four team members, 
a duty officer, and three inspectors monitoring the portal. All inspectors 
followed a U.S. policy of working in pairs. If measurements were taken, 
Soviet escorts, with linguists, were always present. The U.S. inspectors 
recorded their measurements on special, agreed-upon report forms; these 
were compiled at the end of each month in an INF Treaty Monthly Portal 
Inspection Report. As with all INF inspection reports, two originals were 
made, with a copy retained by each party/ 1 

In the first few weeks at Votkinsk, Colonel Englund and Lt. Colonel 
Guiler, his deputy, met frequently with the Soviet escort leaders and plant 
officials. Anatoly D. Tomilov represented the Soviet Ministry of Defense 
Industry and the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. Vyacheslav K. Lopatin, 
deputy director for coordination of the INF inspection, attended many of 
these meetings. Topics included treaty rights and obligations, construction 
schedules, technical data on monitoring equipment, and reciprocal treat¬ 
ment of INF inspectors at Votkinsk and Magna. The latter was a significant 
issue, as the Soviet Union’s portal monitoring inspections had already begun 
at Magna. 


Magna 


On July 2, 1988, the first Soviet INF portal monitoring inspection team 
arrived in Utah. Colonel Anatoly Y. Samarin led the 22-man Soviet inspec¬ 
tion team. They were met at the Salt Lake City airport by representatives of 
the state governor, the city, and OSIA, as well as journalists, television 
reporters, and local citizens. Colonel Samarin characterized the reception 
to an Izvestiya reporter as a "great ceremony" and a "very major event in 
Utah’s life." 22 Following a short rest, the Soviet team was given a familiari¬ 
zation tour of the treaty area at Hercules Plant No. 1—the perimeter fence, 
exits, and the portal area. Colonel Samarin informed Colonel Connell, the 


78 





Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



senior U.S. escort, that in deference to the American national holiday on 
July 4, the Soviet inspection team would delay the start of its continuous 
portal monitoring inspections until July 5. At a news briefing, Samarin 
summarized for the local, national, and international media the Soviet 
team's purpose at Magna. "Our task is to verify that output banned by the 
treaty is not shipped from the plant. We shall be in Magna two to three 
months, then a new group will fly in. Meanwhile, we are resolving everyday 
questions which, thanks to the foresight of the U.S. side, have been reduced 
to a minimum." 23 

Initially, the "everyday" questions at Magna fell into three categories: 
establishing the portal monitoring inspection process; transporting and 
installing the Soviet portal monitoring equipment; and overseeing the 
construction of a permanent residence for the Soviet inspectors. In the first 
few weeks, Colonel Samarin met daily with Lt. Commander Szatkowski 
and Robert Erickson, OSIA detachment commander and senior technical 
manager, to discuss questions of inspection procedures, site preparations, 
and permanent housing. It would take more than a year for the resolution 
of some of these issues. 

Within the U.S. government, responses to Soviet questions were 
coordinated throughout OSIA Headquarters and with other agencies and 


During the first year, the Soviet continuous portal monitoring inspection team moved into permanent 
housing quarters. Colonel Vyacheslav S. Lebedev, Soviet team leader, holds high the ribbon on opening 
day. U.S. team leader, Commander James L. Szatkowski (r.) accompanies Colonel Lebedev. 


79 






On-Site Inspection Agency 



Magna: Soviet inspectors meas¬ 
ure a rocket motor to determine 
the diameter. 


Votkinsk: the U.S. Data Collection 
Center, flown in by C-5A aircraft , 
is placed on its foundations. 


Magna: a vehicle exits the plant 
and passes through the environ¬ 
mental shelter. 



Votkinsk: a Soviet vehicle 
passes through the U.S. road 
profiler system. 


80 
























































Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



Votkinsk: American inspectors celebrate 
July 4, 1991 with an open house and 
picnic. 


Votkinsk: on July 4th, 1989 American in¬ 
spectors hosted a picnic and celebration of 
the first year of continuous inspections. 
Soviet officials and their families attended. 


Votkinsk: Colonel Douglas Englund, U.S. Site 
Commander, presents a gift to General Major 
Vladimir Medvedev, Director NRRC. 


Magna, Soviet inspectors discuss conditions in 
the USSR, and answer questions in a meeting at 
the First Unitarian Church. 


81 



































On-Site Inspection Agency 


departments. In issue after issue, two principles emerged: adherence to the 
treaty and reciprocal treatment for Soviet inspectors at Magna and American 
inspectors at Votkinsk. 24 

Practical and procedural questions arose during the inspection proc¬ 
ess, as anticipated by the treaty negotiators. The treaty established the 
Special Verification Commission, with a specific charter to resolve ques¬ 
tions relating to compliance with treaty obligations and to agree on measures 
for improving the "viability and effectiveness" of the treaty. This bilateral 
commission began meeting in Geneva in June 1988; portal monitoring 
issues arising from both the Magna and Votkinsk on-site inspections were 
major topics during its initial 18 months. 2 ' 

Soviet portal monitoring inspections at Magna began as planned on 
July 5 and proceeded continuously from that day. Colonel Samarin ex¬ 
plained to a New York Times reporter that the Soviet inspectors worked in 
24-hour shifts at 3-day intervals. They observed or inspected every vehicle 
leaving the fenced facility through the portal or through one of the two plant 
exits. They carried out random perimeter patrols, usually walking around 
the two-mile-long fence encompassing the 185-acre plant. Hercules Plant 
No. 1 was a working plant, with an average of 400 to 500 vehicles entering 
and leaving each week. All exiting vehicles were subject to monitoring. 
Because the Soviet Union’s portal monitoring equipment would not be in 
place and operational for more than a year, initial monitoring was done 
visually. 

Under the treaty, the United States had to declare when a vehicle 
leaving the plant was large enough to contain a missile or a missile stage as 
large as or larger than the first stage of a Pershing II missile. Those vehicles 
had to leave the plant along the specially built portal road to the Soviet 
inspection area. Using a measuring tape and a fixed measuring rod, the 
Soviet inspectors determined if the missile stage or cargo being transported 
exceeded 3.68 meters in length and 1.02 meters in diameter, which were the 
dimensions of the Pershing II missile’s first stage.* 

In Utah there was genuine community interest in the Soviet INF 
inspectors. Requests for speaking engagements, participation in local 
events, personal home visits, and media interviews flowed into OSIA’s 
Magna office. The Soviet team chief was informed of each request; he 
decided which ones to accept. For all events, Soviet inspectors were 
transported and escorted by OSIA personnel. Private home visits were not 
allowed. In July and August, the Soviet team participated in many events, 
speaking at service clubs, community groups, and business organizations. 
Sports events were especially popular. 2 


In the Memorandum of Agreement of December 21. 1989, this measurement was changed from 
3.68 meters to 3.25 meters. 


82 




Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



During the first treaty year at Votkinsk, 1988-1989, Soviet engineers began construction on the American 
residence, office, and inspection buildings. 


First Treaty Year at Votkinsk 


When there are no precedents in an international treaty, the "first time" 
takes on added significance. At Votkinsk, the first year established patterns 
for subsequent years. Colonels Englund and Connell, the alternating U.S. 
site commanders, found themselves participating in extensive discussions 
with Soviet officials at Votkinsk. Both American officers were fluent in 
Russian; both had served as military attaches at the U.S. embassy in 
Moscow. Their experience was put to good stead as Soviet officials fre¬ 
quently discussed the reciprocal treatment being given to the Soviet inspec¬ 
tors at Magna. When Englund and Connell returned to Washington, they 
often flew to Magna for a firsthand account of the Soviet inspection and 
American escort issues there. 

During the first treaty year at Votkinsk, Englund and Connell focused 
the American inspectors on two tasks. First, they established the U.S. 
standards and procedures, based on the treaty, for conducting the inspec¬ 
tions. Second, they oversaw the installation and operation of the monitor¬ 
ing equipment. As noted above, the INF Treaty gave the inspecting party 
the right to make perimeter patrols, install and operate monitoring equip¬ 
ment, make continuous, direct observation of the plant’s portal and exits, 
and inspect those railcars leaving the plant. Colonel Connell explained to a 
reporter from the Boston Globe that he was "paid to be skeptical.... Everything 
is suspect," he said. "It’s up to the Soviets to prove otherwise."'" 

In the first two months, July and August, the American team con¬ 
sisted of a team chief, deputy, linguists, treaty specialists, and inspectors. 
Twenty U.S. inspection teams had been trained to conduct INF baseline 
inspections. One of those teams went to Votkinsk and assisted with the 


83 















On-Site Inspection Agency 



American Inspector Charles B. Haver. 


portal monitoring inspections. Every 15 days for the first six weeks, another 
American inspection team rotated into Votkinsk. In mid-August, the first 
cadre from the Hughes Technical Services Company arrived at the site. Led 
by Jerry W. Porter, these inspectors were responsible for providing the 
technical, operational, and managerial services for operating and maintain¬ 
ing the U.S. portal monitoring facility at Votkinsk. Within a month, there 
was a full complement of 23 Hughes Company personnel in Votkinsk. They 
were a mix of professionals and specialists: civil engineers, electronic 
technicians, Russian linguists, data management specialists, physician as¬ 
sistants, and chefs. By mid-September, they had completed their initial 
on-site training and were functioning as an integral part of the American 
inspection team. Always on site were a cadre of American military person¬ 
nel: the OSIA site commander, deputy, and treaty specialists. They provided 
leadership and had specific responsibilities in communicating with Soviet 
officials. 

In the fall, winter, and spring months of 1988-89, the portal monitoring 
inspections continued, but another task emerged as significant. The Ameri¬ 
can inspectors had to install, with the assistance of Soviet engineers, the 
treaty-authorized inspection equipment. Following site preparation by So¬ 
viet engineers, U.S. inspectors installed the following equipment: traffic 
lights, power conduits, a closed-circuit television system, semaphore traffic 
gates, computers,and infrared profilers for both road and rail traffic. Thousands 
of hours were spent digging conduits, pouring concrete foundations, laying 
telephone and power cables, and installing components of the monitoring 
equipment. By June 1989, the American inspectors were using the equipment. 


In a significant accomplishment that first year, Soviet construction 
engineers completed all of the work on the U.S. permanent housing and 
offices at Votkinsk. Three large dormitories and an office building were 
constructed in the U.S. compound next to the plant. The three two-story 



t 





Votkinsk, U.S. dormitories under construction in the spring of 1989. 


. r EE I 


84 






















Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



At Votkinsk, the American inspectors hosted a ceremonial opening of the new res¬ 
idences and office buildings on June JO. 1989. Colonel Douglas M. England, U.S. Site 
Commander, welcomed the guests. 


residences had rooms for each of the INF inspectors, while the office 
building contained space for dining, community activities, offices, and 
recreation. A warehouse and sauna were also constructed on the compound. 
All of the furnishings and equipment needed for the American inspectors’ 
residence and offices were acquired in the United States, transported to the 
Soviet Union, and installed at Votkinsk. In January 1989, for instance, the 
U.S. Air Force flew ten C-141 cargo flights to Izhevsk, the nearest large 
city to Votkinsk. It was 38 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, with three to four 
feet of snow. Soviet crews helped the Americans unload the cargo and 
transport it to the American compound. 24 

On June 10, 1989, there was a celebration at the American compound. 
The first year of the INF Treaty was history; Colonel Englund and the 
American team held a ceremonial opening of the U.S. inspectors’ residence 
and office buildings. They invited Jack F. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the 
USSR; General Major Vladimir I. Medvedev, director of the USSR Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center; and other Soviet officials and guests to visit the U.S. 
facilities. It was a propitious time to review the work of the first year. " 

U.S. portal monitoring inspections had begun in July 1988; they had 
gone on continuously, 24 hours a day, throughout the year. Contractor 
personnel had been hired, trained, and were on site performing their duties. 
Some of the treaty-authorized monitoring equipment—traffic lights, induc¬ 
tion loops, closed-circuit television, semaphore traffic gates—had been 
shipped to Votkinsk and was being used. Other more critical equipment— 
specifically the large, nondamaging imaging system known commercially 
as CargoScan—was not operational by the end of the first treaty year. The 
United States had negotiated, signed, and ratified the INF Treaty with the 
intention of using the imaging system to scan railcars leaving the portal to 
determine categorically that no banned SS-20 missiles were exiting the 



Inspector Tim Kubik preparing food 
at the celebration. 


85 






On-Site Inspection Agency 


Votkinsk plant. Until that system was installed, approved, and was in use 
at Votkinsk, the U.S. government would not consider its INF portal moni¬ 
toring inspection regime fully operational. 

In June 1989, considerable work remained before CargoScan would 
be operational. Soviet officials had to approve the system's technical 
documents, Soviet engineers had to complete construction of the Cargo- 
Scan buildings at the site, the United States had to transport the equipment 
to Votkinsk and conduct operational and safety testing, and, finally, Soviet 
officials had to approve the equipment and operating procedures before 
scanning operations could begin. These activities became the focus of the 
second treaty year. 



CargoScan was the United States' radiographic imaging system for the continuous 
portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk. Soviet missile cars would pass through the 
linatron X-ray and American inspectors monitoring the system would ascertain 
whether the missile in the rail car was, in fact, a banned missile or not. 

In the first year, however, permanent residences and offices at the 
Votkinsk compound had been constructed, furnished, and occupied. The 
logistical system for getting people, materials, and supplies from the United 
States to the Soviet Union had proven to be effective and smoother than 
anticipated. Many of the difficulties inherent in crossing international 
borders, passing through customs inspections, and completing the trans¬ 
shipment of equipment and supplies had been overcome in the first year. 
The American site commanders and their Soviet counterparts had held 
frequent, regular discussions on portal issues. 

During the first year at Votkinsk, issues and information about portal 
monitoring inspections went from the site to the respective governments 
and then to the Special Verification Commission in Geneva. A strong link 
had emerged between on-site experience at the portals and diplomatic 
negotiations in the commission. When the INF Treaty Memorandum of 
Agreement was signed in December 1989, it clarified, altered, and author¬ 
ized the portal monitoring equipment and inspection procedures at both 
Magna and Votkinsk. 


86 
































Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



At the Votkinsk ceremony opening the 
American compound, U.S. Ambassa¬ 
dor Jack F. Matlock stood with V.G. 
Tolmachev, Plant Manager, General 
Medvedev, NRRC Director, and other 
Soviet officials. 


The American celebration on June 10, 1989, at Votkinsk was an open 
house. At two o’clock the doors of every building were opened and the 
American inspectors showed their Soviet guests their new residence and 
office complex. More than 200 people attended. Colonel Englund, in his 
welcoming remarks, said, "When I first arrived in Votkinsk in May of last 
year, this place was an empty field. Today, when much has been done by 
both sides, we are opening the beautifully built living complex and inspec¬ 
tion workplace. The labor put into this, as you can see, is of the highest 
quality and reflects the serious attention of both sides towards the fulfillment 
of the Treaty." 31 

Ambassador Matlock echoed some of the same themes in his remarks: 
"We are grateful to the Soviet builders for their good work. The opening of 
the village...shows everyone that a very serious treaty for the destruction of 
missiles is beins carried out. Conscientious fulfillment of one treaty breeds 
trust, which aids in resolving many contentious questions in all areas." ' V. 
G. Tolmachev, director of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, responded 
by pointing out that at the portal of the factory "two governments [were] 
reconstructed here in miniature." 33 Finally, General Major Medvedev, di¬ 
rector of the Soviet Union's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, thanked the 
INF inspectors for their American hospitality and cast the event into the 
context of recent history: "Two years ago, few people on earth would have 
suggested that in Votkinsk or in Magna, near the gates of missile factories, 
groups of specialists would observe the exit of products.... Nevertheless, 
today is a reality." 34 


87 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


First Treaty Year at Magna 


During the first treaty year at Magna, Soviet portal monitoring inspec¬ 
tors dealt with many of the same issues as the American inspectors at 
Votkinsk. Initially, the Soviet team concentrated on establishing inspection 
procedures for the continuous on-site monitoring of the Hercules Corpora¬ 
tion's former INF missile plant site. Using the procedures detailed in the 
treaty, they observed the departing traffic, patrolled the perimeter fence, and 
inspected any vehicle transporting a missile stage or any cargo that had been 
declared to exceed the agreed-upon length (3.68 meters) and diameter (1.02 
meters). U.S. escorts were always present on the site, observing the Soviet 
inspectors and confirming their measurements. 

Throughout the first treaty year, the Soviet inspectors at Magna held 
extensive discussions with the U.S. detachment commander, Lt. Commander 
Szatkowski. and his staff. Initially, the topics concerned the on-site inspection 
procedures, coordination with the plant, and preparations for installation of the 
authorized Soviet portal monitoring equipment. Installation required site prepa¬ 
rations—grading, foundation work, sewage, and electrical power. Commander 
Szatkowski and Robert Erickson met frequently with the Soviet team chief and 
went over plans and schedules for each stage of the site preparations. By the 
fall of 1988, construction was under way on most of the Magna portal projects. 
This work closely paralleled the work being done at Votkinsk on the American 
monitoring equipment. At Magna, the weekly meetings between U.S. and 
Soviet team chiefs helped resolve minor issues. 



The Soviet housing complex at Magna was located at West Jordan,Utah, a small suburb located 
approximately eight miles southeast of the plant. The Soviet inspectors moved into these new apartments 
in April 1989. 


88 












Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



At Magna, Soviet inspectors, dressed 
in special anti-static suits, examine a 
rocket motor product that had exited 
the plant. American linguist Orr Po- 
tebnya assists Robert Erickson and the 
Soviet inspectors in answering a ques¬ 
tion. 


In late July 1988, the USSR's portal monitoring building arrived by 
air cargo from the Soviet Union. The building was a group of four prefab 
modules that would be fitted together at the site. It would become the Soviet 
Union’s data collection center. Also included in the cargo were two small 
booths for monitoring road exits. The Soviet buildings and booths were 
inspected by U.S. officials at the airport, then transported to the Magna site. 
In early October, they were placed on concrete foundations. The U.S. escort 
team, assisted by the Soviet inspectors, installed electrical wiring, backup 
electrical generators, and treaty-authorized monitoring equipment. By mid- 
October, the Soviet inspection team was monitoring the traffic leaving the 
portal from their data collection center. Other monitoring equipment—traf¬ 
fic lights, gate switches, and closed-circuit television—were also installed 
during the first treaty year. 

By agreement, the two inspection agencies determined that, the party 
being inspected would provide permanent housing for the portal monitoring 
inspectors within the first year. The inspecting party would pay for the 
housing, as required by the treaty, but it would be constructed by the 
inspected party. At Magna, U.S. officials offered the Soviet INF inspectors 
two choices for their permanent housing. The Soviets selected a five-acre 
site in West Jordan, Utah, a small town approximately eight miles southeast 
of Magna. In West Jordan, the U.S. government proposed to build a 
permanent apartment housing complex for the 30 Soviet inspectors, 
equipped with a clubhouse, swimming pool, spa, jogging path, and tennis 
court. It would cost $1.6 million. The Soviets agreed. Construction began 
in October 1988; as the work proceeded in the fall and winter months of 
1988-89, Soviet team chiefs were briefed weekly on the construction status. 


89 






On-Site Inspection Agency 


They also made periodic escorted visits to the site. By the spring of 1989, 
the West Jordan housing complex had been completed. The Soviet inspec¬ 
tion team moved into their new residences on April 18. Approximately two 
weeks earlier, the American inspectors at Votkinsk had moved into their 
permanent quarters. ^ 

By the end of the first treaty year at Magna, the unfinished items 
included construction of the Soviet portal warehouse and paving of the 
portal inspection area. The U.S. site commander, Lt. Commander 
Szatkowski, had these items under contract; they would be completed 
during the second treaty year. As at Votkinsk, the portal monitoring equip¬ 
ment and procedures at Magna were subject to scrutiny and deliberations 
in the Special Verification Commission in Geneva. There, Soviet and 
American delegations worked out changes for the Magna portal monitoring 
equipment and procedures that were published in the Memorandum of 
Agreement of December 1989. 


From the First to the Third Treaty Year 


In the broadest sense, two developments influenced the Soviet and 
American INF portal monitoring inspections in the second and third treaty 
years. First, on December 21, 1989, U.S. Ambassador Steven E. Steiner and 
Soviet Ambassador Mikhail N. Strel’tsov signed the INF Treaty Memorandum 
of Agreement. This important document covered many aspects of the treaty 
communication procedures, elimination procedures, pre-inspection require¬ 
ments, general rules for conducting on-site inspections, and specific provisions 
for each type of inspection. On-site portal monitoring inspections received the 


At Votkinsk, an American inspector 
attaches the cable mechanism that 
pulls the missile rail car through the 
CargoScan imaging system. 



90 












Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 



- 


At Votkinsk , American and Soviet inspectors stand before a missile rail car in January 1990. 

most attention, as virtually every aspect was defined and codified into 
mutually agreeable language. 7 


The Memorandum of Agreement detailed the obligations of the party 
being inspected at the portals regarding the presentation of the missile stages 
leaving the plant, the number of exits, the construction of storage facilities, 
and procedures for all vehicles exiting the portals. It defined the rights of 
the inspecting party regarding portal monitoring equipment, radio commu¬ 
nications for inspectors making perimeter patrols, procedures for patrolling 
the perimeter, procedures for measuring missiles and missile stages leaving the 
plant, CargoScan requirements and installation procedures, inspector rotation 
procedures, and embassy visits by portal inspectors. When the memorandum 
was signed, it became one of the most significant treaty documents governing 
U.S. and USSR portal monitoring inspections. 

The second major issue that influenced Soviet and American portal 
monitoring inspections occurred at Votkinsk, where a serious issue arose 
over the installation and initial operation of the U.S. nondamaging CargoS¬ 
can X-ray imaging equipment. This equipment measured the length and 
diameter of the second stage of those missiles that Soviet officials declared, 
and U.S. inspectors confirmed, exceeded a certain treaty-defined length. 
Two Soviet missiles, the SS-20 (banned by the INF Treaty) and the SS-25 
(not banned) had been or were being assembled at the Votkinsk plant. The 
CargoScan system would scan the declared railcars to determine if the 
second stage of any banned SS-20 missiles were leaving the plant. The U.S. 
government had always regarded CargoScan as critical to its INF portal 
monitoring inspection regime. 



Missile rail car being pulled through 
the CargoScan building. 


In the first treaty year, Soviet officials had started preparations for the 
CargoScan building at the portal monitoring site. Soviet engineers laid the 


91 



















On-Site Inspection Agency 



mm 

wMm 

feU 

Wm 

l|« 




•f# 


KtTlP 


If* 


fSf$ 

mm 




V^.V^.VA\ 


I# 

MS 


//V/V/' 


//? February and March 1990, the operational status of CargoScan reached a crisis point. Delegations 
from Moscow' and Washington flew’ to Votkinsk to meet and discuss the issues and recommend solutions. 


foundation for the building, constructed a spur rail line, and erected a 
shielding wall. In the summer and fall of 1989, work accelerated on the 
CargoScan building, and all of the system modules were in place by 
mid-November. Soviet officials then indicated that the final installation of 
CargoScan could proceed. After the signing of the Memorandum of Agree¬ 
ment in December, the final equipment (the linatron X-ray system) was 
installed in January 1990. It was tested and declared by U.S. experts to be 
ready for imaging operations.^ 


Over the next two months the CargoScan system became a contentious 
issue at Votkinsk. In late February. Soviet officials raised several concerns 
about CargoScan operations, such as magnetic tape storage, joint operating 
procedures, and the X-ray safety procedures. The American site com¬ 
mander, Lt. Colonel Roy E. Peterson, U.S. Army, addressed the Soviet 
queries point by point. He cited the INF Treaty and the recently signed 
Memorandum of Agreement as authorization for use of the CargoScan 
system and the procedures for operating it. The Soviets disagreed. 4 


On March 1, the CargoScan issue reached a crisis point. Soviet 
officials declared that a missile-carrying railcar would be leaving the plant. 
When the railcar exited, Lt. Colonel Peterson directed that the customary 
visual and manual measurements be taken by U.S. inspectors. Ascertaining 
that the railcar contained a missile, he requested that it be scanned using the 
CargoScan system. Since the Soviets had not yet agreed that CargoScan 
was operational and ready for use by the U.S. inspectors, they did not agree 
to move the railcar into the CargoScan area. Instead, by mutual agreement, 
the railcar was moved into the special environmentally-controlled building 
within the U.S. portal compound, where it was kept under constant U.S. 
observation while the problem was reviewed by senior government officials 
in both nations. The railcar and missile remained in the building until the 
evening of March 9, when Soviet plant officials announced that the railcar 
and its contents would be moved out of the environmental building 


92 





























Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 


immediately and taken out of the American area. Simultaneously, the 
Soviets declared their intention to have additional railcars leave the plant 
without allowing the United States to image them. 4 " 

This was an extremely serious action. Colonel Peterson declared that 
the U.S. government had been denied its rights under the treaty to image 
the missile in the railcar. He directed that photographs be taken, in accord¬ 
ance with the treaty. He asked that the missile canister be opened for visual 
examination pursuant to paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the treaty’s Pro¬ 
tocol on Inspections. It was. Later that same day, two additional missile¬ 
carrying railcars left the plant. These railcars were manually inspected , but 
they exited the American compound without being imaged by CargoScan, 
despite U.S. objections. 41 

This action was so serious that Secretary of State James A. Baker III 
lodged an official protest with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevard¬ 
nadze. 4 " To resolve the impasse at the plant, the two governments agreed to 
dispatch a team of experts to Votkinsk to investigate the issue and make 
recommendations to the respective policy communities. From Washington, 
George W. Look, the Secretary of Defense’s representative to the Special 
Verification Commission, led a small U.S. delegation to Votkinsk. Lev 
Kokurin, Soviet Defense Industry Representative for Votkinsk, led the 
Soviet Union's delegation. The two groups spent five days in Votkinsk 
reviewing the procedures and technical issues for operating the CargoScan 
system with Colonel George Connell, Director of Portal Monitoring at 
OSIA; Lt. Colonel Peterson, U.S. site commander; and Anatoly D. Tomilov 
of the Soviet Ministry of Defense Industries. As a result of these discussions, 
the two sides agreed to technical and operational steps that addressed Soviet 
concerns. These modifications did not alter CargoScan’s ability to operate 
within the parameters of the treaty’s Memorandum of Agreement. In turn, 
the Soviets agreed that the system could become operational. 4 ' By the end 
of March, the American on-site inspectors had the CargoScan system 
operational at Votkinsk and Soviet railcars leaving the portal were being 
imaged in accordance with the new procedures. 44 



A table model of the American compound at Votkinsk. 


93 
















With the major exception of this CargoScan incident, INF portal 
monitoring inspections at Magna and Votkinsk developed in the second and 
third treaty years into the inspection regime that had been envisioned by the 
INF Treaty negotiators. Leadership changes occurred at both portal sites. 
At Magna, Colonel William R. McNally, USAF, became the senior escort 
and OSIA Chief of the Magna Portal Division. Colonel Connell left Vot- 
kinsk to become Director of Portal Monitoring at OSIA Headquarters. 
Colonel Englund became Chief of Staff, OSIA. In the fall of 1990, Colonel 
Laurence Burgess, USMC, became the new Director of Portal Operations. 


U.S. Team Leaders at Votkinsk 

July 1988 

- May 1991 

Colonel Douglas M. Englund, USA/ , 
Colonel George M. Connell, USMC 

July 1988 - October 1989 

Lt. Col. Roy E. Peterson. USA 

October 1989 - December 1989 

Lt. Col. Mark L. Dues, USAF 

December 1989 - February 1990 

Lt. Col. Roy E. Peterson, USA 

February 1990 - April 1990 

Maj.Thomas E. Michaels, USA 

March 1990- May 1990 

Cmdr. Charles N. Myers, USN 

May 1990 - June 1990 

Lt. Col. Mark L. Dues, USAF 

June 1990-July 1990 

Maj. Thomas E. Michaels, USA 

July 1990 - September 1990 

Lt. Col. Mark L. Dues, USAF 

September 1990 - November 1990 

Maj. Thomas E. Michaels, USA 

November 1990 - December 1990 

Lt. Col. Stephen J. Zolock, Jr. USAF 

December 1990 - January 1991 

Lt. Col. Mark L. Dues, USAF 

January 1991 - February 1991 

Lt. Col. Nicholas Troyan, USA 

February 1991 - March 1991 

Lt. Col. Warren C. Wagner, USA 

March 1991 - April 1991 

Lt. Col. Stephen J. Zolock, Jr. USAF 

April 1991 - May 1991 

* For 16 months. Colonel Englund and Colonel Connell rotated as the American Team Chief 
every three to four weeks 

Soviet Team Leaders at Magna, Utah 

July 1988 - 

May 1989 

Anatololiy Yevgenyevich Samarin 

July 1988 - September 1988 

Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Kharlamov 

September 1988 - December 1988 

Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Yevdokimov 

December 1988 - February 1989 

Viktor Dimitryevich Kozlov 

February 1989 - April 1989 

Vyacheslav Semenovich Lebedev 

April 1989 - June 1989 

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kuznetsov 

June 1989 - August 1989 

Anatololiy Yevgenyevich Samarin 

August 1989 - October 1989 

Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Komogortsev 

October 1989 - December 1989 

Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Yevdokimov 

December 1989 - February 1990 

Gennadiy Ivanovich Solntse 

February 1990 - March 1990 

Vyacheslav Semenovich Lebedev 

March 1990 - May 1990 

Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Komogortsev 

May 1990 - July 1990 

Anatololiy Yevgenyevich Samarin 

July 1990 - September 1990 

Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Yevdokimov 

September 1990 - November 1990 

Vyacheslav Semenovich Lebedev 

November 1990 - January 1991 

Vladimir Ivanovich Tselishchev 

January 1991 - March 1991 

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kuznetsov 

March 1991 - May 1991 

Anatololiy Yevgenyevich Samarin 

May 1991 






Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 


AN AMERICAN NURSE IN VOTKINSK 

In February 1991, Phyllis Sanders, Registered Nurse, began 
working at Votkinsk for the Hughes Technical Services Company. 

In November 1992, she recalled her experiences at Votkinsk in 
nursing, inspecting, and participating in local, Russian cultural 
activities. Educated at Pennsylvania State University and the Sa¬ 
muel Merritt Hospital School of Nursing in Oakland, California, she 
worked in trauma centers, emergency and operating rooms prior to 
her Votkinsk duty. 

I am an R.N. and came to Votkinsk in February 1991 as the 
person responsible for the medical care of 30 U.S. civilian and 
military portal monitoring inspectors. 

I believe that we were in the vanguard as far as any group of 
Americans outside those in the Embassy in Moscow who were 
living in the then Soviet Union. Medical care in Russia was a virtual unknown to us, and in order to 
establish what our resources here might be, and to develop a policy for our own care. I did a lot of work 
investigating and evaluating the Russian medical system. Seeing that system from the inside out, writing 
my opinions about it, and interacting extensively with the Russian medical personnel, was a time in my 
career that / will always remember. 

The routine, daily care of the inspectors here is a pleasant, new type of work for me. The inspectors 
are polite, healthy, intelligent, and conscientious individuals who are interested in staying healthy. Many 
of the medical problems encountered are athletic injuries. This is afar cry from gunshots, stabwounds, 
and drug overdose that I experienced as a nurse in a trauma center in Oakland, California. 

Beyond the duties associated with our particular areas of expertise, each inspector "sits shift." 
This means that he or she sits several times a week for 12-hour periods, day or night, seven days a week, 
52 weeks a year. The "sitting" is in a small metal building with a lot of high-tech equipment, monitoring 
the traffic coming out of the Russian missile assembly plant. One thing I did not get away from, then, is 
shift work. 1 am now spending my second Thanksgiving on site and will soon share my second Christmas 
with my fellow inspectors. 

The inspectors, to a great degree, develop close relationships, not only out of common interests 
and disposition, but from the sharing of a common experience .However, we live under many restrictions. 
We are 30 people confined to a living area of about 2.5 acres. We can only leave this area by request, 
and that request must be made a full 24 hours in advance. It may then be "approved," but just as often 
it is not. When we finally do go out, we are always under escort, and we may not wander freely from the 
place, or the stated activity. 

Despite all of this, being deep inside Russia is, in some convoluted way, the adventure of all 
adventures. In my wildest dreams I would never have pictured dinners with American generals and 
Soviet government officials at a dacha in a forest in Udmurtia. Or listening to hauntingly beautiful a 
capella music in the Russian Orthodox Church on Easter morning, with the elaborate service being 
peiformed by half a doz.en priests dressed in rich brocades and silver vestments juxtaposed against 
hundreds of attending men, women and children. The Russians were wrapped in dark, colorless cloth 
coats, heavy woolen head scarves, and woolen stockings. Standing in the nave of the church for over 
tv'O hours, the Russians worshiped their God openly after so many years of oppression. 

Source: Letter, Phyllis Sanders, Votkinsk, Russia, November 27, 1992. 



95 


















On-Site Inspection Agency 


Summary 


Throughout the first three years of the INF Treaty, Soviet and Ameri¬ 
can on-site portal monitoring inspections were watched closely. Other arms 
control treaties were being negotiated; American and Soviet START Treaty 
negotiators in Geneva examined the INF experience carefully. On-site 
inspections of strategic missile armament plants would, in all probability, 
be a part of any final START Treaty. Thus, the experiences of the INF portal 
monitoring inspectors and escorts did not go unnoticed; the arms control 
community in both the Soviet Union and the United States kept a close 
watch on the process and the results of these unprecedented on-site inspec¬ 
tions. 



At Votkinsk in the winter of 1988-1989, the American portal monitoring inspection team gathered one morning and framed this 
American flag in the snow. 


96 











Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections 


NOTES: CHAPTER 5 

'"Lajoie’s US Team Arrives," TASS, July 2, 1988, rpt. in FBIS-SOV , July 5, 1988, 
pp. 3-4. See also: Dawn Tracy, "Utah Greets Soviet Arms Inspectors," Salt Lake 
Tribune , July 3, 1988, pp. Al-2; Salt Lake Tribune , July 1-5, 1988; Desert News, 
July 5, 1988; INF Treaty, Article 11. 

2 

The INF Treaty, Article 6, Paragraph 1. 

"Thomas B. Cochran et al.. Nuclear Weapons Databook: Soviet Nuclear Weapons 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1989), Vol. 4, pp. 68-77. See also: CIA, Soviet 
Weapons Industry, 1986; INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding for the 
SS-20, SS-12, SS-23, SS-25, all of which had been or were currently being 
assembled at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. 

4 //VF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, pp. 115-120. 

^James R. Blackwell, "Contributions and Limitations of On-Site Inspections in INF 
and START," in Dunn, The New Role, pp. 95-120. 

6 Ibid. pp. 100-102. 

7 

INF Treaty, Article 11, Paragraph 6. 

8 Ibid. 

9 , . . 

"Missile Maker Unhappy That Russians Are Coming," Washington Post, June 1, 
1988, p. 16. See also: Susan Kelleher, "To Utah Town, Soviet Monitors Will Ad 
Flavor to Ethnic Crucible," Washington Post, July 2, 1988. The Hercules Corpo¬ 
ration's Bacchus Works Complex produced rocket motors for the MX, Trident, and 
Midgetman nuclear missile stages. 

10 Salt Lake Tribune, February 18, 1988. 

1 Reports of the Technical Consultations. 

12 

~INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 9, Paragraph 1. 

l3 Ibid., Paragraph 6a. See also: INF Treaty, Article 11, Paragraph 6; Reports of the 
Technical Consultations. 

l4 Interview with Lt. Commander James L. Szatkowski (USN), OSIA Detachment 
Commander at Magna, January 2, 1990. See also: Colonel George M. Connell 
(USMC), "Memorandum: Magna Issues and Tasks," June 22, 1988. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Lajoie as quoted by Mike Gorrell, "US Ready for Soviets Arrival," Salt Lake 
Tribune, June 24. 1988, p. Bl. 

n Reports of the Technical Consultations. 

18 

1 Interview, Daniel. 

I9 /Vew York Times, June 23, 1988. 

~°"Lajoie's US Team Arrives," TASS, July 2, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, July 5, 
1988, pp. 3-4. 

_l For additional information on portal monitoring activities, see: David Arnold, 
"It’s Not a Job for the Squeamish," Boston Globe, May 15, 1989; Tom Ashbrook, 
"Our Men in Votkinsk," Boston Globe, August 31, 1988, p. 66; Jim Stewart, 


97 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


"Experts: The INF Treaty Works Surprisingly Well," Atlanta Journal-Atlanta 
Constitution, November 27, 1988, p. 20. 

“ 2 "Inspector on ‘Warm’ Reception," Izvestiya (Moscow), July 6, 1988, morning 
edition, p. 4, trans. in FBIS-SOV, July 8, 1988, p. 1. 

23 Ibid., p. 2. 

~ 4 OSIA Headquarters, Portal Weekly Reports , July/August 1988. 

25 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement. 

~ 6 New York Times, September 26, 1988. 

“ 7 OSIA Magna Detachment, Magna Weekly Reports, August/September, 1988. 

‘ As paraphrased in Arnold, "Squeamish," Boston Globe. 

29 

“ OSIA Headquarters, Portal Weekly Reports, January/June 1989. 

30 "On the Way to Strengthening Trust," Leninski Put (Votkinsk), June 14, 1989, 
trans. by OSIA, p. 5. 

3 'ibid. 

3 “Ibid., p. 6. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 

35 OSIA Headquarters, Portal Weekly Reports, July/October 1988. See also: Mark 
Grotelueschen (USAFA), "Portal Monitoring: The Monitoring of the Votkinsk 
Machine Plant for the On-Site Inspection Agency," OSIA Research Internship 
Report , July 1990. 

36 Salt Lake Tribune, October 12,1988. See also: OSIA Magna Detachment, Magna 
Weekly Reports, March/April 1989. 

37 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement. 

38 

‘ OSIA Headquarters, Portal Weekly Reports, January/February, 1990. See also: 
Lt. Commander Roy Peterson (USN), OSIA Votkinsk Site Commander, "Sequence 
of Events Surrounding the Exit of Soviet 6-Axle Railcar," March 10, 1990. 

39 

Peterson, "Sequence." 

40 

ACDA, Annual Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control 
Agreements, February 15, 1991, pp. 13-14. See also: ACDA, Supplemental Report 
to Congress on SS-23 Missiles in Eastern Europe , September 18, 1991. 

41 Ibid., p. 13. 

4- U.S. State Department, Press Release , March 18, 1990 ACDA, Annual Report 
to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, February 
15, 1991, pp. 13-14. 

43 ACDA, Noncompliance, pp. 13-14. 

44 Ibid. 


98 



CHAPTER 6 


INF ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS 


■ 



In September 1988, the U.S. eliminated the first of 169 Pershing 1A missiles at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Texas. Vice 
President George Bush, (right) observed the process with General Lajoie, Director OS1A, and Soviet Colonel Nikolai Shabalin. 


B y mandating the elimination ol U.S. and Soviet missiles, the 
INF Treaty marked a sharp break with previous arms control 
treaties. President Reagan noted this distinction in his remarks at the INF 
Treaty signing ceremony in the White House on December 8, 1987. 
Speaking to General Secretary Gorbachev and an audience of diplomats. 


99 











On-Site Inspection Agency 


negotiators, and political leaders, the President began by noting that it had 
taken six years of negotiations to produce the treaty. Then he made a 
comparison: "Unlike treaties in the past, it didn't simply codify the status 
quo or a new arms buildup; it didn't simply talk of controlling an arms race. 
For the first time in history, the language of arms control was replaced by 
arms reduction—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of 
United States and Soviet nuclear missiles." 1 


Elimination Sites 


When the treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, the Soviet Union 
and the United States listed 12 elimination sites in the revised data exchange 
in the official Memorandum of Understanding. In the same document, they 
designated which missile system would be eliminated at each site. 

The United States declared it would eliminate 846 INF missiles, as 
well as launchers and associated equipment. All were grouped into three 
major weapons systems: the Pershing II (234) and Pershing IA (169) owned 
and operated by the U.S. Army, and the BGM-109 GLCMs (443) of the 
U.S. Air Force. Once the treaty went into effect, the military services were 
responsible, upon receipt of appropriate orders, for removing the INF 
missiles and launchers from operational status, for transporting them to the 
elimination sites, and for conducting the actual eliminations. Four sites were 
used: three in the continental United States and one in West Germany. In 
the United States, the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, 
Texas, would eliminate all Pershing IA and a portion of the Pershing II 
missile stages. The Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado, was the site 
for eliminating the other portion of the Pershing II missiles and selected 
Pershing II launchers. In Europe, the elimination site was located at the U.S. 
Army’s Equipment Maintenance Center at Hausen, West Germany. There, 



100 





















INF Elimination Inspections 



Pershing II launchers would be eliminated. The Air Force selected Davis- 
Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, as the site for destroying its 
GLCM missiles and launchers. The Army and Air Force had to complete 
all eliminations within the deadlines set by the treaty: 18 months for the 
shorter-range missile systems and three years for the intermediate-range 
systems." 

The USSR declared it would eliminate 1,846 INF missiles. Eight sites 
were used, all within the Soviet Union. In the eastern USSR, two military 
bases, Kansk and Chita, served as elimination sites where a small number 
of SS-20 missiles were launched to destruction. The treaty permitted each 
party the right to destroy up to 100 missiles through launching. This activity 
had to be completed by December 1, 1988. Saryozek in the eastern Soviet 
Union served as the elimination site for SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. On the 
European side of the Ural Mountains, in the western USSR, five sites were 
used for eliminating INF missiles. At Kapustin Yar, SS-20 missiles would 
be destroyed though explosive demolition. At Stan'kovo, SS-12 and SS-23 
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles would be eliminated, while at 
Sarny, SS-20 (TEL) vehicles were scheduled for elimination. At Lesnaya, 
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and components would be destroyed. At Jelgava, 
the nondeployed SSC-X-4 missiles and launchers would be destroyed. ' 


Elimination Schedules 


The scheduling of missile eliminations was at the discretion, within 
the time lines prescribed in the treaty, of the respective governments. No 
missiles, launchers, or support equipment could be eliminated unless an 
inspection team was present to record and report on the destruction. The 
most significant of the treaty schedules were those mandating the elimina¬ 
tion of the shorter-range missiles within 18 months and of the intermediate- 
range missiles in three years. Another important treaty provision addressed 
the unique INF problem of both parties’ maintaining operational parity in 


101 







On-Site Inspection Agency 



* 

**$ 


All INF missiles, launchers, and support equipment had to he eliminated in accordance with the treaty’s 
protocol on eliminations. Here, Soviet soldiers are cutting the aft section, trunion block, of an SS-20 
missile transporter-erector-launcher vehicle at the Sarny Elimination Facility, USSR. 


the number of warheads. The SS-20 missile had three reentry vehicles, the 
Pershing II, one. To achieve parity in the final elimination months, treaty 
negotiators included a provision that, no later than the 29th treaty month, 
the number of deployed intermediate-range missile launchers should not 
exceed the number of launchers capable of carrying missiles with 171 
warheads. This meant that the Soviet Union had to eliminate sufficient 
SS-20 missile launchers so that at the beginning of the 29th treaty month 
no more than 57 of the three-warheaded SS-20 missiles remained deployed. 4 


Rate of INF Missile Eliminations: 
1988-1989 


Percentage of Total Missiles 



T mm us Note: Differences in percentages reflect two treaty disparities: the USSR 

Legend: soviet had more shorter range missiles (SS-23, SS-12) which had to be destroyed 

within 18 months, and the Soviet SS-20 had 3-warheads per missile. 


102 

































INF Elimination Inspections 


Another treaty requirement involved the time period for either party 
to exercise its right to destroy up to 100 of its missiles by launching them 
to destruction. The period was six months following entry into force. The 
Soviet Union exercised this treaty right; the United States did not. Within the 
first six months the Soviets launched 72 SS-20 missiles from Chita and Kansk. 
All of these launches were observed by American on-site inspection teams.' 

For all scheduled eliminations of the INF missiles, launchers, and 
associated equipment, the treaty required that the inspecting party be 
notified 30 days in advance. This official notification was to contain the 
name and coordinates of the elimination facility and an estimated date for 
beginning the eliminations. Because the actual process had to be observed 
by on-site inspectors, the date became, in effect, the arrival date of the 
inspection team. The notification also contained an estimated date of 
completion. For its part, the inspecting party had to provide the inspected 
party with a 72-hour notice before arriving in the country. Once there, the 
inspectors would travel to the elimination site under escort and would 
remain there until the eliminations were completed. 


Record of INF Eliminations 


The purpose of the on-site elimination inspections was clearly defined 
in the treaty. Article 10, Paragraph 2, stated that "verification" by "on-site 
inspection" of the elimination of missile systems specified in the Protocol 
on Eliminations "shall be conducted" in accordance with the treaty and its 
protocols. The missile systems specified in that protocol included INF 
missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile 
transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, support structures, and 
propellant tanks. 



103 





















































































On-Site Inspection Agency 



Vice President George Bush observed the first Pershing l A elimination on September 8, 1988 at the 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas. 



Crushing of Pershing 1A rocket 
motor casing. 


U.S. missile eliminations began at the Longhorn Army Ammunition 
Plant in Marshall, Texas, on September 8, 1988A Both nations had agreed 
that the initial missile eliminations could be witnessed by senior government 
officials, the public, and television and print media, provided the INF on-site 
inspectors were not interfered with in any way. A team of Soviet inspectors, 
with their American escorts, went to Texas the first week in September. The 
first American INF missile elimination attracted an audience of several 
hundred. On the morning of September 8, the Vice President of the United 
States, the Director of OSIA, other senior officials, and almost one hundred 
print and television journalists watched as a 12-man Soviet inspection team 
arrived at the Army Ammunition Plant destruction area and conducted their 
preliminary inspection of two Pershing IA missile stages. As the missile 
stages were bolted into the static test stands, the inspection team monitored 
the preparations leading to the rocket motor firing. Vice President George 
Bush, General Roland Lajoie, Colonel Nikolai Shabalin (the senior Soviet 
inspector at the site), and the journalists watched as the missile rocket 
motors were ignited in a roar of smoke and fire. Following the missiles’ 
destruction. Vice President Bush spoke briefly, stating that, "This is the day 
we began to reverse the arms race." 7 In his comments, Colonel Shabalin 
explained the Soviet Union’s motives for entering into the INF Treaty and 
concluded, "The world is by no means doomed to the nuclear arms race."* 

Throughout September and into the fall of 1988, the United States 
continued eliminating Pershing IA missile stages in Texas. In October, 
eliminations of GLCM missiles, launch canisters, and launchers began at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. Also in October, eliminations 
of Pershing II launchers got underway at Hausen, West Germany. 1 " In 
December, eliminations started at the Pueblo Depot Activity in Colorado." 
All U.S. eliminations were witnessed by Soviet on-site inspection teams. 


104 









INF Elimination Inspections 


According to the treaty, all shorter-range INF missiles had to be 
eliminated within the first 18 months. For the United States, every Pershing 
IA missile, training missile stage, and launcher had to be destroyed by 
November 30, 1989. On July 6, 1989, five months ahead of schedule, the 
last of the 169 Pershing IA missiles was eliminated at Longhorn Army 
Ammunition Plant in Texas. Edward J. Lacey, principal deputy director of 
OSIA, and General Major Vladimir I. Medvedev, director of the Soviet 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and senior on-site inspector for this elimi¬ 
nation, observed the destruction of the last American Pershing IA missile. 12 

The next major elimination point for the United States came three 
years after the INF Treaty entered into force. By June 1, 1991, the United 
States had to eliminate all of its intermediate-range Pershing II and GLCM 
missiles. The pace, but not the progress, of eliminating these intermediate- 
range INF missiles varied because of operational and treaty considerations. 
Both the Pershing II and the GLCMs had been deployed in Western Europe 
in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force combat units. The INF Treaty stipulated 
that when either party removed its intermediate-range missiles, launchers, 
and support equipment, it had to do so in "deployed operational units." For 
the United States, this meant that Pershing II batteries and GLCM flights 
had to be taken off operational status as a unit, prepared for transportation, 
and sent to the elimination sites. According to the treaty, all transits of 
missiles and associated equipment had to be completed within 25 days. 



Soviet inspector Viktor Bozhenkov examines a GLCM missile at Davis-Monthan Ait 
Force Base, Arizona. 



GLCM elimination. 


105 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


As a consequence of these operational and treaty considerations, the 
U.S. elimination schedule for intermediate-range missiles saw bursts of 
activity, followed by periods of inactivity and preparations for the next 
series of eliminations. The United States eliminated the following INF 
missiles during the first three treaty years. 


U.S. INF Missile Eliminations 3 



MOU 

Totals 

1988-1989 

Eliminated 

1989-1990 

Eliminated 

(cumulative) 

1990-1991 

Eliminated 

(cumulative) 

Intermediate- 
range INF Missiles 

Pershing II 

234 

34 

106 

234 

BGM-109 GLCM 

443 

130 

220 

443 

Shorter-range 

INF Missiles 

Pershing 1A 

169 

169 





Soviet inspector reading weighing 
scales prior to Pershing 11 elimination 
at Longhorn, Texas. 


During the third treaty year, 1990-91, the United States conducted 
eliminations at each of the four sites: Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant 
in Texas, Pueblo Depot Activity in Colorado, Davis-Monthan AFB in 
Arizona, and the U.S. Army Equipment Maintenance Center at Hausen, 
West Germany. At each elimination, OSIA escort teams remained with the 
Soviet on-site inspectors throughout the entire scheduled elimination. Usu¬ 
ally, the escort teams consisted of 10 or more people, all of whom were 
knowledgeable about the treaty and its protocols. Their responsibilities 
included treaty clarification, direct communications with the Soviet inspec¬ 
tion team, and logistics associated with housing, feeding, and transporting 
the Soviet inspectors. 

By the end of the third treaty year, all of the U.S. and Soviet INF 
missile systems had to be eliminated. The final round of American elimi¬ 
nations began in Europe in mid-April 1991. By that time, the United States 
had eliminated 95.5 percent of its INF missiles and 95.9 percent of its INF 
treaty-limited items (launchers and support equipment). On April 16, at 
Hausen, the U.S. Army eliminated the final Pershing II launcher as a Soviet 
inspection team led by Colonel V.V. Yevdokimov monitored the destruc¬ 
tion. Colonel Fred F. Grosick, USAF, led the American escort team. Dr. 
Joerg H. Menzel, the new principal deputy director of OSIA, served as a 
team member and was the senior U.S. government official at this final 
Pershing II launcher elimination in Europe. 

Two weeks later, on May 1, 1991, the United States destroyed the last 
of its 443 U.S. Air Force ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. Colonel Anatoly Y. Samarin 
led the Soviet inspection team and Lt. Colonel Stephen B. Boyd, USAF, 
was the senior American escort. Because it was the final GLCM elimination, 
the final ceremony became a time of reflection. 


106 









INF Elimination Inspections 


ELIMINATING THE INF MISSILES 

Lt. Colonel Stephen B. Boyd, USAF, was a senior American 
escort team leader who participated in more than 50 INF Treaty 
inspections. An experienced field grade officer, he had served in 
strategic missiles, missile maintenance,officer training, and tactical 
missiles, prior to his assignment as the deputy, then commander, of 
the On-Site Inspection Agency’s San Francisco Field Office. Colonel 
Boyd and his staff had responsibility for escorting all Soviet INF 
inspection teams in the western United States from July 1988 through 
June 1992. 

On preparing for a Soviet INF inspection team: "The treaty, 
obviously, was the pivot point for everything we do. In managing, it's 
best to set a certain reference point. Then management starts in 
earnest when we anticipate a Soviet inspection. For the eliminations, 
we knew a month in advance: that's when we in the field office went 
into high gear. I'd say that probably 75 percent of what I personally 
had to do was to take care of the logistical matters. We had to set up 
a secure area for billeting, establish a means for feeding the Soviet 
inspectors, and then plan out the entire movement of the team for 
what we anticipated would be a ten day (elimination) event.” 

On the early days: "We operated on promises.They (Travis Air 
Force Base officials) trusted us that we would pay them back. We got 
vehicles, for example. We would go down to the motor pool, and they 
would say, how many do you need? Vehicles are always a scarce commodity: yet they gave them up for the 
INF mission. We also got an entire block ofVOQ rooms for six weeks for our TDY people. I was, frankly, 
surprised because most bases jealously guard their resources." 

On using military airlift: "We kind of grew with the system. I don't know who did it, but someone set 
up a good liaison with the Military Airlift Command. Sometimes on the ground we'd anticipate the Soviet 
inspectors being there a short period of time (closeout inspections), but other times it could be a full 24-hour 
period (short-notice inspections). As it turned out, the Soviets spent almost 24 hours on each of the sites. The 
airlift has worked flawlessly." 

On the Soviet INF inspection teams: "The Soviets, at least the ones that I have been in contact with, 
have been very diplomatic, rational, and logical. Let me tell you about two instances, both at Davis Monthan. 
In the first, the Soviets looked at several GLCM missile trainers, and they were of different configurations 
because they had slightly different training objectives. One of them had a fuel bladder that was used for 
fueling/defueling training: the others looked like standard missile trainers. The Soviet inspectors were 
concerned that we had different modifications, or different models of the GLCM missiles. They spent what / 
considered a considerable amount of time, an hour or so, discussing why these trainers were different in 
appearance. I explained, and the Air Force people on site explained to them, that the trainers had different 
training objectives within the same missile system." 

"On another occasion, there were several GLCM canisters which differed in appearance from the 
standard MOV photographs. These missiles had been deployed overseas. The ones the Air Force displayed 
for this inspection, at Davis-Monthan were 20 inches shorter. The Soviet inspectors were concerned because 
the missiles presented did not look like those in the pictures from the official Memorandum of Understanding. 
On both occasions, the Soviets did not accuse us of anything, nor did they imply that we were trying to pull 
anything over on them. They just simply asked what / considered to be very logical questions. I inferred from 
their questions what their concerns were, which was that the U.S. had more models of GLCM missiles than 
we had advertised. That was not the case. In their inspection report they did not address these differences as 
treaty ambiguities ;they simply made notes in the report that not all of the trainers had the same con figuration 
as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding." 

Source: Interview, April 3, 1989 



Soviet Colonel A.Y. Samarin with 
American Lt. Colonel Stephen Boyd. 


107 











On-Site Inspection Agency 



'•V 1 «* 




Soviet SS-12 missile explodes at 
Kapustin Yar, USSR. 


American technician cutting GLCM 
missile. Davis-Monthan, Arizona. 


Demolition expert Joe MacDonald (r) 
prepares a Pershing II for destruction. 


Soviet warrant officer cuts an SS-20 
TEL at Sarny, USSR. 


108 





























































INF Elimination Inspections 


Soviet and American inspectors and 
escorts discuss the final SS-20 elimi¬ 
nation at Kapustin Yar, USSR. 



Soviet Colonel Kuznetsov (c.) holds a 
child during a visit to a scout troop at 
Magna, Utah. 


General Parker, Director, OS I A, prepares to 
offer a toast at a dinner at Kapustin Yar, 
USSR, in May 1991. 


et inspectors and American 
rts jogging in the evening 
'arshall, Texas. 


mm 


109 




























On-Site Inspection Agency 


"We can now look forward 
to eliminating other nuclear 
weapons.... " 


General Medvedev 


Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, who became the director of 
OSIA in January 1991, said that there had been 17 elimination inspections 
at Davis-Monthan, and "each has been successful...each complied with the 
treaty." 14 General Medvedev, Director of the USSR’s Nuclear Risk Reduc¬ 
tion Center, responded that the Soviet Union and the United States had 
eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. "We can now look forward," 
General Medvedev concluded, "to eliminating other nuclear weapons, and 
we have created a good premise for that." 1 " 


Five days after this final GLCM elimination in Arizona, the United States 
destroyed its last Pershing II missile stages in Texas on May 6, 1991. A 
large team of 18 Soviet inspectors flew into Washington, D.C., on Satur¬ 
day, May 4. Led by Colonel V.V. Yevdokimov, the Soviet team was es¬ 
corted to Texas by Major Freddie L. Price, USAF, and an experienced 
American INF escort team. Because this was the final American elimination of 
an INF missile system, a formal, public ceremony was held at the Longhorn Army 
Ammunition Plant. It was attended by several hundred people, including Ameri¬ 
can and Soviet dignitaries, agency personnel, plant employees, soldiers from 
Pershing regiments, journalists, and the public. In his remarks just before the 
destruction of the final nine-ton Pershing II first-stage rocket motor. Ambassador 
Ronald F. Lehman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
said, "The INF treaty has set high standards for arms control achievement and 
has opened doors for the political changes necessary to address the causes rather 
than the symptoms of conflict." 1 ' 1 



Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman . Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
threw the switch which ignited the final Pershing II rocket motor. 


110 


















INF Elimination Inspections 


Speaking for the Soviet Union, General Medvedev predicted that the 
next major arms control treaty—the START Treaty, then in the final 
negotiating stages—would build upon the precedents established under the 
INF Treaty. "The tracks are already made," he concluded. 1 General Parker, 
the OSIA director, focused his remarks on the work of the on-site inspectors: 

"Nearly three years ago, on the first of July 1988, the first US. inspectors 
landed in Moscow to begin the implementation of this treaty. Sixteen days 
later a group of Soviet inspectors arrived here at Longhorn, Texas, to 
conduct a baseline inventory of Pershing treaty-limited items.... 

For the past 35 months, this process of inspector visits to sites halfway 
around the world has repeated itself over 600 times. Twenty-nine teams 
of Soviet inspectors came to Marshall, Texas, primarily to participate 
intimately in the INF countdown, to attest to their government that indeed 
the United States was eliminating these missile systems as promised.... 
Please remember that what we are witnessing is not just the passing of 
this noble weapon system, but also an important milestone in an historic 
agreement between the two most powerful nations on earth." Is 

The Soviet Union's INF Treaty eliminations began at Kapustin Yar 
Missile Test Complex on July 22, 1988, with the elimination of an SS-20 
missile." Less than 10 days later, on August 1, the Soviets destroyed their 
first SS-12s at Saryozek.In contrast to the United States, which used a 
static firing method, the Soviet Union eliminated the INF missiles at 
Kapustin Yar and Saryozek by explosion. By the end of the baseline 
inspection period on August 31, the Soviet government had begun elimina¬ 
tions at seven of its eight designated sites. 21 The reason for this concentrated 
activity had to do with the larger number of missiles the Soviet Union had 
to eliminate. Not only were they obligated by the treaty to destroy 1,000 
more missiles than the United States (1,846 to 846), but they had to 
eliminate more than 900 shorter-range missiles within the first 18 months. 
At the Soviet elimination sites—Kansk, Chita, Kapustin Yar, Saryozek, 
Lesnaya, Stan'kovo, Sarny, and Jelgava—they destroyed the following 
missiles during the first two treaty years. U.S. on-site inspectors observed 
each elimination. 

USSR INF Missile Eliminations 22 



MOU Totals 

1988-1989 

Eliminated 

1989-1990 

Eliminated 

(cumulative) 

1990-1991 

Eliminated 

(cumulative) 

Intermediate- 
range INF missiles 





SS-20 

654 

192 

454 

654 

SS-4 

149 

149 

149 

149 

SS-5 

6 

1 

6 

6 

SSC-X-4 

80 

80 

80 

80 

Shorter-range INF 
missiles 





SS-23 

239 

0 

239 

239 

SS-12 

718 

600 

718 

718 



Major General Robert W. Parker 
Director. On-Site Inspection Agency. 


Ill 











On-Site Inspection Agency 



American and Soviet teams at the last elimination ofSS-4s at Lesnaya Elimination Facility, USSR, in May 1990. 


The On-Site Inspection Agency sent 129 inspection teams to the 
Soviet Union to verify these eliminations from 1988 through 1991. They 
observed and recorded the destruction according to the treaty’s protocols 
on eliminations. The pace was steady, with nearly continuous eliminations 
scheduled by Soviet officials during the first two years. Both of the Soviet 
shorter-range INF missile systems—the SS-23s and SS-12s with ranges 
from 500 to 1,000 kilometers—were eliminated in advance of the 18-month 
treaty deadline of November 30, 1989. On July 25, 1989, the last of 718 
SS-12 missiles was destroyed at Saryozek, Kazakhstan. 2, The OSIA team 
of nine inspectors that observed this final destruction was led by Lt. Colonel 
Terry Comeil, U.S. Army. The final parts of the SS-23 missile system, the 
missiles and the launchers, were eliminated on October 27, 1989, at separate 
Soviet elimination sites. The final SS-23 launchers were eliminated at 
Stan’kovo, Byelorussia, with Lt. Colonel Thomas Brock, U.S. Army, 
leading the 10-person inspection team. The final SS-23 missile was de¬ 
stroyed at Saryozek, Kazakhstan, with Captain John Williams, U.S. Navy, 
serving as the chief of the American inspection team. 24 

As the treaty entered its third year, the Soviet Union had eliminated 
all of its shorter-range and most of its intermediate-range missiles, with the 
exception of the three-warhead, mobile SS-20 missile. The last of 6 SS-5 
missiles had been destroyed on August 16,1989, at the Lesnaya elimination 
site, and the last of 149 SS-4 missiles on May 22, 1990, also at Lesnaya. 2 " 
One remaining SS-4 missile transporter vehicle was eliminated in October 
1990. With only the SS-20 missiles remaining, six of the eight Soviet 
elimination sites were shut down. The remaining two, Sarny and Kapustin 
Yar, functioned as elimination sites for the SS-20s. 

The last SS-20 missile elimination occurred at Kapustin Yar Missile 
Test Complex in southern USSR on May 12, 1991. The United States sent 
20 of its most experienced inspectors, including OSIA Director General 


112 













INF Elimination Inspections 


Parker; Colonel Douglas Englund, chief of staff; Colonel Ronald Forest, 
director of operations; and Captain John Williams, chief of the Inspection 
Division. Captain Williams led the team. General Medvedev represented 
the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, which had conducted all of the 
INF inspections and escorts for the USSR. Accompanying General Med¬ 
vedev and his senior staff was General Colonel Alexander P. Volkov, First 
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces." 1 ’ 


"This road was not easy." 


General Medvedev 


At Kapustin Yar, the Soviet demolition crew began the final elimina¬ 
tion by crushing two SS-20 front sections, including the instrumentation 
compartments and reentry vehicles. At approximately four o’clock in the 
afternoon, they detonated the final two SS-20 missiles before the small 
crowd of American inspectors, Soviet escorts, Soviet military observers, 
journalists, and television reporters. At the brief ceremony that followed, 
General Parker recounted that in the course of the previous three years, U.S. 
inspectors had carried out more than 400 on-site inspections of Soviet INF 
sites and missile systems, while the Soviets had conducted more than 230 
inspections of U.S. facilities and missile systems. General Medvedev also 
complimented the inspectors and escorts, as well as the Soviet Strategic 
Rocket Forces, on their implementation of the INF Treaty." This road was 
not easy," Mevedev recalled. "We all remember what a political maelstrom 
existed around these missiles...in the 1980s. But the struggle for peace and 
common sense won." 27 



Major General Robert W. Parker, Director OSIA (c.) and Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley (r.) with a Soviet 
military journalist and a site escort officer at Kapustin Yar in May 1991. 




113 










On-Site Inspection Agency 


With the destruction of these SS-20 missiles, there remained only the 
elimination of SS-20 launchers and missile transporter vehicles to complete 
the Soviet Union’s obligation to eliminate its 1,846 INF missiles and 
systems. That occurred at Sarny on May 28, 1991. Lt. Colonel Comeil, the 
American team chief, signed the INF inspection report certifying that the 
last launchers and vehicles had been eliminated. 


Summing Up 


For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the conduct of the 
INF Treaty eliminations constituted deployment of the largest number of 
inspectors and escorts. In the first three treaty years, 129 OSIA on-site 
inspection teams and 64 OSIA escort teams participated in elimination 
inspections. Counting all types of inspections, the OSIA teams were in¬ 
volved in more than 600 inspections and escorts in the three treaty years 
from 1988 to 1991. In carrying out these inspections, the team chiefs, 
deputies, linguists, and team members validated the on-site inspection 
concepts and procedures associated with a detailed nuclear amis reduction 
treaty. Their experiences would be a valuable asset as the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the European nations turned to newer and larger negoti¬ 
ated conventional and nuclear amis reduction treaties. 



The Soviet Union declared 654 SS-20 missiles. These nvo instrument compartments and warhead sections 
were destroyed on May 13, 1991, at Kapustin Yar, USSR, in the presence of American INF inspectors. 


114 







INF Elimination Inspections 


NOTES: CHAPTER 6 

'"Soviet Union-United States Summit in Washington, DC," Weekly Presidential 
Documents (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, December 8, 1987), 
Vol. 23, pp. 1457-1458. 

2 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding Data Update. See also: U.S. Army 
Missile Command, Report: Pershing Weapons Systems, Lessons Learned, INF 
Treaty Retrograde!Elimination (Fluntsville: Colsa, Inc., July 2, 1990). 

3 Ibid. 

4 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-11. 

5 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 449. 

6 Peter Applebome, "First US Missiles Destroyed at Part of Nuclear Treaty With 
Soviets," New' York Times, September 9, 1988, p. A13. See also: Marshall News 
Messenger, September 8, 1988; Mary T. Schmich, "US Begins Destroying Mis¬ 
siles," Chicago Tribune, September 9, 1988, pp. 1-2; Carl P. Leubsdorf, "Destruc¬ 
tion in the Cause of Peace: Missile Crushing Begins," Dallas Morning News, 
September 9, 1988, pp. 1, 10A; John W. Mashek, "Bush On Hand for Scrapping 
of Missiles," Washington Post, September 9, 1988. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid. 

9 Arizona Republic, October 19, 1988. See also: Arizona Daily Star, October 19, 
1988. 

I() U.S. Army Missile Command, Pershing Weapons Systems, pp. 15, 31. See also: 
Das Bild (Frankfurt), October 20, 1988. 

1 'ibid., pp. 11,31. See also: "Soviets Oversee ‘Real Disarmament’ in Pueblo," Salt 
Lake Tribune, December 8, 1988, p. A3. 

1 9 

Last Pershing Missile to Be Destroyed Today,” Washington Times, July 6, 1989. 
See also: "Army Destroys Last Pershing 1A as Soviets Watch," Baltimore Sun, July 
7, 1989, p. 12; Dan Shomon, Jr., "Last Pershing 1A is Destroyed," Dallas Morning 
News, July 7, 1989, p. 17A. 

i3 OSIA Office of Public Affairs, "INF Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status 
Report," Fact Sheet, May 31, 1989, and July 2, 1990. 

14 Dee Ralles, "Last Land-Fired Cruise Missile Destroyed at Davis-Monthan," 
Arizona Republic, May 2, 1991. 

15 Ibid. 

16 "Longhom Burns Last Pershing II," Shreveport Times (Louisiana), May 7, 1991. 

17 "US Destroys Its Last Pershing II Missile," Dallas Morning News, May 7, 1991, 
p. 30A. 

,x From the speech notes of Major General Robert W. Parker (USAF), Director 
OSIA, at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, May 6, 1991. 

I9 "US Inspectors See SS-20 Missile Destroyed," TASS, July 22, 1988, trans. in 
FBIS-SOV, July 25, 1988. 


115 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


OQ M 

"Soviets Begin Destroying Missiles as Inspectors Watch," Los Angeles Times, 
August 2, 1988, p. 8. 

21 

Briefing by the Director of OSIA to the Secretary of Defense, November 16. 
1988. 

“"OSIA Headquarters, "INF Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status Report," Fact 
Sheet, July 2, 1990. 

“ OSIA Office of Public Affairs, On-Sight Insights , August 1989. See also: TASS 
(Moscow), July 26, 1989. 

“ 4 "Last SS-23 Missile Eliminated at Saryozek," TASS (Moscow), October 27, 1989, 
rpt. in FBIS-SOV. October 27, 1989, p. 1. See also: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, "US Inspectors Witness Last SS-23s Elimination," News Release , Octo¬ 
ber 27, 1989. 

~ 5 TASS (Moscow), August 16, 1988; See also: Viktor Litovkin, "Last R-12 Missile 
Destroyed Under INF Treaty," Izvestiya , May 24, 1990, trans. in FBIS-SOV , 
May 31, 1990, p. 1. 

?6 

Associated Press (Moscow), May 12, 1991. See also: Reuters (Moscow), May 12, 
1991; Pravda , May 20, 1991; Moscow Central Television , June 4, 1991, trans. in 
FBIS-SOV, June 5, 1991. 

97 , 

"Soviets Destroy Last Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles," Christian Science 
Monitor . May 14, 1991, p. 5. 


116 



CHAPTER 7 


INF CLOSEOUT INSPECTIONS 



The last act in this closeout inspection of the US. Army's Redstone Arsenal was the signing of the inspection reports. Here 
American Colonel Ronald P. Forest and Soviet Colonel Vladimir A. Akimenkov prepare to sign the report flanked by their 
interpreters. 

C onceptually, it is useful to think of the INF Treaty’s five types 
of on-site inspections as a series of treaty "rights" which 
unfolded in a sequence. These inspections, together with the scheduled 
elimination of nearly 2,700 missiles, constituted the heart of the treaty. The 
first type, baseline inspections, began on July 1, 1988. For 60 days, INF 
inspectors confirmed, on site, the number and location of missile systems 


117 






On-Site Inspection Agency 



Test Range, Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
Closed out August 4,1988. 


and sites that had been declared in the Memorandum of Understanding and 
the Data Update. In the second type of inspection, which also began on July 
1, 1988, resident INF inspectors initiated continuous portal monitoring 
inspections at one former missile final assembly facility in each nation. In 
the third type, elimination inspections, INF inspectors observed the destruc¬ 
tion of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at designated elimination 
sites. These missile eliminations began on July 22, 1988, at Kapustin Yar 
in the Soviet Union and on September 8, 1988, at Marshall, Texas. 

The fourth type, closeout inspections, gave the inspecting party the 
treaty right, after being officially notified that a missile site had been 
eliminated, to send inspectors to observe the status of the missile operating 
base, support facility, or launcher production facility. If the inspecting party 
chose not to exercise its right to conduct a closeout inspection, the site was 
considered closed after 60 days had elapsed from the time of the elimination. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union exercised their treaty rights 
and conducted inspections of every announced closed site. Most declara¬ 
tions fell into the period after baseline and before the final eliminations that 
came at the end of the third treaty year—May 31, 1991. In a few instances, 
however, the inspected party declared that the INF missiles and associated 
equipment had been removed and all INF activity had ceased prior to July 
1, 1988, the start of the initial baseline period. In those cases, the treaty 
stipulated that the inspecting party had the right to conduct one inspection, 
which would constitute both a baseline and a closeout inspection of the site. 



Missile Operating Base, Zasimovichi 
USSR. Closed out June 25,1990. 


In all cases, the treaty stipulated explicit procedures for closing out a 
missile site. Thirty days in advance, the inspected party had to declare its 
intention to close or eliminate the INF missile operating base or missile 
support facility. To close the site it had to meet three conditions. First, it had 
to remove all INF missiles, launchers, and associated equipment from the 
site. Second, it had to eliminate, through dismantling or destruction, the INF 
missile support facilities, such as missile or launcher structures, and launch 
pads. Finally, it had to cease all activity relating to production, flight-testing, 
training, repair, storage, or deployment of INF missile systems. The site 
could be converted to another puipose; the treaty only restricted use of the 
site from any future activity associated with any INF missile system. Once 
these conditions had been met and the inspecting party officially notified, 
the missile site or facility was considered under the treaty to be closed out 
after 60 days had elapsed or after the site had been subjected to a closeout 
inspection. 1 

The fifth type of on-site inspection was called "short-notice." Short- 
notice inspections worked within a quota system—20 per year allowed 
during the first three treaty years, 15 per year for the next five treaty years, 
and 10 per year for the last five years. Their function was to give the 
inspecting party the right to inspect any INF site, active or closed, to 
ascertain the declared status of the site. These short-notice inspections 
placed all of the Soviet and American INF sites "at risk" to be inspected at 
any time, within the quota limits. The inspection teams were limited to 10 
inspectors and they had 24 hours to conduct the inspection. 2 


118 













































INF Closeout Inspections 


Initial American Closeout Inspections 


The Soviet Union declared 130 INF sites, all of which had to be closed 
out under the provisions of the treaty within three years. By comparison, 
the United States declared only 31 INF sites. There were two reasons for 
this significant disparity. First, the Soviet Union agreed in the INF Treaty 
to eliminate 1,846 missiles, the United States, 846. One thousand more 
Soviet missiles meant that there were simply more sites—missile operating 
bases, production facilities, flight-testing areas, training sites, repair depots, 
and storage facilities—associated with the USSR's INF missile systems 
than with those of the United States. Second, the two nations had different 
political constraints for deploying missile systems. The United States de¬ 
ployed its missiles on a few, centralized bases in Western Europe, while the 
USSR used many smaller, more dispersed missile operating bases. Thus, 
the disparity in the number of sites—130 Soviet to 31 American—reflected 
differences in treaty missile numbers and deployment strategies. 



The Zasimovichi Missile Operating Base w as closed out in June 1990. These American inspectors and their Soviet escorts are 


standing on the rubble of a detonated missile launch pad. 

The initial closeout inspections began during the baseline period— 
July 1 to August 29, 1988. Before that, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union had prepared several INF sites for elimination. When the INF Treaty 
officially entered into force on June 1, 1988, these sites were listed in the 
Data Update to the Memorandum of Understanding as having no missiles 
or associated treaty-limited items. According to the treaty, this listing 
constituted notification that the sites had been "closed out." To confirm that 


119 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


condition, the inspecting party had the right to examine the site during one 
of its baseline inspections. Thus, in this instance, a baseline inspection was 
also a closeout inspection. Both the United States and the USSR, in every 
instance, deployed an inspection team to inspect these sites. 


INF Sites in the Western Soviet Union 


a Declared in Memorandum of 
Understanding, 1 November 1987. 




V 


Finland 


V3 


Sweden 


* 


\ . 

cm jf-f 







200 Kilometers 

- 1 -1- 1 -1 

200 Miles 







'Leningrad 


_/V 


Cherepovets > 


.Novgorod 


Vyru .Pskov 

Aluksne A A Ostrov 


A 'Riga 

Jelgava 


Sovetsk A Taurage ^jkmerge Vetrm °M. Po i otsk 
LadushkinA ^ Ka A mala , a Postav V 

Vilnius* A 

C * Smorgon 


Kalinin. 


Gor'kiy * 


, * MOSCOW 

(point of entry) 

A Serpukhov 

Tula 


WARSAW 


1 Lida a Kolosovo _. „ 

GezgalyA ±Stankovo 

\ Lesnaya A j^Lapichi 

■ )Slonim A Sluisk Tsel 

RuzhanyA A blutsk 

ZasimovjcTii a a A Bronnaya Gora „ .. 

- Slobudka A Pinsk ^ Petrikov A p° c ' hitsa 

Malorita A Zhitkovichi \, ozyf , Glukhov ^ 


Poland 

Dnynoni/A A 


Soviet Union 


loritaA Zhitkovichi A M ozyr • 

Sarny A 

X Lutsk A ALipniki 

> A Belokorovichi A Korosten’ 

y^A Slavuta Berezovka >Kiev 

Chervonograd A A * 

. Brody A Vysokaya Pech’ 

L vov 

^Stryy 


.Voronezh 


A Skala-Podol’skaya 


Zherebkovo 

i 



Lebedin A 

Akhtyrka A 


A Lozovaya 

.Dnepropetrovsk 


Rosto v.Bataysk 




/ 


Sea of 
Azov 




A ,Krasnodar 


Black Sea 


120 










INF Closeout Inspections 


On July 17, Lt. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, U.S. Army, led an American 
inspection team to the industrial city ot Sverdlovsk, where they conducted 
an INF baseline/closeout inspection of the Experimental Plant of the Amal¬ 
gamated Production Works of the M.I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant. 
This plant formerly had produced SSC-X-4 missile launchers; the Soviet 
Union had listed the plant in the MOU, but had not included any data in the 
initial data exchange. By deduction, this meant that the Soviet government 
had declared officially that all production of INF missile launchers had 
ceased at the plant. Colonel Nelson's 10-person team inspected the plant, 
signed the inspection reports, and met briefly with reporters. An interviewer 
with Vremya, the Moscow-based national television news program, asked 
E.I. Krayniy, plant engineer, about the American INF inspection. "The U.S. 
inspectors." he replied, "carried out an inspection of the territory and the 
installations of the experimental works.... All conditions of the treaty have 
been complied with."' 


"It gives us pleasure to see 
that our professional ties 
with the USSR are devel¬ 
oping." 


Lt. Colonel Nelson 


Colonel Nelson then spoke to Vremya: "I am pleased to be here today, 
to have inspected the Sverdlovsk launcher production facility.... It gives us 
pleasure to see that our professional ties with the USSR are developing." 4 
In a separate interview. Nelson told a TASS reporter, "Under the Treaty, I 
do not have the right to comment on the results of the inspection, but I am 
satisfied with the cooperation of the Soviet side. All those we worked with 
are good professionals.' 0 After these brief interviews, the 10-person Ameri¬ 
can team departed, returning to Moscow and then to OSIA European Field 
Office in Frankfurt. 


One week later, on July 21, Colonel Edward H. Cabaniss, U.S. Army, 
led an American INF inspection team to Petropavlovsk in Kazakhstan, 
approximately 2,000 kilometers east of Moscow. Petropavlovsk was the 
location of the V.I. Fenin Heavy Machine Building Plant, where the 
American team conducted a closeout inspection of the former SS-23 missile 
launcher production facility. Following the inspection and signing of the 
reports, the Americans were given a brief tour of the city. There, a TASS 
reporter asked Colonel Cabaniss about the INF inspection. "The American 
inspectors," he replied, "had been given a chance of visiting all places they 
thought it was necessary to visit, and of seeing everything they wanted to 
see." He thought that there was a "mutual understanding" with the Soviet 
side on the conduct of the inspection. ' 

That same day, July 21, more than 3,800 kilometers to the west. Ft. 
Colonel Fawrence G. Kelley, USMC, led a 10-person American INF team 
to Prague, Czechoslovakia. Prague’s Ruzyne International Airport was a 
treaty-designated point of entry. The U.S. inspection team was in Czecho¬ 
slovakia to conduct a closeout inspection of the Soviet SS-12 missile 
operating base at Hranice in northern Moravia. The Czechoslovakian CTK 
news service reported that, the SS-12 missiles had been withdrawn in March 
1988 and sent to elimination sites in the Soviet Union.' At the airport, 
Colonel Kelley and his team were met by Colonel Ivan Y. Abrosimov, chief 
of the Soviet INF escort team for this inspection. Following introductions 
to the Soviet escort team and representatives of the Czechoslovakian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Central 
Group of Forces, Colonel Kelley spoke to a Prague television reporter. "We 
are coming to carry out a basic inspection of the Soviet missile base on 
Czechoslovak territory. We are coming to verify whether or not certain 


121 




On-Site Inspection Agency 



pieces of equipment, liable to the treaty, remain deployed at this base." s 
After these brief courtesies, the American inspection team and their Soviet 
and Czech escorts departed by bus for Moravia and the INF missile 
operating base. 

At Hranice, the inspection commenced shortly after the team’s arrival. 
A reporter from the RUDE PRAVO newspaper in Prague recorded his 
observations of the inspection: 

The American group began its inspection work in Hranice at 1500. The 
inspectors checked the Hranice military barracks, including the vehicle 
pool and the training area. They had the opportunity to inspect in detail 
individual buildings, which formerly served the Soviet missile unit, and 


122 








INF Closeout Inspections 


places where there used to he equipment for the training of Soviet soldiers. 
They also made random checks on vehicles and further equipment belong¬ 
ing to the unit of the Czechoslovak People's Army which has taken over 
Hranice barracks.... The inspectors then moved into the military area to 
one of the former combat positions. There they were able to convince 
themselves that all military materiel which is subject to elimination under 
the Soviet-American treaty was no longer there 

When the inspection was completed, the INF inspectors and their 
escorts returned to Prague; once again they were interviewed by television 
and newspaper reporters. Colonel Abrosimov commented on the inspection, 
the treaty, and Czechoslovakia's role. "Czechoslovakia completely fulfilled 
all commitments resulting for it from the adopted documents." 10 The Soviet 
Union had negotiated separate diplomatic agreements with both Czechoslo¬ 
vakia and the German Democratic Republic, where Soviet INF missile units 
had been based. Colonel Kelley was also asked about the results of the 
inspection. "Appropriate conclusions had been drawn,"" but he was not 
authorized to make the results public. He stated that his group’s activity was 
in "complete harmony" with the provisions of the treaty. He, too, acknow¬ 
ledged Czechoslovakia's role in assisting with the transportation and ar¬ 
rangements for the inspection. 

These were 3 of 16 closeout inspections conducted by American INF 
inspection teams during the baseline period, July through August 1988. In 
the same two weeks, U.S. inspection teams completed 114 INF baseline 
inspections of 79 Soviet INF missile operating bases, 19 missile storage 
facilities, 6 training facilities, 2 test ranges, 12 repair facilities, 3 launcher 
production plant, and 8 elimination sites. The United States also instituted— 
on July 2, 1988—its continuous portal monitoring inspections at the former 
SS-20 assembly plant at Votkinsk. The Votkinsk missile final assembly 
facility was one of three declared in the Soviet’s treaty memorandum of 
understanding. Although these facilities were listed in the treaty, they were 
designated as "noninspectable" sites. Also during baseline, the United States 
began sending on-site inspection teams to monitor the elimination of the 
Soviet INF missiles and support systems. Thus, during the initial baseline 
phase, there were four types of on-site inspections underway in the Soviet 
Union. 



Missile Operating Base Hranice, 
Czechoslovakia. 


Initial Soviet Closeout Inspections 


Soviet INF inspectors during baseline conducted closeout inspections 
at five U.S. missile sites and facilities. All five sites—Dugway Proving 
Grounds in Utah; Air Force Plant 19 in California; Missile Test Range 
Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral, Florida; the Martin Marietta Launcher 
Production Facility in Middle River, Maryland; and Woensdrecht Missile 
Operating Base in the Netherlands—had been listed in the MOU of June 1, 
1988, as having no INF Treaty-limited items. This meant that June 1 was 
the closeout notification date for these sites. A baseline inspection by a 
Soviet team would also constitute a closeout inspection. 

The Soviet Union’s first two closeout inspections occurred at Dugway 
Proving Grounds, a former test range for the ground-launched cruise 
missiles (GLCMs), and at Air Force Plant 19, a former production plant for 


"Czechoslovakia com¬ 
pletely fulfilled all of its 
commitments ." 

Colonel Ivan Y. Abrosimov 























































On-Site Inspection Agency 


At the USAF Plant 19 in San Diego, 
Soviet inspectors watch as a plant escort 
(c.) diagrams the inspectahle area inside 
the former GLCM launcher production 
facility. 



GLCM launchers. Both inspections occurred on the same day. July 3. The 
24-hour on-site inspections went according to schedule, with the two Soviet 
teams making their declaration of the sites to be inspected at Travis Air 
Force Base, California, the point of entry for INF sites in the western half 
of the United States. Lt. Colonel Claesen D. Wyckoff, U.S. Army, served 
as the senior escort for the Soviet INF team inspecting the Dugway Proving 
Grounds; Lt. Colonel Robert Yablonski, USAF, led the American team 
escorting the Soviet team to Plant 19. Both teams flew to the site via USAF 
military transport aircraft; each group of Soviet inspectors was taken to the 
site within the nine hours stipulated in the treaty. The inspections themselves 
lasted for 24 hours and were followed by the signing of the inspection 
reports. On July 3, both Soviet teams and their American escorts returned 
to Travis, where the Soviets prepared for departure to the USSR. 


BASE LINE 63 
ELIMINATION 
SHORT N OTICE 
CLOSEOUT 


On August 4, Colonel Gennadiy I. Solntse led a Soviet on-site inspec¬ 
tion team to Cape Canaveral, Florida, for a baseline and closeout inspection. 

Monthly Record of U.S. Inspections, 1989-1991 

51 NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS 



JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV 


1988 


1989 


124 















































INF Closeout Inspections 



This Soviet inspection began with both inspectors and escorts walking around the entire perimeter of the 
buildings and inspectable area. The site was the Martin Marietta plant in Middle River. Maryland. 
Formerly, Pershing I launchers had been produced at the plant. 


Accompanying the Soviet inspectors was an American escort team led by 
Colonel Wyckoff. Cape Canaveral had been the test site for the Pershing II 
missiles; the Soviet inspection team was limited to inspecting the former 
launch complex, the missile assembly buildings, and the access road that 
connected them. The Soviet inspectors conducted their inspection, signed 
and exchanged the reports, all within the 24-hour time allotted in the treaty. 12 

One thousand miles north of Cape Canaveral, on the same day, 
another Soviet inspection team conducted an inspection of the former 
Pershing I launcher production facility at Middle River, Maryland. Colonel 
Anatoly S. Chentsov led the Soviet inspection team, while Captain Albert 
E. Graham, U.S. Navy Reserve, served as the senior American escort team 
leader. Newspaper reports indicated that, throughout the inspection, secu¬ 
rity was "tight." 1 Plant officials had prepared for this event by conducting 
mock inspections in the months before the Soviet team's arrival. They had 
conducted security and treaty briefings for the more than 4,000 employees 
working at the site. Once the inspection was completed, the Soviet and 
American INF teams signed and exchanged the official treaty reports. The 
Soviet inspection team returned to Washington, D.C., the point of entry, 
where they prepared for their departure for Moscow. 14 


3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 j 2 

2 

2 

2 

4 



2 

1 

5 

5 

2 


2 

2 

1 

4 

3 

1 

3 

1 

3 

1 

1 

2 

2 


3 

3 

2 

2 

5 

2 

3 

4 1 4 

3 

5 


4 


4 

1 

1 

5 

1 




DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY 


1990 1991 


125 














































On-Site Inspection Agency 


These initial Soviet closeout inspections occurred simultaneously 
with the baseline inspections being conducted at the 31 U.S. INF sites in 
Western Europe and the United States. During July and August 1988, Soviet 
inspection teams went to each of these sites and conducted baseline inspec¬ 
tions. In addition, Soviet INF inspectors were establishing their continuous 
portal monitoring of the Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah. Just as the 
U.S. INF inspection activity was at its peak in the summer of 1988, so too 
was the Soviet Union’s. 

The number of initial INF closeout inspections equaled the number of 
INF missile sites declared closed out. In the June 1, 1988, Memorandum of 
Understanding, the USSR declared that there were no INF missiles, support 
systems, or activity at 16 sites; the United States conducted 16 closeout 
inspections. The United States notified the Soviet Union that five American 
INF sites had been closed out; the Soviet Union sent five on-site inspection 
teams to ascertain the status of these sites. 


Routine Closeout Inspections 


Following the baseline period, declarations of INF missile sites as 
closed out became an important gauge of treaty progress, especially in the 
early months. In the Memorandum of Understanding, the Soviet Union had 


INF Sites in Central and Eastern Soviet Union 


Declared in Memorandum of Understanding, 
1 November 1987. 


Barents Sea 



L. *’v 

o jmw 


Sea 



^ ^Moscow 

(point of entry) 

Kamenka A Kazan - SOViet UlliOn 

a . 

_ . A Votkinsk 

Saratov A 

,, . Sverdlovsk 

A Volgograd 

A Kapustin Yar Petropavlovsk A Kansk £ 

Novosibirsk ^Pashino Gomwf hita 

A Ulan-Ude . A^Drovy 

A Barnaul (point of entry) ^ ■ 

Semipalatinsk A v -__ 1 

a 

A Balkhash 

Kattakurgan Saryozek A 

A r 

V A Bayram-Ali China 

Afghanistan 


Mongolia 


■Sea a a 

wm of VL 

IP 1 Japan 

Ko^ea /yf;-. 1 

\ y - 

r J Soutf. 

— N Korea ISy-i 


Iran 


126 














INF Closeout Inspections 


declared 957 shorter-range INF missiles; these had to be eliminated within 
18 months. 1 The United States had identified 169 shorter-range INF mis¬ 
siles that would have to be eliminated in the same time period. Routine, 
steady missile eliminations signaled adherence to the treaty; so too did a 
steady rate of notifications of missile sites being closed out. The first stage 
in closing out a missile operating base was the movement of the INF missiles 
from the base to the elimination sites. This movement required 30 days’ 
advance notice via the NRRC message system to the inspecting party. The 
transit of the INF missiles had to be completed within 25 days. " When all 
ot the missiles had been moved, the operating base’s missile support 
structure dismantled or destroyed, and all INF missile system activity 
ceased, then the inspected party could declare, through an NRRC message, 
that the base had been closed out. 

Dismantling the Soviet INF missile base at Novosysoyevka was 
typical. Located near the Sikote-Alin mountain range in the Soviet province 
bordering the Pacific Ocean, Novosysoyevka was an SS-12 base. On July 
1, 1988, a train loaded with 14 SS-12 launchers and 4 missile transporter 
vehicles left Novosysoyevka station, bound for the elimination site at 
Stan'kovo in Belorussia. The United States had been notified by official 
message through the Soviet NRRC of the time and places of the 7,200-kilo- 
meter journey across virtually the entire Soviet Union. On the same day, 
another missile train left the small station at Novosysoyevka, laden with 20 
SS-12 missiles. It would arrive, after a trip of 4,200 kilometers, at the 
Saryozek elimination site in Kazakhstan. On July 4, a reporter from Sotsial- 
isticheskaya Industriya visited the Novosysoyevka SS-12 base and asked 
Major A. Kostitsyn. the battery commander, about dismantling the site. " 
"Throughout June," Kostitsyn replied, "we prepared the equipment for 
dispatch, for it has to cross the entire country. We missilemen have complex 
feelings." He explained his thoughts on dismantling operational missiles 
and the pride he had for his nation, which had negotiated the treaty. 
However, he also had concerns about his future. "Our service and life are 
changing. It is now my dream to enter an academy. I am a professional 
soldier, and I believe that I can still prove useful to the motherland in that 
capacity." 

The remaining 17 SS-12 missiles at the Soviet missile operating base 
departed Novosysoyevka within a week. The site commander. Colonel 
Viktor Korshikov. told an Izvestiya reporter that he would remain at the 
missile base and become the chief site escort. "We are ready for the 
meeting," he said on July 5, adding, "The Americans will not find the 
missiles here....""’ The command was prepared, he went on, to show 
everything stipulated in the treaty. The reporter accompanied Colonel 
Korshikov into the missile buildings, examining the trucks stored under 
canopies, looking at the pit machines and track layers. The colonel explained 
what equipment the American inspectors could examine. " 

On October 1, Lt. Colonel Nicholas Troyan, U.S. Army, led an 
American INF inspection team to the Novosysoyevka SS-12 missile site 
where they conducted the closeout inspection. The inspection lasted 24 
hours on site; however, the logistics needed to get this American inspection 
team to and from the site illustrated how difficult and arduous these INF 
inspections could be. In mid-August, Troyan's 10-person inspection team 
met in Washington, flew to San Francisco and then to Tokyo." 



Soviet Major Igor Kirichenko and Lt. 
Colonel Nicholas Troyan at Saryozek, 
USSR. 


"We are ready for the 
meeting." 

Colonel Korshikov 


127 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


American teams in the USSR 



3r.cc!* » m o k,:o 

£ XlOlUTt ,0 ' >-i 
■iWD.mt f 
C»64I>C*(:* *t4t3*0B 
flOPOl* B KtPuPfl* 

nPFCCi J*TE»S CHK PC®C 
T08 T 4P PUCK»»0B 


Team Troyan in Kazakhstan at the 
joining of the Siherian-Turkistan 
Railroad. 


Team Nelson at Saint Basil's 
Cathederal in Red Square. 


U.S. Team at the Tsars' 
Cannon in the Kremlin. 


128 


























INF Closeout Inspections 


Soviet teams in Washington 


General Medvedev (c.) and 
team at the U.S. Capitol. 




In the Old Senate Gallery, 
U.S. Capitol■ 




_ 


In the U.S. Capitol Rotunda. 




129 





































On-Site Inspection Agency 


From Tokyo, they went to Yokota Air Base, site of OSIA's gateway 
office, where they rested after the initial 10,880-kilometer leg of the journey. 
After final mission preparations, the team flew 3,000 kilometers on a USAF 
C-141 aircraft from Yokota to Ulan-Ude, the treaty’s eastern point of entry 
into the USSR. Ulan-Ude is a city of 370,000 people near Lake Baikal. 
When the American team arrived they were met by Captain James Connell, 
U.S. Navy Reserve, who was the OSIA representative." Fluent in Russian 
and knowledgable about the INF Treaty, Captain Connell assisted the 
American inspectors and aircrew members with meals and hotel accommo¬ 
dations in Ulan-Ude. One day after arriving. Colonel Troyan’s team, 
accompanied by a Soviet escort team, boarded an Aeroflot aircraft for the 
2,400-kilometer flight to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan, where they were trans¬ 
ported by bus to the Soviet elimination site at Saryozek. 2 ’ 

After approximately two weeks of monitoring the elimination of 
SS-12 missiles at Saryozek, Troyan’s inspection team returned to Ulan-Ude 
and then departed immediately for Kansk, a Soviet SS-20 elimination site 
located approximately 1,100 kilometers to the north, in central Siberia. After 
two weeks of monitoring the launch-to-destruction of SS-20 missiles and 
another trip to Ulan-Ude, the team was directed to go to Novosysoyevka 
for the closeout inspection. Accompanied by their Soviet escorts, the 
travel-weary American team flew east 2,120 kilometers to Vladivostok in 
the Pacific maritime province. The American inspection team then went by 
bus again along the valley of the Sikote-Alin Mountains and back through 



In accordance with the INF Treaty, every on-site inspection began with a pre-inspection briefing. 
Here too Soviet escort officers examine the briefing materials which included site diagrams, 
local safety problems, and a statement of the INF missiles or equipment at that site. 


130 








INF Closeout Inspections 


a dense deciduous forest to the former Soviet SS-12 missile base at Novo- 
sysoyevka. There they conducted their on-site closeout inspection. Once the 
treaty inspection reports had been signed and exchanged, the American 
team began its long trip home. In all, by the time they returned to Washing¬ 
ton, Colonel Troyan and his team members had traveled more than 37,000 
kilometers, or 23,000 miles, in five weeks. 24 

The logistics of scheduling, transporting, housing, feeding, equipping, 
and supporting this and other INF inspection teams and the aircrews was a 
major effort tor both the U.S. and the Soviet on-site inspection agencies. 
Both nations needed an extensive logistical infrastructure. OSIA established 
field offices and support personnel in Washington and San Francisco; at 
Yokota Air Base in Japan; at Frankfurt, West Germany; and in Moscow and 
Ulan-Ude in the Soviet Union. Stretching across 19 time zones, these people 
and offices had responsibility for supporting the mission of on-site inspec¬ 
tions and escorts under the INF Treaty. 2 " 

Colonel Troyan's team was not the only American inspection team in 
the USSR during September and October 1988. Three other U.S. teams were 
conducting closeout inspections of six Soviet missile bases, in widely 
dispersed areas of the USSR. At the same time, eight more American teams 
were monitoring the destruction of Soviet missiles at Kasputin Yar, 
Saryozek, Kansk, Chita, Stan'kovo, Sarny, Lesnaya, and Jelgava. OSIA’s 
director said that in the fall of 1988 the United States had almost 100 INF 
inspectors in the Soviet Union conducting closeout, elimination, and portal 
monitoring on-site inspections. 26 

The record of the United States in conducting closeout inspections of 
Soviet INF sites can be understood by examining the inspection activity in 
each of the first three treaty years. All INF sites, Soviet and American, had 
to be closed out or declared as closed out within those three treaty years, 
from June 1, 1988, to June 1, 1991. The term "declared as closed out" took 
on added significance at the end of the third treaty year. In the final weeks 
of that year the United States and the Soviet Union declared several INF 
sites closed out—having no INF missiles, support systems, facilities, or 
activities. The declarations were made in late April and May 1991, but the 
actual closeout inspections occurred in June, July, and August. Conse¬ 
quently, a few of the final closeout inspections were actually accomplished 
in the fourth treaty year. 



American inspectors boarding a bus. 
Ulan-Ude . USSR. 


United States INF Closeout Inspections 27 


1st INF Treaty Year, June 1988-June 1989 

50 

2nd INF Treaty Year, June 1989-June 1990 

36 

3rd INF Treaty Year, June 1990-June 1991 

47* 


*Includes U.S. inspections in June. July and August 1991. 


131 











On-Site Inspection Agency 


As noted earlier, closings of U.S. missile sites progressed at a dis¬ 
tinctly different pace than closings of Soviet sites. This was because the 
United States had fewer sites (31 to the USSR’s 130) and because U.S. 
basing strategy placed its INF missiles, specifically the Pershing II and the 
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on larger, more centralized 
missile operating bases. During the initial baseline phase, the United States 
declared five INF sites closed. Soviet INF inspectors conducted closeout 
inspections of each site. During the remainder of the first treaty year, the 
United States declared two other INF sites closed out: RAF Molesworth in 
Great Britain and Florennes Air Base in Belgium. When the INF Treaty was 
signed in December 1987, the U.S. Air Force had just begun the deployment 
of INF GLCM missiles at Molesworth. Eighteen missiles and six launchers 
were listed in the treaty’s Memorandum of Understanding and had been 
inspected during baseline. Following that period, the Molesworth GLCMs 
were withdrawn from the force, prepared for shipping, and transported to 
the United States for elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona. At the 
same time, the Air Force prepared the site at Molesworth to be closed out 
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Following the formal 
closeout declaration in December 1988, Soviet INF inspectors arrived at 
Molesworth on January 19, 1989, for the closeout inspection. Colonel John 
Fer, USAF, led the American escort team. After the 24-hour inspection, 
Colonel Fer and the escort team accompanied the Soviet team to the point 
of entry, RAF Greenham Common Air Base, where they departed for 
Moscow. 2S 

In Belgium, the status of the American GLCM base at Llorennes was 
similar to that of Molesworth at the time of the signing of the INL Treaty 
in December 1987. In this case, 20 cruise missiles and 12 launchers had 
been deployed to Florennes; deployment had stopped at that point. 2 ' In the 
summer of 1988, the INF site had been inspected by a Soviet team during 
baseline. Then the Florennes’ missiles and launchers were withdrawn from 
the force, prepared for shipment, and returned to the United States for 
elimination. The last of the Florennes-based cruise missiles left Belgium on 
December 13, 1988. 30 Following the required base closure activities, the 
United States declared that the INF site at Florennes had been closed out. 
On March 10. 1989, Colonel Fer again served as senior American escort 
for the Soviet team performing the closeout inspection. This was the final 
closing of a U.S. site in the first treaty year. Of the 31 sites declared in the 
MOU, the United States eliminated seven sites in that first year. ' 1 

By contrast, during the second treaty year (June 1, 1989, to June 1, 
1990) the United States placed no sites in closeout status.' 2 The United 
States operated Pershing II missile bases at three sites in West Germany; 
Schwaebisch-Gmuend, Neu Ulm, and Waldheide-Neckarsulm. In addition, 
there was a Pershing II missile storage facility at Weilerbach and a launcher 
repair facility at the U.S. Equipment Maintenance Center at Hausen in 
Frankfurt. All of these Pershing II sites remained active during the second 
treaty year. American GLCMs were deployed in U.S. Air Lorce units on six 
missile operating bases in five Western European nations: the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the Netherlands. The missile 
base in the Netherlands, at Woensdrecht, was never activated; it was closed 
out during the baseline period. Two other American cruise missile bases, 
RAL Molesworth in the United Kingdom and Llorennes in Belgium, were 
closed out in the first treaty year. The three remaining bases in Western 



Missile Operating Base, RAF Moles¬ 
worth, Great Britain. 


132 
















INF Closeout Inspections 


Europe were large, centralized, modem bases. Greenham Common in the 
United Kingdom had 101 missiles and 29 launchers; Comiso in Italy, 108 
missiles and 31 launchers; and Wuescheim in West Germany, 62 missiles 
and 31 launchers. In addition, the United States had its GLCM missile repair 
facility at the SABCA plant in Grosselies, Belgium. This facility and the 
three major cruise missile bases remained in active status throughout the 
second treaty year. '' 

Thus, the United States entered the third treaty year, one in which all 
of its remaining INF sites had to be closed out, with 24 active sites. In the 
tirst half of that year, it declared three INF sites closed: SABCA-Grosselies, 
Belgium; Wueschheim, West Germany; and Waldheide-Neckarsulm, West 
Germany. Soviet INF inspectors conducted closeout inspections at each 
installation. In the second half of the treaty year (December 1, 1990, to 
June 1, 1991), the remaining 21 American INF sites were readied for 
closeout in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. By May 31, 1991, 
the United States had declared all of its remaining INF sites eliminated. The 
following table gives the number of Soviet INF closeout inspections by 
treaty year. 


Soviet INF Closeout Inspections 34 


1st INF Treaty Year, June 1988 - June 1989 

7 

2nd INF Treaty Year, June 1989 - June 1990 

0 

3rd INF Treaty Year, June 1990 - June 1991 

24* 


* Includes Soviet inspections conducted in June and July 1991. 


Conversion of Closed-Out INF Missile Sites 


The INF Treaty contained a provision that recognized that either party 
might wish to convert an eliminated INF site to another purpose. Article X, 
paragraph 9, stated that if a party to the treaty wanted to convert an INF 
missile operating base to use by another non-INF missile system, then they 
had to notify the other party "no less" than 30 days before the scheduled 
beginning date of the conversion. The notice declared the purpose of the 
conversion and the completion date.' 5 The Soviet Union exercised this treaty 
provision and converted some of its former INF missile operating bases to 
facilities for newer, longer-range SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. The United States did not. Converted sites, because they had once 
been INF missile operating bases, were still subject to short-notice on-site 
inspections, which is the topic of the next chapter. 


133 











On-Site Inspection Agency 


NOTES: CHAPTER 7 


'INF Treaty, Article 11, Paragraph 4. 

"Ibid.. Paragraphs 5a and 5b. 

7 "US Inspectors Visit Sverdlovsk Plant," Moscow Television Service (Vremya), 
July 18, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV , July 19, 1988, p. 3. 

4 Ibid. 


5 "US Specialists Inspect Works at Sverdlovsk," TASS (Moscow), July 17, 1988, 
trans. in FBIS-SOV, July 18, 1988, p. 5. 

6 As paraphrased in "Tour of Kazakhstan Plant," TASS (Moscow), July 21, 1988, 
rpt. in FBIS-SOV, July 22. 1988, p. 2. 

7 "First US INF Inspectors in Moravian City," RUDE PRAVO (Prague), July 23, 
1988, p. 1. trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Eastern 
Europe (Washington, D.C.—hereafter, FBIS-EEU ) (July 23, 1988), p. 6. See also: 
CTK (Prague), July 20-22, 1988, trans. in EBIS-EEU, July 21-23. 1988. 

S Prague Television Service, July 21, 1988, trans. in FBIS-EEU , July 22, 1988, 

p. 1. 

9 "First US INF Inspectors in Moravian City," RUDE PRAVO (Prague), July 23, 
1988, p. 1, trans. in EBIS-EEU (July 23, 1988) p.6. 

l(l "End of CSSR Inspections," CTK{ Prague). July 22, 1988. rpt. in FBIS-EEU, July 
25, 1988, p. 4. 

1 'ibid. 

12 

"John J. Glisch, "Soviets Look Around at Pershing 2 Pads," Orlando Sentinel, 
August 4, 1988, p. A10. See also: George White, "Soviet Missile Inspectors Touch 
Down at Cape," Florida Today, August 4, 1988. 

1 Ted Shelsby, "Soviets Check Middle River Plant for Treaty Compliance," Balti¬ 
more Sun, August 4, 1988. p. ID. See also: "Soviet INF Inspectors Visit Maryland 
Plant." Washington Times, August 4, 1988, p. 2. 

14 Ibid. 

1:1 INF Treaty, Article 5. Paragraph 1. See also: INF Treaty Memorandum of 
Understanding Data Update. 

l6 Ibid., Article 7, Paragraph 3. 

I7 V. Fridyev, "Missiles Scrapped," Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, July 5, 1988, 
p. 4, trans. in "Further on Missile Dispatch." FBIS-SOV, July 6. 1988, p. 6. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Ibid. 


'interview with Lt. Colonel Nicholas Troyan (USA), OSIA, January 30, 1991. 
“"Interview with Captain James Connell (USNR), OSIA, March 1-2, 1989. 

?3 

' Interview, Troyan. 

24 Ibid. 


134 



INF Closeout Inspections 


25 ... 

'Lajoie, "Defense Appropriations," pp. 1-3. 

^6 

Interview with Lajoie, "Insights," in Arms Control Today , pp. 3-10. 

" 7 OSIA Headquarters, "First Year of On-Site Inspections," Fact Sheet , May 31, 
1989. See also: OSIA Headquarters, "INF Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status 
Report," Fact Sheet , July 2, 1990. 

98 

Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 304-305. 

99 

Ibid., pp. 18, 20. See also: INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. 

3() Brice George, ed., Jane's NATO Handbook. 1989-1990 (Surrey: Jane's Informa¬ 
tion Group, Ltd., 1990), 2nd Ed., p. 437. 

71 OSIA Headquarters, "First Year," Fact Sheet. 

3 ~OSIA Headquarters, "INF Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status Report," Fact 
Sheet, July 2, 1990. 

33 Ibid. 

34 OSIA Headquarters, "First Year," Fact Sheet. See also: OSIA Headquarters, "INF 
Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status Report,” Fact Sheet , July 2, 1990. 

' INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. 


135 

















CHAPTER 8 


INF SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS 



American inspectors SSGT Susan Alborn and TSGT David LaFleur with INF Treatst inspection equipment. Consisting of scales, 
measuring tapes, rod. camera, and first aid kit. this equipment was hand-carried to each site by short-notice inspection teams. 


A short-notice inspection began when the INF team chief de¬ 
clared at a designated point of entry that the 10-person team 
would be conducting an INF on-site inspection under Article XI. paragraph 
5a or 5b. The declaration included the name and coordinates of the missile 
site or facility to be inspected. The party being inspected then had nine hours 


137 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


to get the INF team to the site. That nine-hour time period was the basis for 
calling these inspections "short-notice." 1 


INF SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTION 
TIMELINE 


Notification to NRRC 


16 


(IN HOURS) 


- Arrival at the POE 


4- 

24 


— » Declaration of Site 

Max. Short- Notice Movement 
9 ofTeamtoSite 

■ ^ Arrival at Site 

Mn.l 

— —^ End of Pre-Inspection 
Process 


This process was no different from declaring a closeout inspection and 
delivering that team within nine hours to the site where the closeout 
inspection would be conducted. This similarity was significant, for the 
function of the short-notice inspections was to give the inspecting party the 
right to ascertain through a 24-hour inspection the MOU items on site, 
including any INF missile systems, facilities, or activities at any INF site, 
active or closed. The party being inspected did not know the site to be 
inspected until the declaration. This meant that every Soviet and American 
INF site, with the exception of former missile production facilities that the 
treaty exempted, was at risk for a short-notice inspection. 2 The INF Treaty 
set an annual quota on the number of short-notice inspections. Each party 
could conduct 20 short-notice inspections per year in the first three years, 
15 per year for the next five years, and 10 per year for five years after that. 
Cumulatively, each party had the right, over the full 13 years, to conduct 
185 short-notice inspections.' 


24 


INSPECTION 


Post Inspection Process 
and Preparation of Report 


Signing of Report and 
Departure Prom Site 


Dedicated Airlift 


Short-notice inspections, with their nine-hour deadline, placed a pre¬ 
mium on airlift. Both the United States and the Soviet Union used "dedi¬ 
cated" airlift for transporting INF inspection teams from the point of entry 
to the site after the team chief’s declaration. The time period was so short 
and the distances so great that neither country could have carried out its 



Interior of C-141 aircraft used for short-notice inspections. The United States used military airlift to 
transport Soviet inspectors from the point of entry to the INF inspection sites within the treaty-required 
nine hour time limit. 


138 















INF Short Notice Inspections 


. 






Brigadier General Lajoie, Director OSIA. walks with General Major Medvedev, Director. NRRC, and a team of Soviet inspectors. 
These inspectors had returned to Travis AFB, California, from an inspection site in the western United States. 

obligations under the treaty without transporting the teams by air. For 
instance, the USSR was obligated to deliver American inspection teams 
from Moscow, the point of entry, to any one of 72 missile operating bases 
and missile support facilities in the western Soviet Union within nine hours 
of the team chiefs declaration. The most distant missile site, Bayram Ali, 
lay nearly 1,200 kilometers from Moscow. 4 

The United States had fewer missile sites, but distances were similar. 

For example, the On-Site Inspection Agency was responsible for getting the 
Soviet inspection teams from Dulles International Airport in Washington, 

D.C., to one of five INF sites in the eastern half of the United States within 
nine hours. Those sites were in Oklahoma, Alabama, Florida, Texas, and 
Maryland. Only the site at the Martin Marietta plant in Middle River, 

Maryland, was readily accessible to Dulles International Airport. The other 
American INF sites—at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Redstone Arsenal. Alabama; 

Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Texas; and Complex 16, Cape Ca¬ 
naveral, Florida, required a combination of air and bus travel to get the 
Soviet inspectors to the site within the treaty timelines." In Europe, OSIA’s 
escort teams, operating from the agency's field office in Frankfurt, faced 
equally stringent timelines. The United States had 12 INF missile operating 
bases and facilities in five Western European nations: Great Britain. West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Each of these nations had 
a treaty-designated point of entry to which Soviet inspection teams would 
fly before declaring the site to be inspected. The Soviet teams had to be 


139 

























On-Site Inspection Agency 


met by a U.S. INF escort team, which was responsible for arranging air and 
ground transportation to get the Soviet inspectors from the airport to the 
American INF site within the nine hours. 


The U.S. Air Force had agreed in the spring of 1988 to transport 
American INF inspection and escort teams on a priority basis. This meant 
that the Military Airlift Command (MAC) would have to be available on 
short notice to fly to either of the two treaty-designated points of entry in 
the United States—Dulles International Airport or Travis Air Force Base, 
California—pick up the INF teams and take them to the declared site. If 
mechanical or other problems arose, backup aircraft would be available for 
the mission. In Western Europe, the United States had 12 missile sites 
subject to short-notice inspections. MAC assisted in transporting Soviet 
inspection teams to American missile sites in Europe. In addition, the 
command would fly U.S. INF inspection teams in Frankfurt to and from the 
Soviet points of entry, Moscow and Ulan-Ude, on a priority basis. 1 


When Soviet inspection teams flew to 
the United States, they arrived at either 
Washington Dulles International Air¬ 
port or Travis AFB, California. A So¬ 
viet team, led by Colonel Kuznetsov 
debarks from a IL-62 Aeroflot aircraft 
in California. 


Before the treaty entered into force, both the United States and the 
Soviet Union stipulated the types of aircraft that would be used to transport 
INF teams. The United States indicated that it would use the following 
military aircraft: C-130s, C-141 s, C-9s, and T-43s. The Soviet Union said 
it would transport the INF teams on IF-62, TU-134, and TU-154 aircraft. 7 
Two other larger transport aircraft—the USAF’s C-5 and the USSR’s 
AN-24—were reserved for transporting cargo for the portal monitoring 
inspection sites at Magna, Utah, and Votkinsk, in the Soviet Union. All 
aircraft flying INF Treaty missions were assigned standing call signs. OSIA 
worked with MAC and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to 
develop special, new procedures for communicating air location, arrival, 
and departure times. The FAA worked with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization to coordinate flight routes, clearances, and communications 
over international airspace. Diplomatic approval for special flights into the 



140 



















INF Short Notice Inspections 


Soviet Union usually required up to 30 days for each flight. For the INF 
Treaty, however, standard air routes and standing diplomatic clearances 
were developed for the flights bringing in and retrieving INF inspectors. In 
addition, both parties agreed to forgo the normal procedure of having a 
national pilot or navigator accompany each flight. The reason was the 
frequency of flights (daily in and out of Moscow during baseline and every 
other day into and out of Ulan-Ude) and the logistical burden it would have 
imposed. The exception to this innovative policy was the U.S. military 
airlift flights transporting cargo to Votkinsk; Soviet navigators flew with 
the Air Force crews on their flights from Moscow to Izhevsk. 8 



At the end of this inspection at an SS-20 missile base at Kansk, USSR, in March 1989, the American 
inspection team and their Soviet escorts posed for a group picture. The large map behind the group, 
displays the "Battle Path" of the Soviet military unit stationed at Kansk. 

These flight arrangements were worked out during the technical talks 
held in the spring of 1988 and endorsed by Special Verification Commission 
in July 1988. The procedures remained in effect until a more comprehen¬ 
sive listing of aircraft, equipment, and procedural rules were agreed to by 
the commission, and codified in the December 21, 1989, Memorandum of 
Agreement. On-board navigation systems for each type of aircraft also were 
detailed in this memorandum. 1 ’ 


Inspection Team Composition and Equipment 


According to American inspectors, short-notice inspections were 
among the most interesting of the five types of INF on-site inspections. 
They contained an element of surprise, because the party being inspected 
had no advance notice of the site to be inspected. They had an element of 
pressure, because the inspection could not exceed 24 hours on site. The 
only exception to this 24-hour rule was a treaty provision for the inspecting 
team chief and senior escorting officer to agree to an extension of no more 


141 











On-Site Inspection Agency 


than eight hours. In fact, during the first three treaty years, no inspection 
was ever extended. Short-notice inspections also had an element of interest. 
Short-notice inspections of closed-out or converted INF missile operating 
bases and support facilities, after they had been formally eliminated, con¬ 
stituted an opportunity for on-site inspectors to examine these sites. If a 
missile site had been converted from an operating base for INF missiles— 
for instance, Soviet SS-20s—to a base for missiles with longer ranges— 
such as the SS-25s (not an INF missile)—short-notice inspectors might find 
inspecting that site to be of special interest. 

For all on-site inspections the INF Treaty spelled out team size, 
composition, leadership, and, to a degree, how the inspection team could 
organize itself. On-site inspection teams conducting short-notice, as well as 
baseline and closeout, inspections were limited to 10 members. Each 
inspection team operated under the direction of a team leader and a deputy. 
At least two inspectors on each team spoke the language of the party being 
inspected. Short-notice inspections, like those conducted during baseline 
and closeouts, were limited to 24 hours."' American teams conducting 
short-notice inspections always brought with them the measuring, weigh¬ 
ing, and photographic equipment authorized in the treaty’s Memorandum 
of Agreement. This equipment, which was negotiated, had to be hand-car¬ 
ried to the site by the inspection team members. The equipment consisted 
of the following items: 


Authorized INF Team Equipment 



United States 

USSR 

Linear measuring devices 
(each inspector) 

2 measuring tapes (30m,3m) 

1 plum bob set (bob, cord, target) 

1 pi tape 

3 measuring tapes 
(20m, 10m, 5m) 

Portable weighing devices 
(each team) 

4 Heavy-duty portable scales 

4 Heavy-duty portable scales 

Camera equipment 
(each team) 

2 Polaroid camera sets 
(8-eight pack film) 

2 Polaroid camera sets 
(8-eight pack film) 

Other portable equipment 
(each inspector) 

1 Flashlight, 1 Compass 

1 Roll of seals (tamper indicating) 

1 Flashlight,1 Compass 

1 Sealing device 
(tamper indicating) 

Radiation detection device 
(each team) 

1 Radiation detection device set 

1 Radiation detection device set 


142 







INF Short Notice Inspections 



This equipment allowed the inspectors to measure and, if appropriate, 
weigh the missiles and support equipment and facilities declared to be 
present at the site. The objective was for the inspectors to ascertain that the 
INF missiles and facilities were in fact those covered under the treaty. 
Storage buildings, garages, trucks—all were subject to measurement to 
discover if a treaty item, a missile stage, for instance, had been stored in 
them. All on-site inspections of active INF missile operating bases or 
facilities involved visually inspecting, measuring, and possibly weighing 
the INF missile systems that were on site at the time of the inspection. 

The standard characteristics of these missiles and their supporting 
equipment had been declared in the treaty's Memorandum of Under¬ 
standing.^ In that memorandum, both parties had published technical data 
for each INF system—length of the missile; length of first and second 
stages; maximum diameter; weight of first and second stages; maximum 
length, width, and height of launchers; and characteristics of the missile 
transporters, support equipment, and missile shelters. During baseline, 
these standard measurements were confirmed and, where necessary, cor¬ 
rected by one inspection team from the U.S. and one from the USSR. 
Commander John C. Williams, U.S. Navy, led the U.S. team and they 
conducted baseline technical data measurements on the six Soviet INF 
missile systems. The measurements made by this team became the standard 
used by all other U.S. teams as they conducted on-site inspections. 1 ' 


Inspection teams had to hand-carry 
all inspection equipment from the 
point of entry to the inspection sites. 
Shown here are the emergency first 
aid kit, Polariod camera with film, 
flashlights, compass, seals, measur¬ 
ing tapes, measuring rod, and weigh¬ 
ing scales. 



SGT Stephen C. Prato, escort, assists 
and confirms measurement by Soviet 
inspector G.M. Komogortsev. 


143 





On-Site Inspection Agency 


Two Polaroid cameras, a primary camera and a backup, were carried 
to the site by the inspecting team. The treaty’s Protocol on Inspections 
defined their use. 14 During an inspection, an inspector had the right to 
request a clarification from the escorting party regarding an ambiguity. The 
term "ambiguity" was never formally defined in the treaty, but it was clear 
that the on-site inspector could ask for a clarification if he or she had a 
question about an aspect of the treaty. To give an example, an on-site 
inspector might ask for a clarification about an object or building at the site that 
did not appear to conform to the description provided in the treaty documents. 
Or an inspector might question a procedure used during an elimination for 
destroying an item on a missile launcher, rendering it inoperable. 

To resolve the ambiguity, the treaty stipulated that the inspector had 
the right to request a clarification from the in-country senior escort. If the 
inspector’s questions could not be resolved satisfactorily, the inspecting 
party could make a note of the question or issue on the inspection report and 
they could request that a photograph be taken. The inspecting team’s 
camera would be used, but the escort team, according to the treaty, would 
take the photograph. Two photographs were snapped, one for each party. 
Both parties had agreed during the INF Technical Talks to use Polaroid 
cameras. Once the photos were taken, they were included in the final 
inspection report, along with any explanation of the ambiguity." From this 
point, resolution of the ambiguity lay in the hands of decision makers in the 
respective national capitals. If they felt the inspector’s questions merited 
further consideration, they could place the issue before the Special Verifi¬ 
cation Commission in Geneva. The commission was authorized by the 
treaty and its charter to resolve questions relating to compliance with treaty 
obligations. If the issue did not merit further consideration, it remained as 
noted in the inspection report. 


In general, the equipment authorized by the INF Treaty for use in 
short-notice (as well as baseline, closeout, and elimination) inspections 


When the inspection team leader de¬ 
cided to document a treaty ambiguity, 
Polaroid photographs were taken. The 
escorting team took the photos. Here 
SGT Spenser A. Smith, holding the 
camera, takes the picture, while Colo¬ 
nel Aleksandr V. Kuznetsov (I), Soviet 
team chief, obseiwes. 



144 



INF Short Notice Inspections 


constituted a "low" technology approach. The treaty limited on-site inspec¬ 
tions to a prescribed area (a site), to direct observation (10 inspectors on 
site), and to making a few simple measurements (length, diameter, weight) 
to confirm gross system data. There were two major exceptions to this 
generalization. The first involved the X-ray imaging equipment used by 
U.S. continuous portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk. The second 
occurred during short-notice inspections when the inspecting party used 
specially authorized radiation detection equipment (RDE). 


Inspections with Radiation Detection Equipment 


During the INF treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union indicated its 
intention to convert some of its SS-20 missile operating bases to SS-25 
bases. The SS-25 was a fifth-generation intercontinental ballistic missile 
that contained a single warhead. It was road mobile, carried in a sealed 
canister, and mounted on a transporter-erector-launcher. 16 The SS-25’s 
range (10,500 kilometers) placed it outside the INF Treaty (500 to 5,500 
km). However, the United States expressed specific concerns during treaty 
negotiations. When the SS-25 missile system was deployed in the field, 
with its missile inside the canister and mounted on the launcher, the U.S. 
contended that the canister might conceal an SS-20 missile. The one 
distinguishing characteristic between the two systems, U.S. treaty negotia¬ 
tors argued, was that the SS-25 had a single nuclear warhead, while the 
SS-20 had three warheads. 1 

After considerable discussion, the Soviet Union agreed to a provision 
in the treaty allowing the inspecting party the right to use radiation detection 
equipment to measure the fast neutron intensity flux emanating from the 
launch canister. 1 " A launch canister with a missile inside containing a single 
warhead (SS-25) emitted a different pattern of fast neutrons than did one 
with a missile having three warheads (SS-20). The American inspection 
team, using the RDE, compared their measurements against a set of bench¬ 
mark radiation measurements taken during a special inspection in the 
summer of 1989. At that time. Commander Williams and a special INF 
inspection team had gone to two Soviet missile operating bases (one with 
SS-20s, the other with SS-25s) and had used the RDE to measure the 
emanations from the warheads in their canisters. The team's RDE bench¬ 
mark measurement data, which were confirmed on site by their Soviet 
escorts, became the standard against which all subsequent RDE measure¬ 
ments were compared. 14 

In the Memorandum of Agreement of December 21, 1989, the USSR 
and the U.S. agreed on procedures on how RDE measurements would be 
taken during an on-site inspection. The inspection team had the right under 
the treaty to go to a former INF missile site that had been converted to a 
missile operating base for another system, set up its RDE, and measure only 
the exterior of the missile canisters to determine if the neutrons emanating 
indicated one or three warheads. For the entire period during which 
radiation measurements were being taken at the site, the party being 
inspected had the right to observe the process. Both parties, inspectors and 
escorts, recorded, processed, and made graphic representation of the RDE 
data. 20 





An American inspector conducting 
training on the Radiation Detecting 
Equipment. 


145 






On-Site Inspection Agency 



SS-20 and Pershing II INF missiles on 
display at the Air and Space Museum, 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 
D.C. 


After measuring each missile canister, the two parties compared the 
results of the RDE measurements made on site with the RDE benchmark 
measurements made during baseline. If the data did not differ by more than 
50 percent, the on-site missile "would not be considered a missile subject 
to the Treaty." If the data did differ by more than 50 percent, the inspected 
party had to open the launch canister and allow the inspecting party to 
confirm by visual observation that the missile inside was not "a missile 
subject to the Treaty." In any event, after all of the RDE measurements of 
the launch canisters, the inspecting team had the right to select one of the 
launch canisters at random and have it opened by the inspected party for 
visual inspection. This provision added a measure of randomness to the 
inspection process and allowed a visual check of one SS-25 missile canister 
by the inspectors on site.' 1 

Radiation detection equipment and procedures were used primarily 
during short-notice inspections. The same rules applied as for all other 
short-notice inspections: the inspection lasted no more than 24 hours; the 
inspection team was transported to the site within nine hours; the team had 
a maximum of 10 inspectors. The final inspection report was written on 
site by the team at the conclusion of the inspection. The report was signed 
by the U.S. and Soviet team chiefs. Each nation retained a copy. 


The INF Treaty: A Template for the Future 


During the first three years, the INF Treaty permitted each party to 
conduct 20 short-notice inspections each year. From June 1988 to June 
1991, both nations conducted their full quota of 60 short-notice inspec¬ 
tions. 22 By the end of the third treaty year—May 31, 1991—the United 
States and the USSR had eliminated all of their declared INF missiles and 
components and had declared as closed out all INF activity at the missile 
operating bases and support facilities. With the exception of a few closeout 
inspections in June, July, and August 1991, only two types of on-site 
inspections remained after the end of the third treaty year: continuous portal 
monitoring and short-notice inspections. These would continue as inspec¬ 
tion rights in the treaty for 10 more years. During the first three years, 
however, a complex, five-part process had emerged for carrying out all 
aspects of the INF Treaty. 


The first part consisted of U.S. and Soviet diplomats refining through 
their work in the Special Verification Commission the basic treaty docu¬ 
ments: the Protocols on Eliminations and Inspections; the Memorandum of 
Understanding and Data Updates; and the Memoranda of Agreement. The 
second part was the effort by the American and Soviet on-site inspection 
agencies, the inspection and escort teams, and the new treaty communica¬ 
tion centers. Cumulatively, their work established precedents, patterns, and 
processes for carrying out the on-site inspection provisions of the treaty. 
The third part of the process was the effort by the U.S. and Soviet military 
services, which owned and operated the INF missiles, launchers, support 
equipment and missile sites. They did the hard work of demobilizing, 
transporting, and eliminating the systems and closing out the sites. The 
fourth part consisted of the efforts within both governments to audit and 
analyze the treaty’s two basic obligations of eliminating INF missile 


146 










INF Short Notice Inspections 


systems and sites, and of ceasing production, testing, and deployment of all 
ground-based, intermediate- and shorter-range INF missile systems. Judge¬ 
ments rendered here were critical to the fifth and final part. Leaders in both 
nations had to decide on a continuing basis if the other party was in 
compliance with the treaty. Their compliance decisions became part of a 
larger question about the role of arms control treaties in national security. 
This was the ultimate issue; and it took on added significance in the 1990s 
as both nations entered into new, more extensive arms control treaties and 
agreements. 


"An inspector is not a 
tourist." 


General Lajoie 


Until these new treaties actually entered into force, the cumulative 
record of on-site inspections under the INF Treaty constituted an important 
reservoir of experience. During the first three years, both U.S. and Soviet 
inspectors and escorts developed a sense of professionalism in implement¬ 
ing the INF Treaty. This professionalism was rooted in a thorough knowl¬ 
edge of the treaty; leadership by the team chiefs, deputies, and linguists; and 
participation in hundreds of INF inspection and escort missions. This sense 
was captured in a quiet exchange in late December 1988, in Riga, Latvia, 
between a Soviet journalist and an American INF inspection team member. 
The Americans had just completed a closeout inspection of a former 
SSC-X-4 site at Jelgava, Latvia. They had flown to Riga, the capital, and 
were preparing to go from the aiiport to the city when a reporter from 
Sovetsksaya Latviya asked to interview them. He singled out Lt.Colonel 
Nicholas Troyan, the team chief, and General Roland Lajoie, who on this 
occasion was one of the 10 inspectors.' 


Riga, Latvia 
January 1,1989 

Latvian reporter: Please tell us how the treaty is being fulfilled. Do you 
have any complaints against the Soviet side? 


Inspector Lajoie : From my point of view and from the point of view of the 
OSIA representatives, the treaty is being fulfilled irreproachably. About 
150 inspections have already been carried out; they have shown that the 
elimination of the missiles is proceeding as was agreed. 


Reporter : Tell us, if you can, what you like about our republic. Have you 
seen anything besides military facilities? 

Lajoie : We have an expression: An inspector is not a tourist. But none¬ 
theless a very interesting program was organized for us. In 15 minutes we 
should be at a concert at the Dorn Cathedral. By the way, I am not visiting 
Latvia for the first time. Six years ago, while I was working in the American 
embassy in Moscow, I had the opportunity to visit Riga. I know tor 
American diplomats the Baltic region, and especially Riga, is always of 
special interest. 



General Roland Lajoie being inter¬ 
viewed by the media. 


147 





On-Site Inspection Agency 


Reporter. Will you be visiting us again? 

Lajoie: The treaty says that on-site inspections may be made for the next 12 
years. Therefore, we will probably be back, but infrequently. The missiles 
are all destroyed and the bases are empty. 

Reporter. Then everything was done properly? 


Lajoie : Yes. 



“ is just another African verification* team looking 
For intermediate range missiles , comrade wife i u 


148 




















































INF Short Notice Inspections 


NOTES: CHAPTER 8 

l U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-11, pp. 22- 
23. 

2 Ibid. 

3 INF Treaty, Article 11. Paragraph 5a. 

4 

For a list of the declared Soviet INF sites according to point of entry, either in 
Moscow and Ulan-Ude, see the INF Memorandum of Agreement, Annex III, 
Paragraphs la and lb. 

5 Ibid., Paragraphs 2a and 2b. 

^Kennedy, Supporting the INF Treaty. See also: Interview, McConnell. 

3 INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Article 3, Paragraphs 7a and 7b. 

X Lt. Colonel Gerald Heuer (USAF), OSIA, "Letter from the OSIA Yokota Field 
Office," May 15, 1991. 

9 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Annex II. 

W INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections , Articles 6 and 7. 

1 l INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Annex IV, Section 1. 

12 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding, Articles 3 and 4. 

l2 See Chapter 4 for an account of Team Williams’ baseline measurements. 

14 

INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 6, Paragraph 12. 

I ^Ibid. See also: Article 7, Paragraphs 8-10 and 14; Article 11. 

l6 Cochran, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, pp. 133-135. 

17 

INF Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Article 6, Paragraph 9. See also: INF 
Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Annex IV; Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, INF Treaty, Vol. 1, pp. 56-63, 188-204. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North 
Carolina) raised this issue before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during 
its hearings on the INF Treaty. For a reprint of related testimonies, see pp. 188-197. 

18 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Annex IV, Paragraph 3d. 

19 OSIA Office of Public Affairs, On-Site Insights, July 1990. 

20 

INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement, Annex IV, Paragraph 3d. 

2 'ibid. 

II 

“OSIA Headquarters, "First Year," Fact Sheet. See also: OSIA Headquarters, 
"INF Treaty On-Site Inspections: A Status Report," Fact Sheet, July 2, 1990. 

23 

Yu Giants, "Topical Interview: The Missiles Disappear at Noon," Sovetsksaya 
Latviya (Riga), January 1, 1989, p. 3, trans. in "US OSIA Director Interviewed 
During Inspection in Latvia," FBIS-SOV, January 2, 1989. 


149 































CHAPTER 9 


EPILOGUE: 

CONTINUITY OF ARMS CONTROL 
AMIDST REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES 



President Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bash sign the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in the White House on June 1 . 1990. 


O n June 1, 1990 at the Washington Summit President Bush and 
President Gorbachev signed the new Protocols to the Thresh¬ 
old Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET). 1 These treaties, first signed in 1974 and 1976, limited the size of 
each signatory's underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons or less. 
The new Protocols authorized reciprocal verification rights, including 
monitoring nuclear tests through on-site inspections, seismic measure¬ 
ments, and under certain conditions, hydrodynamic measurements. 2 


151 









On-Site Inspection Agency 



Drilling crew maneuvers large 
drilling bit into emplacement hole at 
the Nevada Test Site. 


President Bush Directs OSIA Expansion 


These treaties and their new protocols were the first of several signifi¬ 
cant, new bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements in 1990-1991. 
Recognizing that the U.S. Government was entering into a new phase of 
cooperative arms control agreements, President Bush issued an executive 
directive just prior to the Washington Summit. He expanded the On-Site 
Inspection Agency's charter to include operational planning and prepara¬ 
tions for four arms control agreements under negotiation: Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons, Strategic Arms Reductions, 
and Nuclear Testing. The President cited three reasons: OSIA's extensive 
experience in conducting on-site inspections under the INF Treaty, the long 
lead times associated with identifying, assigning, and training linguists, and 
the pending series of new arms control treaties. With this directive. Presi¬ 
dent Bush changed the On-Site Inspection Agency from a single-to a 
multi-treaty agency. 

Within the United States government, all treaties moved through a 
sequence of actions from treaty negotiation to implementation. The process 
began with diplomatic negotiations to develop the treaty text, protocols, and 
annexes. Presidential approval and formal signature, usually at a summit 
meeting, were followed by a presidential directive defining roles and 
missions for carrying out each aspect of the treaty. The Constitution required 
the President to submit the signed treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice 
and consent. Following Senate hearings, debate, and ratification, the treaty 
was returned to the President for his signature and a formal exchange with 
the other signatories. Actual entry into force and implementation of the 
treaties began after the formal constitutional provisions had been met. 

For the two Nuclear Testing Treaties, TTBT and PNET, and their new 
protocols, the initial phases, diplomatic negotiations and presidential signa¬ 
ture concluded with the Washington Summit of June 1, 1990. In defining 
which government departments and agencies would carry out the provisions 
of the treaties, the President’s National Security Council staff surveyed 
existing laws, directives, and precedents.They incorporated President 
Bush's directive to expand the On-Site Inspection Agency with the laws 
and policies governing the Department of Energy’s and the Department of 
Defense's conduct of underground nuclear tests. The result was President 
Bush’s directive in mid-July 1990. In defining the roles and missions for 
those departments and agencies responsible for the nuclear testing treaties. 
The Department of Energy would carry out all of its statutory obligations 
in planning, scheduling, and conducting the U.S. underground nuclear tests 
at the Nevada Test Site. The On-Site Inspection Agency would manage and 
support the on-site monitoring of the nuclear tests conducted under the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Management included providing for team 
leadership, linguists, logisticians, and administrative support personnel. 
Support included responsibility for treaty training, funding, communica¬ 
tions, logistics, and the construction of facilities including inspector housing 
and treaty-required seismic stations. Because of the technical nature of 
conducting controlled, underground nuclear tests and the complex rights 
and obligations under the new protocols to the treaty, the President stated 
that extensive coordination would be necessary between the Department of 


152 











Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 


Energy, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the other agencies of the 
Department of Defense involved in nuclear testing. 4 

President Bush submitted the treaties and new protocols to the U.S. 
Senate in early July, 1990. From July to September, the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee held hearings on the new protocols. Following hear¬ 
ings and debate, the full Senate consented to ratification in late September 
by a vote of 98-0. The Soviet Union’s legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, 
voted unanimously in early October to ratify the two treaties and the new 
protocols. For the next ten weeks, the treaties and accompanying documents 
were readied for the formal exchange." 

While the Bush administration was working through these Nuclear 
Testing Treaties decisions and constitutional processes, negotiations on the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty were moving toward 
a conclusion in the summer and fall of 1990. This was a complex, multina¬ 
tional treaty with multiple protocols for inspections, reductions, notifica¬ 
tions, reclassificiation, and categorization. Personnel from OSIA, who had 
extensive experience in implementing the INF Treaty, advised American 
treaty negotiators working on the CFE Treaty. As the treaty negotiations 
grew progressively more detailed and intense. General Fajoie succeeded in 
placing some of the agency’s most experienced INF team chiefs and 
inspectors as technical advisors on key backstopping committees and treaty 
working groups in Vienna, and Washington.' 1 

When CFE Treaty negotiators in Vienna began focusing on inspection 
and reduction protocols. Ft. Colonel Paul Nelson, an experienced Army 
foreign area specialist and INF Treaty team leader, went to Austria and 
served as technical advisor to the U.S. delegation. After a month. Colonel 
John C. Reppert, US Army, a senior Soviet specialist and INF team leader, 
lent his expertise to the delegation. While these CFE negotiations were 
underway, General Fajoie dispatched Irene Nehonov, OSIA’s Russian 
Fanguage Coordinator, and Ft. Colonel Vitali Mostovoj, USAF, an OSIA 
team chief, on an extensive round-the-world trip to California, Hawaii, 
Japan, and Europe, to interview and evaluate hundreds of linguists for 
training and then assignment to the agency. More than one hundred and fifty 
linguists would be needed by 1992 to carry out the inspection and escort 
provisions of the new treaties. The first group of a continuing stream of 
these military linguists were entering formal training when the CFE Treaty 
was signed in Paris in mid-November 1990. 

President Bush went to Paris on November 19, 1990, where he joined 
the leaders of 21 nations in the formal signing ceremony for the CFE Treaty. 
Immediately thereafter, the President’s National Security Council began the 
process of defining the roles and mission of those U.S. Government depart¬ 
ments and agencies responsible for implementation. Since this was a treaty 
which focused exclusively on conventional arms—tanks, artillery, aircraft, 
and other military equipment—the U.S. Department of Defense was 
assigned principal responsibility. Within DOD, the U.S. European Com¬ 
mand (EUCOM) and the On-Site Inspection Agency received specific 
missions in managing and carrying out the United States’ treaty rights and 
obligations. At OSIA, General Fajoie acted quickly, instituting a major 
internal restructuring of the agency less than three weeks after the treaty 
was signed. 


153 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


On December 1, 1990, OSIA’s Field Office Europe was elevated to 
be the OSIA-Europe with responsibility for conducting all of the United 
States' CFE Treaty inspections/ OSIA-Europe retained responsibility for 
serving as a gateway office, supporting both the INF Treaty and Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty missions. The CFE Treaty mission, however, meant a 
significant expansion. To carry out all aspects of the European operation, 
the command would be increased from 20 to 150 people. In Europe, three 
senior officers. Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Colonel Lawrence G. 
Kelley, USMC, and Lt. Colonel Scott G. Lang, USA, directed the selection 
and recruitment of new team chiefs, deputies, linguists, inspectors, and 
support personnel. Training for these new inspectors required a rigorous 
regime because the CFE Treaty differed from other treaties in several 
important respects. There were five types of equipment—tanks, armed 
combat vehicles, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters—and approximately 
188,000 treaty-limited equipment items. There were six official treaty 
languages: English, Russian, French, German, Spanish, and Italian. The 
number of treaty parties (22 in 1990), and the anticipated use of multina¬ 
tional inspection teams, also differed from the experience of the INF Treaty. 
At OSIA-Europe, Colonel Kelley and his staff concentrated their efforts on 
developing in each new inspection team a thorough knowledge of the treaty, 
skills to recognize the types and and variations of treaty equipment, and a 
linguistic vocabulary for communicating and understanding treaty-specific 
information in multiple languages. At the same time. Colonel Grosick and 
Colonel Kelley worked with the U.S. European Command in devising and 
scheduling a series of CFE Treaty trial inspections. These trial inspections 
were conducted with the operational military forces and multinational 
inspection teams from the NATO alliance. ’ 



In their preparations for implementing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, OS!A inspectors and escorts participated 
in a series of site visits and trial inspections at U.S. Army sites in Europe. 


154 









Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 



For the CFE Treaty, training included mock inspections in which American inspectors (bluejackets) 
played the role of the inspecting team, while the American escorts (battle dress uniforms) acted the part 
of the escorting team. 


While OSIA-Europe was planning and preparing to carryout CFE 
Treaty inspections, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty and their new protocols entered into force on December 
11,1990.Within days both parties began implementing the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty. The first step was the exchange of information on national test 
sites and the number of scheduled nuclear tests that would exceed 35 
kilotons. Tests above that level and below 150 kilotons were subject to 
verifying inspections under the treaty. For 1991, the United States declared 
that two of its nuclear underground tests at the Nevada Test Site would fall 
within the TTBT's threshold limits. 1 ' The Soviet Union declared that it 
would exercise its treaty rights and monitor the tests. Initially, President 
Gorbachev declared a limited moratorium on Soviet testing; however, he 
changed that policy in June of 1991 and announced that the Soviet Union 
would conduct two tests at its Semipalatinsk nuclear test sites later in the 
year. The United States promptly declared its intention to send verification 
inspection teams to the USSR to monitor those tests. 12 

For the On-Site Inspection Agency these announcements meant that 
the transition from planning and preparations to implementation was occur¬ 
ring rapidly. Implementing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, like preparing 
for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, meant significant new 
responsibilities, requiring new people, resources, and funding, together with 
the necessity for considerable interagency coordination. 


General Parker Takes the Reins 


Coincidental with these new responsibilities were changes in the 
agency’s leadership. On January 25, 1991, Major General Robert W. Parker, 
USAF, accepted the command from Major General Roland Fajoie, the first 
Director. General Fajoie accepted reassignment to the Joint Staff as the 


155 







I«\ 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Deputy Director for International Negotiations. The new Director, Major 
General Parker, was an experienced strategic missile officer and Strategic 
Air Command wing commander who had served immediately before as the 
Military Advisor to Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Starting in January 1991, the new 
director accelerated the pace of change in the rapidly expanding 250-person 
inspection agency. Growth came quickly, one year later, there were 604 
people. Upon assuming command. General Parker stated that OSIA's first 
priority would remain on-site inspections under the INF Treaty. 1 ' 

Against the background of the Gulf War of 1991, implementation of 
the INF Treaty continued unimpeded. General Parker directed Colonel 
Ronald P. Forest, Director of Operations, to initiate planning and prepara¬ 
tions for the final eliminations of the INF Treaty missiles and launchers 
scheduled for April and May 1991 in the Soviet Union, Europe, and the 
United States. These final eliminations, which had to be completed by the 
end of the third treaty year (May 31, 1991), would involve national officials, 
senior military officers, the public, and the media to the greatest extent since 
the initial baseline inspections. Simultaneously, numerous closeout INF 
inspections by Soviet and American teams were being carried out confirm¬ 
ing the declared status of the remaining missile operating bases and 
facilities. Both parties were also conducting short-notice INF inspections at 
a pace to complete their annual quota of 20 by May 31, 1991. In three months 
—March, April, May—more than 350 American inspectors deployed to the 
Soviet Union, and another 350 assisted in escorting Soviet inspectors 
conducting inspections at U.S. INF installations. For some, it ranked among 
the busiest times of the entire INF Treaty. 14 



Genera! Lieutenant Vladimir 1. Medvedev, Director, Soviet NRRC, and Major General Robert W. Parker, 
USAF, Director, OSIA, at the Pershing II final elimination ceremony,at Longhorn, Texas on May 6,1991. 


156 







Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 



The Threshold Test Ban Treaty required a Coordinating Group Meeting. The USSR (l.) and U.S. (r.) 
delegations met in Washington D C., in February - March 1991. 


Simultaneous with this INF Treaty activity, General Parker entrusted 
Colonel Gerald V. West, OSIA's Chief of Escorts, with responsibility for 
leading the United States’ delegation to the first joint U.S.-Soviet Coordi¬ 
nating Group Meeting conducted under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 
Hosted by OSIA, this precedent-setting meeting of US and Soviet technical 
experts was held in Washington, D.C. in February and March 1991. The 
experts established a detailed schedule for the Soviet verifying party to go 
to the Nevada Test Site, install their treaty-authorized monitoring equip¬ 
ment, and to monitor the scheduled underground nuclear explosion. The 
monitoring equipment authorized under the treaty’s protocols was quite 
extensive, consisting of tons of cable, metal tubing, and specific, approved 
monitoring devices. Every item had to be identified, shipped from the Soviet 
Union, inspected, and then shipped again to the Department of Energy’s 
Nevada Test Site. The logistics involved in this and subsequent Soviet 
verification inspections under the treaty caused a significant expansion in 
OSIA’s workload. Within three months of the first Coordinating Group 
Meeting, Colonel West and the agency hosted a second meeting in June, 
1991. This one was just as detailed and protracted as the first. It planned the 
detailed schedule of the Soviet verifying party’s activity in monitoring the 
second U.S. underground nuclear test to be conducted under the treaty." 

Negotiations on the START Treaty entered their final stages in April 
1991. For the next three months, the United States and the Soviet Union 
pressed hard to complete a strategic arms reduction treaty that had been 
locked in negotiation for more than ten years. Anticipating the signing of 
the START Treaty, General Parker initiated with the Air Force and Navy's 
strategic nuclear missile, bomber, and submarine commands a series of staff 
assistance visits by experienced teams of on-site inspectors and escorts. 1 * 1 
These "visits" and subsequent mock inspections went to every American 
missile, bomber, and submarine site included in the START Treaty. There, 
the teams worked with Air Force and Navy officers and non-commissioned 
officers in reviewing the infrastructure of each inspectable facility. They 


157 










PHOTOGRAPH BY GARY P. MARINO 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


identified problem areas, and suggested improvements in the procedures for 
escorting the inspection teams. At the same time, OSIA identified, recruited, 
and trained new START inspection team leaders, deputies, linguists, and 
inspectors on the complex treaty text and its protocols. Under the treaty 
there were 12 types of on-site inspections. 

On the final day in July 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
was signed in the Kremlin. Speaking to an audience of diplomats, legisla¬ 
tors, military leaders, and television viewers worldwide. President Bush 
defended the treaty: "Neither side won unilateral advantage over the other. 
Both sides committed themselves instead to achieving a strong effective 
treaty." President Gorbachev struck a similar theme: "Here in Moscow, 
some will point to our unilateral concessions, while in Washington there 
will be talk about concessions made to the Soviet Union.... Sharp criticism 
is to be expected from those who want faster and more ambitious steps 
toward abolishing nuclear weapons. In other words, this treaty will have to 
be defended."' 


Collapse of the Soviet Union, Continuity of Arms Control 


Within three weeks of the signing of the START Treaty the Soviet 
government was threatened on August 19 by a coup d'etat. The coup leaders 
acted to halt implementation of the All-Union Treaty, which ceded signifi¬ 
cant powers to Russia and the other Soviet republics. However, in the early 
hours of the revolution the leaders appeared hesitant and uncertain. Oppo¬ 
sition appeared quickly. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and thousands of 
his supporters went into the streets of Moscow, protesting the unconstitu¬ 
tional seizure of power. ,s By chance. Master Sergeant Gary Marino and Joe 



Russian President Boris Yeltsin, standing on a Soviet tank, declared the coup d'etat illegal and called for a general 
strike and civil disobedience. Moscow, August 19, 1991. 


158 











Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 



On the morning of August 19,1991, Soviet tanks proceeded down Kutuzovsky Prospekt towards 
the Russian Parliament Building, Moscow. 


Murphy, two American INF Treaty inspectors from Votkinsk, were in 
Moscow picking up the weekly mail when the revolution began. As they 
walked out of the U.S. Embassy, Marino noticed "the ground began shaking 
as the sound of tanks became deafening outside of the perimeter fence. As 
I ran back to the hotel...tank after tank rolled methodically toward the 
Kremlin. While crossing the Moscow River, I looked down Kutuzovsky 
Prospekt at the endless number of tanks, annored personnel carriers, and 
other military vehicles."' 1 ’ 

Marino and Murphy stayed in their hotel long enough to pick up a 
camera, then went back into the streets. Crowds began to gather. "At a 
five-way intersection by the bridge," Marino recalled, "people began to 
block traffic and attempted to break up the convoy and disrupt movement 
by commandeering buses and electric trams." 11 Then, as they were standing 
among the crowd, Yeltsin came out of the Russian Parliament Building, 
climbed up on a tank, and began rallying the people against the coup plotters. 
When the Russian president finished his speech, he walked through the 
crowd shaking hands, including those of the two Americans. 

By the end of the week the coup had failed. However, when President 
Gorbachev returned to power, his government and the Communist Party 
were seriously weakened. Within ten days the party had been abolished, the 
All-Union Treaty had been reaffirmed, and power had shifted to President 
Yeltsin and the leaders of the national republics. Over the next six months, 
domestic issues dominated the revolutionary agenda, but foreign issues, 
especially those concerning control of nuclear weapons and the conduct of 
arms control treaties, continued to evoke intense interest. 



Soviet tank in front of Hotel Ukraine, 
the hotel used by all American INF 
inspectors from 1988-1991. 


159 

















On-Site Inspection Agency 



Just si.x weeks after the signing of the START Treaty on July 31,1991, the first on-site exhibition took place at Carswell Air Force 
Base, Texas. Here Colonel Richard Sfafranski, Commander, 7th Bomb Wing, accompanies General Medvedev, Director, NRRC, 
and Genera! Parker, Director, OSIA. 

The first exhibition under the START Treaty had been scheduled to 
occur in Texas in mid-September 1991. The treaty permitted both the Soviet 
Union and the United States to send on-site inspection teams to strategic 
missile, bomber, and submarine bases to record and confirm the technical 
characteristics of the missiles and bombers included in the treaty. In Texas, 
the United States would exhibit, to a Soviet on-site inspection team, B-l 
and B-52 bombers. This was to be the first of four American exhibitions, 
while the Soviet Union would conduct nine exhibitions. The first START 
exhibition took place as scheduled at Carswell Air Force Base in Texas on 
September 17, 1991. All of the other START exhibitions were conducted as 
scheduled in the fall and winter months of 1991-1992. 21 

On-site inspections associated with the INF Treaty continued unim¬ 
peded during these same months. Two types of on-site inspections remained 
active: continuous portal monitoring and short-notice inspections. All as¬ 
pects of the continuous portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk and 
Magna continued as in earlier years. All short-notice inspections were 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. 

In late September, approximately a month after the failed coup. 
President Bush announced major new unilateral reductions in U.S. strategic 
and tactical nuclear weapons. Bush’s sweeping reductions were matched a 
week later when Gorbachev declared new reductions and cancellations in 
weapons production programs in the Soviet Union. 22 One part of Gor¬ 
bachev’s declaration was his announcement of a one-year moratorium on 
all Soviet underground nuclear tests. This Soviet moratorium was 


160 







Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 


reconfirmed a tew weeks later by Russian President Yeltsin for all tests on 
Russian territory. As a direct result, the United States cancelled its plans to 
verify under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty a previously scheduled Soviet 
test at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan, USSR. 23 

These test moratoriums did not stop a Soviet verification team from 
continuing its activities to monitor the first American nuclear explosion 
under the provisions of the treaty. In late June, 23 Soviet inspectors had 
arrived at the U.S. Nevada Test Site to oversee the drilling required for the 
emplacement of the Soviet monitoring equipment. A month later, 18 mem¬ 
bers of the Soviet team departed the country, leaving on-site 5 inspectors to 
observe the emplacement and tamping. On September 10, the remaining 
inspectors departed, leaving only the equipment to monitor the HOY A Test 
on September 14, 1991. Following the test the Soviet verification party 
returned to the site, collected the monitoring data, and signed, along with 
the senior American escort, the treaty inspection reports. 24 

These Soviet arms control actions and announcements demonstrated 
continuity. However, they were insignificant when placed against the 
deterioration of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1991. From August to 
November, the Soviet government lost legitimacy, the Soviet president lost 
power, and the Soviet economy collapsed. On December 1, 1991, the people 
of the Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for independence from the Soviet 
Union. Eight days later the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met 
in Minsk, Belarus, and declared the USSR defunct. They established a 
limited confederation, the Commonwealth of Independent States. Stripped 
of territory, population, military forces, and money. President Gorbachev’s 
Soviet government collapsed on December 25, 1991, ending 70 years of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These revolutionary developments 
influenced every aspect of the new states’ domestic and foreign relations, 
including implementation of arms control treaties and agreements. 23 

Initially, on-site inspections and exhibitions under existing treaties, 
specifically, the INF, the TTBT, and START treaties, continued as under 
the previous government. However, in the spring and summer of 1992 there 
was evidence that a new sense of cooperation was developing among 
Russian, Eastern European, Western European, and American inspectors, 
negotiators, and arms control policy leaders. This was most apparent for the 
CFE Treaty. Multinational CFE trial inspections were conducted in the 
spring of 1992 by teams from the NATO nations and the nations of Eastern 
Europe and Russia. Versed in the treaty and its inspection protocols, these 
inspectors cooperated on an unprecedented scale. At OSIA’s European 
Operations Command, Colonel William R. Smith, USAF, and Colonel 
Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, and CFE inspection teams participated in a 
series of trial inspections with teams from Russia, Romania, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 2 ' 1 

In March 1992 a new arms control agreement, the Open Skies Treaty, 
was signed in Helsinki by 25 nations, including the United States, NATO 
nations, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. This agreement established 
an inspection regime of unarmed aerial Bights over the entire territories of 
the 25 signatory nations. Covering national territory from Vancouver, 
Canada east to Vladivostok, Russia, this treaty in its scope is one of the most 
extensive agreements in modern times.' 


161 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


As the United States' principal agency for conducting on-site inspec¬ 
tions in these arms control treaties, the On-Site Inspection Agency partici¬ 
pated directly in many of these new developments. General Parker and 
General Medvedev joined the multinational CFE trial inspection teams, 
reviewing in detail the inspection protocols with their senior team chiefs, 
linguists, and inspectors. Both directors served as on-site inspectors on the 
START exhibition teams, traveling to military bases in the United States 
and Russia to inspect, measure, and record the technical characteristics of 
the missile and bomber systems. Both generals participated in international 
meetings and seminars, discussing with experts and the public their INF 
experiences learned from conducting more than 850 on-site inspections. In 
Europe, both Parker and Medvedev participated in multinational planning 
meetings on implementing the inspection regime of the CFE Treaty. 

In May, General Medvedev traveled from Moscow to Washington 
where he joined with General Parker in a briefing to the Middle East 
Regional Security and Anns Control Group which included representatives 
from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Richard A. Clarke, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, hosted the 3-day 
meeting which focused on the methods and concepts in arms control from 
the U.S.-Soviet experience. Clarke characterized the meeting: "I think the 
briefing on the mission and work of OSIA [was] of great benefit to the 
Middle East states’ familiarization process." s In June, in a somewhat 
similar vein. Dr. Edward M. Ifft, OSIA's Deputy Director for External 
Affairs, led a small group of experienced team chiefs, linguists, and com¬ 
manders to seven of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. In the 
capital cities of the Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldava, Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan, they briefed the senior military and diplomatic 
staffs on the CFE Treaty, on-site inspection concepts and protocols, and the 
experiences learned from the INF Treaty. 

Perhaps the clearest concrete indication of continuity occurred in July 
1992. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty entered into force, 
beginning mandatory data exchanges, on-site inspections, and scheduled 
reductions of military arms on the European continent, from the Urals to 
the Atlantic. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of new 
independent states, the number of treaty signatories increased to 29 nations. 
Representatives of these nations met in Helsinki, Finland at the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe and exchanged the treaty docu¬ 
ments." 4 The actual date for the CFE Treaty’s entry into force was July 17, 
1992, the same day the 120-day baseline inspection period began. Just as 
with the INF Treaty, United States' inspection and escort teams were poised 
to inaugurate the CFE Treaty baseline inspections. U.S. Army Lt. Colonel 
Guy White led the first American CFE team as they inspected the Russian 
Army’s 22nd Central Reserve Depot at Buy, Russia. 3(1 The nine-member 
team included officers and non-commissioned officers, linguists and arma¬ 
ment specialists, team and subgroup leaders. During the inspection. Colonel 
White’s team identified, counted, and recorded more than 1,200 Russian 
tanks and other treaty-limited equipment items. 31 This inspection was just 
the beginning, over the 120-day baseline period the United States and the 
other 15 NATO nations would be inspecting a portion of the more than 1.000 
declared sites where conventional weapons were located in the former 
Warsaw Pact nations. General Parker, OSIA's Director, was an inspector 


162 



Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 


on that first CFE inspection team. Just before departing for Russia, a reporter 
asked him to compare previous amis control treaties with the CFE Treaty. 
Parker explained the treaty’s size, complexity, and multinational aspects, 
and then concluded: "The CFE Treaty is the accumulation of just about 
every treaty worked out in the past few years." 0 

When one thinks about the breadth of these new arms control treaties, 
agreements, and developments, they dwarf the scope of the INF Treaty. All, 
however, were indebted to that treaty and the precedents it established. For 
in the final analysis, the INF Treaty can be considered a template for subse¬ 
quent arms control agreements; a template carefully drawn, tempered 
through implementation, and closely watched for flaws and ambiguities. 
Like any good template, the pattern established for one set of materials 
could, if properly done, be applied to a different set. Perhaps it is time to 
incorporate into our knowledge of amis control treaties, the efforts of those 
nations and people who carried out "On-Site Inspections Under the INF 
Treaty." 



163 







On-Site Inspection Agency 


NOTES: CHAPTER 9 

'George Bush, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1990, Book I. 
(Government Printing Office) pp. 747-751; Washington Post, June 1, 1990, p.l.; 
Washington Times, June 1, 1990, pi. 

9 

" Treat}' Between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, with Proto¬ 
cols, July 3, 1974, June 1, 1990. See also; Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear 
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, with Protocols, May 28, 1976, June 1, 1990. 
These two treaties had been signed, but not ratified, pending agreement on the new 
protocols. 

Major General Robert W. Parker (USAF), OSIA Director, "Statement Before the 
House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, Interna¬ 
tional Security, and Science," March 21, 1991. In his statement, Parker discusses 
President Bush's directive. 

4 Ibid. See also. Statement of US State Department Counselor Richard Holwill, 
Congressional Record, Senate 13707. 

^Baltimore Sun, September 26, 1990, p 1: Tass, October 9, 1990. in FBIS-Soviet 
Union, October 10, 1990. 

"Brigadier General Lajoie, "Statement Before the US Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence," August 2, 1990. 

1 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, November 19, 1990. 

s OSIA Office of Public Affairs, On-Site Insights, December, 1990, pp 3-4. 

9 H 

Parker, "Foreign Affairs Subcommittee," March 21, 1991; Major General Parker, 
"Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Conven¬ 
tional Forces in Europe Treaty," July 25, 1991. 

"'Reuters, "Bush Signs 2 Pacts Limiting Underground Nuclear Tests," New' York 
Times , December 11. 1990, p. A13. 

1 \\rms Control Reporter , March 21, 1991,p.605.Bl 16. 

l ~Tass, May 30, 1991, in FBIS-Soviet Union , May 31, 1991. 

1 OSIA Office of Public Affairs, On-Site Insights, January 1991. p 1, February 
1991, pp 1-2. 

l4 See Chapter 6, INF Elimination Inspections, for a statistical account of this final 
phase of eliminations. 

1 "Major General Robert Parker, "Statement Before House Foreign Affairs Subcom¬ 
mittee on Amis Control. International Security and Science," May 12, 1992. 

1 "Parker, "House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee," May 12, 1992. 

l7 Remarks of Gorbachev and Bush from White House transcript, Moscow, July 
31, 1991, cited in Arms Control Reporter, 1991 ,611 .B.689. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush 
and Gorbachev Sign Pact to Curtail Nuclear Arsenals; Join in Call for Mideast 
Talks," New' York Times , August 1, 1991, pp. Al, A11. See also: Associated Press, 
"We have Achieved the Best That is Now Possible," and "We ‘Sign the Treaty' As 
Testament to New Relationship," Washington Post, August 1, 1991, p. A25. 

18 

1 New York Times, August 19, 1991, p 1, August 20-25, ppl-passim. 


164 



Epilogue: Continuity of Arms Control 


19 

Gary P. Marino, "Routine mail run - anything, but routine." On-Site Insights’ 
September 1991, p.7-8. 

20 

Ibid. Interview, Master Sergeant Gary P. Marino, U.S. Army, September 9, 1992. 

21 

General Robert Parker, "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit¬ 
tee on the Implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty," June 30, 1992; 
General Robert Parker, "Statement before the Senate Armed Services Subcommit¬ 
tee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence," April 28, 1992. 

22 

“Arms Control Today, November, 1991, Start Treaty Supplement, pp.1-24. 

~\\rms Control Reporter, 1992 , pp 608.B.220-221; Arms Control Reporter, 1991, 
pp 605.B. 118-119. 

24 Arms Control Reporter, 1991, pp.605B. 118-119 

95 

"New York Times , December 2, 1991, p..2, December 9, p. 1, December 26, p. 1. 
26 

“ Parker, "Senate Armed Services Subcommittee," April 28, 1992. 

97 

For the Open Skies Treaty, see Peter Jones, "Open Skies: A New Era of 
Transparency," Arms Control Today, May 1992, pp 10-15. 240SIA Office of 
Public Affairs, On-Site Insights, May 1992. pp 10-15. 

“ S OSIA Office of Public Affairs, On-Site Insights, May 1992, p 1. 

29 "Europeans Agree To Honor Pact By Old Blocks," New York Times, June 6, 1992, 
p. 5. 

30 "U.S. Inspection Team Readies For CIS Tasks," Stars and Stripes, July 18, 1992 
pp 1-2; "Historic Arms Cut Takes Effect," Associated Press, July 17, 1992; OSIA 
Office of Public Affairs, On-Site Insights. August 1992, p. 5, 9. 

31 On-Site Insights, p. 5. 

'Stars and Stripes, July 18, 1992, p. 2. 


165 






















APPENDICES 








APPENDIX A 


Treaty 

Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles 


The United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 

Conscious that nuclear war would 
have devastating consequences for all 
mankind, 

Guided by the objective of 
strengthening strategic stability, 

Convinced that the measures set 
forth in this Treaty will help to reduce 
the risk of outbreak of war and 
strengthen international peace and 
security, and 

Mindful of their obligations under 
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

In accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty which includes the 
Memorandum of Understanding and 
Protocols which form an integral part 
thereof, each Party shall eliminate its 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, not have such systems 
thereafter, and carry out the other 
obligations set forth in this Treaty. 

Article II 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

1. The term “ballistic missile” 
means a missile that has a ballistic 
trajectory over most of its flight path. 
The term “ground-launched ballistic 
missile (GLBM)” means a ground- 
launched ballistic missile that is a 
weapon-delivery vehicle. 

2. The term “cruise missile” means 
an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle 
that sustains flight through the use of 
aerodynamic lift over most of its flight 
path. The term “ground-launched 
cruise missile (GLCM)” means a 
ground-launched cruise missile that is 
a weapon-delivery vehicle. 


3. The term “GLBM launcher” 
means a fixed launcher or a mobile 
land-based transporter-erector-launcher 
mechanism for launching a GLBM. 

4. The term “GLCM launcher” 
means a fixed launcher or a mobile 
land-based transporter-erector-launcher 
mechanism for launching a GLCM. 

5. The term “intermediate-range 
missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM 
having a range capability in excess of 
1000 kilometers but not in excess of 
5500 kilometers. 

6. The term “shorter-range 
missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM 
having a range capability equal to or in 
excess of 500 kilometers but not in 
excess of 1000 kilometers. 

7. The term “deployment area” 
means a designated area within which 
intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles may operate 
and within which one or more missile 
operating bases are located. 

8. The term “missile operating 
base” means: 

(a) in the case of intermediate- 
range missiles, a complex of facilities 
located within a deployment area at 
which intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles normally 
operate, in which support structures 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers are also located and in which 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers is 
normally located; and 

(b) in the case of shorter-range 
missiles, a complex of facilities located 
any place at which shorter-range 
missiles and launchers of such missiles 
normally operate and in which support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers is normally 
located. 

9. The term “missile support 
facility,” as regards intermediate-range 


or shorter-range missiles and launchers 
of such missiles, means a missile 
production facility or a launcher 
production facility, a missile repair 
facility or a launcher repair facility, a 
training facility, a missile storage 
facility or a launcher storage facility, a 
test range, or an elimination facility as 
those terms are defined in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

10. The term “transit” means 
movement, notified in accordance with 
paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this 
Treaty, of an intermediate-range 
missile or a launcher of such a missile 
between missile support facilities, 
between such a facility and a 
deployment area or between 
deployment areas, or of a shorter-range 
missile or a launcher of such a missile 
from a missile support facility or 
missile operating base to an 
elimination facility. 

11. The term “deployed missile” 
means an intermediate-range missile 
located within a deployment area or a 
shorter-range missile located at a 
missile operating base. 

12. The term “non-deployed 
missile” means an intermediate-range 
missile located outside a deployment 
area or a shorter-range missile located 
outside a missile operating base. 

13. The term “deployed launcher” 
means a launcher of an intermediate- 
range missile located within a 
deployment area or a launcher of a 
shorter-range missile located at a 
missile operating base. 

14. The term “non-deployed 
launcher” means a launcher of an 
intermediate-range missile located 
outside a deployment area or a 
launcher of a shorter-range missile 
located outside a missile operating 
base. 


169 


15. The term “basing country” 
means a country other than the United 
States of America or the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on whose 
territory intermediate-range or shorter- 
range missiles of the Parties, launchers 
of such missiles or support structures 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers were located at any time 
after November 1, 1987. Missiles or 
launchers in transit are not considered 
to be “located.” 

Article III 

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
existing types of intermediate-range 
missiles are: 

(a) for the United States of 
America, missiles of the types 
designated by the United States of 
America as the Pershing II and the 
BGM-109G, which are known to the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by 
the same designations; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, missiles of the 
types designated by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the 
R-12 and the R-14, which are known to 
the United States of America as the 
SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, 
respectively. 

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
existing types of shorter-range missiles 
are: 

(a) for the United States of 
America, missiles of the type 
designated by the United States of 
America as the Pershing IA, which is 
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics by the same designation; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, missiles of the 
types designated by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and 
the OTR-23, which are known to the 
United States of America as the SS-12 
and the SS-23, respectively. 

Article IV 

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its 
intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles, and all 
support structures and support 
equipment of the categories listed in 
the Memorandum of Understanding 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, so that no later than three 
years after entry into force of this 


Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, 
launchers, support structures or 
support equipment shall be possessed 
by either Party. 

2. To implement paragraph 1 of 
this Article, upon entry into force of 
this Treaty, both Parties shall begin 
and continue throughout the duration 
of each phase, the reduction of all 
types of their deployed and non- 
deployed intermediate-range missiles 
and deployed and non-deployed 
launchers of such missiles and support 
structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. These 
reductions shall be implemented in two 
phases so that: 

(a) by the end of the first phase, 
that is, no later than 29 months after 
entry into force of this Treaty: 

(i) the number of deployed 
launchers of intermediate-range 
missiles for each Party shall not exceed 
the number of launchers that are 
capable of carrying or containing at 
one time missiles considered by the 
Parties to carry 171 warheads; 

(ii) the number of deployed 
intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
such missiles considered by the Parties 
to carry 180 warheads; 

(iii) the aggregate number of 
deployed and non-deployed launchers 
of intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
launchers that are capable of carrying 
or containing at one time missiles 
considered by the Parties to carry 200 
warheads; 

(iv) the aggregate number of 
deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
such missiles considered by the Parties 
to carry 200 warheads; and 

(v) the ratio of the aggregate 
number of deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range GLBMs of existing 
types for each Party to the aggregate 
number of deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range missiles of existing 
types possessed by that Party shall not 
exceed the ratio of such intermediate- 
range GLBMs to such intermediate- 
range missiles for that Party as of 
November 1, 1987, as set forth in the 
Memorandum of Understanding; and 


(b) by the end of the second 
phase, that is, no later than three 
years after entry into force of this 
Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles 
of each Party, launchers of such 
missiles and all support structures and 
support equipment of the categories 
listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding associated with such 
missiles and launchers, shall be 
eliminated. 

Article V 

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles, and all support 
equipment of the categories listed in 
the Memorandum of Understanding 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, so that no later than 18 
months after entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, 
launchers or support equipment shall 
be possessed by either Party. 

2. No later than 90 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty, each 
Party shall complete the removal of all 
its deployed shorter-range missiles and 
deployed and non-deployed launchers 
of such missiles to elimination facilities 
and shall retain them at those 
locations until they are eliminated in 
accordance with the procedures set 
forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 

No later than 12 months after entry 
into force of this Treaty, each Party 
shall complete the removal of all its 
non-deployed shorter-range missiles to 
elimination facilities and shall retain 
them at those locations until they are 
eliminated in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol on 
Elimination. 

3. Shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall not be 
located at the same elimination 
facility. Such facilities shall be 
separated by no less than 1000 
kilometers. 

Article VI 

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty 
and thereafter, neither Party shall: 

(a) produce or flight-test any 
intermediate-range missiles or produce 
any stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles; or 

(b) produce, flight-test or launch 
any shorter-range missiles or produce 


170 


any stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles. 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of 
this Article, each Party shall have the 
right to produce a type of GLBM not 
limited by this Treaty which uses a 
stage which is outwardly similar to, but 
not interchangeable with, a stage of an 
existing type of intermediate-range 
GLBM having more than one stage, 
providing that that Party shall not 
produce any other stage which is 
outwardly similar to, but not 
interchangeable with, any other stage 
of an existing type of intermediate- 
range GLBM. 

Article VII 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise 
missile has been flight-tested or 
deployed for weapon delivery, all 
missiles of that type shall be 
considered to be weapon-delivery 
vehicles. 

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an 
intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs 
or GLCMs of that type shall be 
considered to be intermediate-range 
missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a 
shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or 
GLCMs of that type shall be considered 
to be shorter-range missiles. 

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed 
and tested solely to intercept and 
counter objects not located on the 
surface of the earth, it shall not be 
considered to be a missile to which the 
limitations of this Treaty apply. 

4. The range capability of a GLBM 
not listed in Article III of this Treaty 
shall be considered to be the maximum 
range to which it has been tested. The 
range capability of a GLCM not listed 
in Article III of this Treaty shall be 
considered to be the maximum distance 
which can be covered by the missile in 
its standard design mode flying until 
fuel exhaustion, determined by 
projecting its flight path onto the 
earth’s sphere from the point of launch 
to the point of impact. GLBMs or 
GLCMs that have a range capability 
equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers 
but not in excess of 1000 kilometers 
shall be considered to be shorter-range 
missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a 
range capability in excess of 1000 
kilometers but not in excess of 5500 


kilometers shall be considered to be 
intermediate-range missiles. 

5. The maximum number of 
warheads an existing type of 
intermediate-range missile or shorter- 
range missile carries shall be 
considered to be the number listed for 
missiles of that type in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be 
considered to carry the maximum 
number of warheads listed for a GLBM 
or GLCM of that type in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

7. If a launcher has been tested for 
launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all 
launchers of that type shall be 
considered to have been tested for 
launching GLBMs or GLCMs. 

8. If a launcher has contained or 
launched a particular type of GLBM or 
GLCM, all launchers of that type shall 
be considered to be launchers of that 
type of GLBM or GLCM. 

9. The number of missiles each 
launcher of an existing type of 
intermediate-range missile or shorter- 
range missile shall be considered to be 
capable of carrying or containing at 
one time is the number listed for 
launchers of missiles of that type in 
the Memorandum of Understanding. 

10. Except in the case of 
elimination in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol on 
Elimination, the following shall apply: 

(a) for GLBMs which are stored 
or moved in separate stages, the 
longest stage of an intermediate-range 
or shorter-range GLBM shall be 
counted as a complete missile; 

(b) for GLBMs which are not 
stored or moved in separate stages, a 
canister of the type used in the launch 
of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless 
a Party proves to the satisfaction of the 
other Party that it does not contain 
such a missile, or an assembled 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLBM, shall be counted as a complete 
missile; and 

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of 
an intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLCM shall be counted as a complete 
missile. 

11. A ballistic missile which is not 
a missile to be used in a ground-based 
mode shall not be considered to be a 
GLBM if it is test-launched at a test 
site from a fixed land-based launcher 


which is used solely for test purposes 
and which is distinguishable from 
GLBM launchers. A cruise missile 
which is not a missile to be used in a 
ground-based mode shall not be 
considered to be a GLCM if it is test- 
launched at a test site from a fixed 
land-based launcher which is used 
solely for test purposes and which is 
distinguishable from GLCM launchers. 

12. Each Party shall have the right 
to produce and use for booster systems, 
which might otherwise be considered to 
be intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles, only existing types of booster 
stages for such booster systems. 
Launches of such booster systems shall 
not be considered to be flight-testing of 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles provided that: 

(a) stages used in such booster 
systems are different from stages used 
in those missiles listed as existing types 
of intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles in Article III of this Treaty; 

(b) such booster systems are used 
only for research and development 
purposes to test objects other than the 
booster systems themselves; 

(c) the aggregate number of 
launchers for such booster systems 
shall not exceed 35 for each Party at 
any one time; and 

(d) the launchers for such booster 
systems are fixed, emplaced above 
ground and located only at research 
and development launch sites which 
are specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 

Research and development launch sites 
shall not be subject to inspection 
pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty. 

Article VIII 

1. All intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall be 
located in deployment areas, at missile 
support facilities or shall be in transit. 
Intermediate-range missiles or 
launchers of such missiles shall not be 
located elsewhere. 

2. Stages of intermediate-range 
missiles shall be located in deployment 
areas, at missile support facilities or 
moving between deployment areas, 
between missile support facilities or 
between missile support facilities and 
deployment areas. 


171 


3. Until their removal to 
elimination facilities as required by 
paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, 
all shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall be 
located at missile operating bases, at 
missile support facilities or shall be in 
transit. Shorter-range missiles or 
launchers of such missiles shall not be 
located elsewhere. 

4. Transit of a missile or launcher 
subject to the provisions of this Treaty 
shall be completed within 25 days. 

5. All deployment areas, missile 
operating bases and missile support 
facilities are specified in the 
Memorandum of Understanding or in 
subsequent updates of data pursuant to 
paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX 
of this Treaty. Neither Party shall 
increase the number of, or change the 
location or boundaries of, deployment 
areas, missile operating bases or 
missile support facilities, except for 
elimination facilities, from those set 
forth in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. A missile support 
facility shall not be considered to be 
part of a deployment area even though 
it may be located within the geographic 
boundaries of a deployment area. 

6. Beginning 30 days after entry 
into force of this Treaty, neither Party 
shall locate intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles, including stages 
of such missiles, or launchers of such 
missiles at missile production facilities, 
launcher production facilities or test 
ranges listed in the Memorandum of 

U nderstanding. 

7. Neither Party shall locate any 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles at training facilities. 

8. A non-deployed intermediate- 
range or shorter-range missile shall not 
be carried on or contained within a 
launcher of such a type of missile, 
except as required for maintenance 
conducted at repair facilities or for 
elimination by means of launching 
conducted at elimination facilities. 

9. Training missiles and training 
launchers for intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles shall be subject 
to the same locational restrictions as 
are set forth for intermediate-range 
and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles in 
paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article. 


Article IX 

1. The Memorandum of Understanding 
contains categories of data relevant to 
obligations undertaken with regard to 
this Treaty and lists all intermediate- 
range and shorter-range missiles, 
launchers of such missiles, and support 
structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, possessed by the Parties as 
of November 1, 1987. Updates of that 
data and notifications required by this 
Article shall be provided according to 
the categories of data contained in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

2. The Parties shall update that 
data and provide the notifications 
required by this Treaty through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 
established pursuant to the Agreement 
Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Establishment of 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 
September 15, 1987. 

3. No later than 30 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty, each 
Party shall provide the other Party 
with updated data, as of the date of 
entry into force of this Treaty, for all 
categories of data contained in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

4. No later than 30 days after the 
end of each six-month interval 
following the entry into force of this 
Treaty, each Party shall provide 
updated data for all categories of data 
contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding by informing the other 
Party of all changes, completed and in 
process, in that data, which have 
occurred during the six-month interval 
since the preceding data exchange, and 
the net effect of those changes. 

5. Upon entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall 
provide the following notifications to 
the other Party: 

(a) notification, no less than 30 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
of the elimination of a specific 
deployment area, missile operating 
base or missile support facility; 

(b) notification, no less than 30 
days in advance, of changes in the 
number or location of elimination 
facilities, including the location and 
scheduled date of a change; 

(c) notification, except with 
respect to launches of intermediate- 


range missiles for the purpose of their 
elimination, no less than 30 days in 
advance, of the scheduled date of the 
initiation of the elimination of 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, and stages of such missiles, 
and launchers of such missiles and 
support structures and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers, including: 

(i) the number and type of 
items of missile systems to be 
eliminated; 

(ii) the elimination site; 

(iii) for intermediate-range 
missiles, the location from which such 
missiles, launchers of such missiles and 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers are moved 
to the elimination facility; and 

(iv) except in the case of 
support structures, the point of entry 
to be used by an inspection team 
conducting an inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 7 of Article XI of this 
Treaty and the estimated time of 
departure of an inspection team from 
the point of entry to the elimination 
facility; 

(d) notification, no less than ten 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
of the launch, or the scheduled date of 
the initiation of a series of launches, of 
intermediate-range missiles for the 
purpose of their elimination, including: 

(i) the type of missiles to be 
eliminated; 

(ii) location of the launch, or, if 
elimination is by a series of launches, 
the location of such launches and 
number of launches in the series; 

(iii) the point of entry to be 
used by an inspection team conducting 
an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 
of Article XI of this Treaty; and 

(iv) the estimated time of 
departure of an inspection team from 
the point of entry to the elimination 
facility; 

(e) notification, no later than 48 
hours after they occur, of changes in 
the number of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, launchers of 
such missiles and support structures 
and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers resulting 
from elimination as described in the 
Protocol on Elimination, including: 


172 


(i) the number and type of 
items of a missile system which were 
eliminated; and 

(ii) the date and location of 
such elimination; and 

(f) notification of transit of 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles or launchers of such missiles, 
or the movement of training missiles or 
training launchers for such 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, no later than 48 hours after it 
has been completed, including: 

(i) the number of missiles or 
launchers; 

(ii) the points, dates and times 
of departure and arrival; 

(iii) the mode of transport; and 

(iv) the location and time at 
that location at least once every four 
days during the period of transit. 

6. Upon entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall 
notify the other Party, no less than ten 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
and location of the launch of a 
research and development booster 
system as described in paragraph 12 of 
Article VII of this Treaty. 

Article X 

1. Each Party shall eliminate its 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles and launchers of such missiles 
and support structures and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in the 
Protocol on Elimination. 

2. Verification by on-site inspection 
of the elimination of items of missile 
systems specified in the Protocol on 
Elimination shall be carried out in 
accordance with Article XI of this 
Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination 
and the Protocol on Inspection. 

3. When a Party removes its 
intermediate-range missiles, launchers 
of such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers from deployment areas to 
elimination facilities for the purpose of 
their elimination, it shall do so in 
complete deployed organizational units. 
For the United States of America, 
these units shall be Pershing II 
batteries and BGM-109G flights. For 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 


these units shall be SS-20 regiments 
composed of two or three battalions. 

4. Elimination of intermediate- 
range and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers shall be carried 
out at the facilities that are specified in 
the Memorandum of Understanding or 
notified in accordance with paragraph 
5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless 
eliminated in accordance with Sections 
IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. 
Support structures, associated with the 
missiles and launchers subject to this 
Treaty, that are subject to elimination 
shall be eliminated in situ. 

5. Each Party shall have the right, 
during the first six months after entry 
into force of this Treaty, to eliminate 
by means of launching no more than 
100 of its intermediate-range missiles. 

6. Intermediate-range and shorter- 
range missiles which have been tested 
prior to entry into force of this Treaty, 
but never deployed, and which are not 
existing types of intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles listed in Article 
III of this Treaty, and launchers of 
such missiles, shall be eliminated 
within six months after entry into 
force of this Treaty in accordance with 
the procedures set forth in the Protocol 
on Elimination. Such missiles are: 

(a) for the United States of 
America, missiles of the type 
designated by the United States of 
America as the Pershing IB, which is 
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics by the same designation; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, missiles of the type 
designated by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics as the RK-55, 
which is known to the United States of 
America as the SSC-X-4. 

7. Intermediate-range and shorter- 
range missiles and launchers of such 
missiles and support structures and 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers shall be 
considered to be eliminated after 
completion of the procedures set forth 
in the Protocol on Elimination and 
upon the notification provided for in 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this 
Treaty. 

8. Each Party shall eliminate its 
deployment areas, missile operating 
bases and missile support facilities. A 


Party shall notify the other Party 
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article 
IX of this Treaty once the conditions 
set forth below are fulfilled: 

(a) all intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers located there have been 
removed; 

(b) all support structures 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers located there have been 
eliminated; and 

(c) all activity related to 
production, flight-testing, training, 
repair, storage or deployment of such 
missiles and launchers has ceased 
there. 

Such deployment areas, missile 
operating bases and missile support 
facilities shall be considered to be 
eliminated either when they have been 
inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 
days have elapsed since the date of the 
scheduled elimination which was 
notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of 
Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment 
area, missile operating base or missile 
support facility listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding that 
met the above conditions prior to entry 
into force of this Treaty, and is not 
included in the initial data exchange 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX 
of this Treaty, shall be considered to be 
eliminated. 

9. If a Party intends to convert a 
missile operating base listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding for use 
as a base associated with GLBM or 
GLCM systems not subject to this 
Treaty, then that Party shall notify the 
other Party, no less than 30 days in 
advance of the scheduled date of the 
initiation of the conversion, of the 
scheduled date and the purpose for 
which the base will be converted. 

Article XI 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall have the right to conduct on-site 
inspections. The Parties shall 
implement on-site inspections in 
accordance with this Article, the 
Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol 
on Elimination. 


173 


2. Each Party shall have the right 
to conduct inspections provided for by 
this Article both within the territory of 
the other Party and within the 
territories of basing countries. 

3. Beginning 30 days after entry 
into force of this Treaty, each Party 
shall have the right to conduct 
inspections at all missile operating 
bases and missile support facilities 
specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding other than missile 
production facilities, and at all 
elimination facilities included in the 
initial data update required by 
paragraph 3 of Article IX of this 
Treaty. These inspections shall be 
completed no later than 90 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty. The 
purpose of these inspections shall be to 
verify the number of missiles, 
launchers, support structures and 
support equipment and other data, as 
of the date of entry into force of this 
Treaty, provided pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of Article IX of this 
Treaty. 

4. Each Party shall have the right 
to conduct inspections to verify the 
elimination, notified pursuant to 
paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this 
Treaty, of missile operating bases and 
missile support facilities other than 
missile production facilities, which are 
thus no longer subject to inspections 
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this 
Article. Such an inspection shall be 
carried out within 60 days after the 
scheduled date of the elimination of 
that facility. If a Party conducts an 
inspection at a particular facility 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article 
after the scheduled date of the 
elimination of that facility, then no 
additional inspection of that facility 
pursuant to this paragraph shall be 
permitted. 

5. Each Party shall have the right 
to conduct inspections pursuant to this 
paragraph for 13 years after entry into 
force of this Treaty. Each Party shall 
have the right to conduct 20 such 
inspections per calendar year during 
the first three years after entry into 
force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections 
per calendar year during the 
subsequent five years, and ten such 
inspections per calendar year during 
the last five years. Neither Party shall 
use more than half of its total number 


of these inspections per calendar year 
within the territory of any one basing 
country. Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct: 

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days 
after entry into force of this Treaty, of 
missile operating bases, and missile 
support facilities other than 
elimination facilities and missile 
production facilities, to ascertain, 
according to the categories of data 
specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, the numbers of 
missiles, launchers, support structures 
and support equipment located at each 
missile operating base or missile 
support facility at the time of the 
inspection; and 

(b) inspections of former missile 
operating bases and former missile 
support facilities eliminated pursuant 
to paragraph 8 of Article X of this 
Treaty other than former missile 
production facilities. 

6. Beginning 30 days after entry 
into force of this Treaty, each Party 
shall have the right, for 13 years after 
entry into force of this Treaty, to 
inspect by means of continuous 
monitoring: 

(a) the portals of any facility of 
the other Party at which the final 
assembly of a GLBM using stages, any 
of which is outwardly similar to a stage 
of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in 
Article III of this Treaty, is 
accomplished; or 

(b) if a Party has no such facility, 
the portals of an agreed former missile 
production facility at which existing 
types of intermediate-range or shorter- 
range GLBMs were produced. 

The Party whose facility is to be 
inspected pursuant to this paragraph 
shall ensure that the other Party is 
able to establish a permanent 
continuous monitoring system at that 
facility within six months after entry 
into force of this Treaty or within six 
months of initiation of the process of 
final assembly described in 
subparagraph (a). If, after the end of 
the second year after entry into force 
of this Treaty, neither Party conducts 
the process of final assembly described 
in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 
consecutive months, then neither Party 
shall have the right to inspect by 
means of continuous monitoring any 
missile production facility of the other 


Party unless the process of final 
assembly as described in subparagraph 
(a) is initiated again. Upon entry into 
force of this Treaty, the facilities to be 
inspected by continuous monitoring 
shall be: in accordance with 
subparagraph (b), for the United States 
of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, 
at Magna, Utah; in accordance with 
subparagraph (a), for the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk 
Machine Building Plant, Udmurt 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic. 

7. Each Party shall conduct 
inspections of the process of 
elimination, including elimination of 
intermediate-range missiles by means 
of launching, of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers carried out at elimination 
facilities in accordance with Article X 
of this Treaty and the Protocol on 
Elimination. Inspectors conducting 
inspections provided for in this 
paragraph shall determine that the 
processes specified for the elimination 
of the missiles, launchers and support 
equipment have been completed. 

8. Each Party shall have the right 
to conduct inspections to confirm the 
completion of the process of 
elimination of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers eliminated pursuant to 
Section V of the Protocol on 
Elimination, and of training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers 
eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV 
and V of the Protocol on Elimination. 

Article XII 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall use national technical means of 
verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law. 

2. Neither Party shall: 

(a) interfere with national 
technical means of verification of the 


174 


other Party operating in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article; or 

(b) use concealment measures 
which impede verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty by national technical means of 
verification carried out in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article. This 
obligation does not apply to cover or 
concealment practices, within a 
deployment area, associated with 
normal training, maintenance and 
operations, including the use of 
environmental shelters to protect 
missiles and launchers. 

3. To enhance observation by 
national technical means of 
verification, each Party shall have the 
right until a treaty between the Parties 
reducing and limiting strategic 
offensive arms enters into force, but in 
any event for no more than three years 
after entry into force of this Treaty, to 
request the implementation of 
cooperative measures at deployment 
bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a 
range capability in excess of 5500 
kilometers, which are not former 
missile operating bases eliminated 
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of 
this Treaty. The Party making such a 
request shall inform the other Party of 
the deployment base at which 
cooperative measures shall be 
implemented. The Party whose base is 
to be observed shall carry out the 
following cooperative measures: 

(a) No later than six hours after 
such a request, the Party shall have 
opened the roofs of all fixed structures 
for launchers located at the base, 
removed completely all missiles on 
launchers from such fixed structures 
for launchers and displayed such 
missiles on launchers in the open 
without using concealment measures; 
and 

(b) The Party shall leave the 
roofs open and the missiles on 
launchers in place until twelve hours 
have elapsed from the time of the 
receipt of a request for such an 
observation. 

Each Party shall have the right to 
make six such requests per calendar 
year. Only one deployment base shall 
be subject to these cooperative 
measures at any one time. 


Article XIII 

1. To promote the objectives and 
implementation of the provisions of 
this Treaty, the Parties hereby 
establish the Special Verification 
Commission. The Parties agree that, if 
either Party so requests, they shall 
meet within the framework of the 
Special Verification Commission to: 

(a) resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the obligations 
assumed; and 

(b) agree upon such measures as 
may be necessary to improve the 
viability and effectiveness of this 
Treaty. 

2. The Parties shall use the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which 
provide for continuous communication 
between the Parties, to: 

(a) exchange data and provide 
notifications as required by paragraphs 
3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty 
and the Protocol on Elimination; 

(b) provide and receive the 
information required by paragraph 9 of 
Article X of this Treaty; 

(c) provide and receive 
notifications of inspections as required 
by Article XI of this Treaty and the 
Protocol on Inspection; and 

(d) provide and receive requests 
for cooperative measures as provided 
for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this 
Treaty. 


Article XIV 

The Parties shall comply with this 
Treaty and shall not assume any 
international obligations or 
undertakings which would conflict with 
its provisions. 


FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 

Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 
of America 


Article XV 

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited 
duration. 

2. Each Party shall, in exercising 
its national sovereignty, have the right 
to withdraw from this Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. It shall give notice of its 
decision to withdraw to the other Party 
six months prior to withdrawal from 
this Treaty. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events 
the notifying Party regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 

Article XVI 

Each Party may propose amendments 
to this Treaty. Agreed amendments 
shall enter into force in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in Article 
XVII governing the entry into force of 
this Treaty. 

Article XVII 

1. This Treaty, including the 
Memorandum of Understanding and 
Protocols, which form an integral part 
thereof, shall be subject to ratification 
in accordance with the constitutional 
procedures of each Party. This Treaty 
shall enter into force on the date of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 

2. This Treaty shall be registered 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Chapter 
of the United Nations. 

DONE at Washington on December 
8, 1987, in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. 


FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

M. Gorbachev 

General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 


175 









Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base 
for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics 
and the United States of America 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles 


Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter 
referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of 
November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and launchers. 

I. Definitions 

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol 
on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection: 

1. The term “missile production facility” means a facility for the assembly or 
production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or 
existing types of GLCMs. 

2. The term “missile repair facility” means a facility at which repair or 
maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other 
than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. 

3. The term “launcher production facility” means a facility for final assembly of 
launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. 

4. The term “launcher repair facility” means a facility at which repair or 
maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes 
place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating 
base. 

5. The term “test range” means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate- 
range or shorter-range missiles takes place. 

6. The term “training facility” means a facility, not at a missile operating base, 
at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are 
located. 

7. The term “missile storage facility” means a facility, not at a missile 
operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of 
such missiles are stored. 

8. The term “launcher storage facility” means a facility, not at a missile 
operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles are stored. 

9. The term “elimination facility” means a facility at which intermediate-range 
or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support 
equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. 

10. The term “support equipment” means unique vehicles and mobile or 
transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter- 
range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include 
full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale 
inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a 
missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of 
missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is 
contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding. 


177 


11. The term “support structure” means a unique fixed structure used to 
support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A 
listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, 
and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in 
Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding. 

12. The term “research and development launch site” means a facility at which 
research and development booster systems are launched. 

II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the 
Treaty 

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for 
each Party are as follow: 


Deployed missiles 

USA 

429 

USSR 

470 

Non-deployed missiles 

260 

356 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles 

689 

826 

Aggregate number of second stages 

236 

650 

Deployed launchers 

214 

484 

Non-deployed launchers 

68 

124 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers 

282 

608 

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each 
Party are as follow: 

Deployed missiles 

USA 

0 

USSR 

387 

Non-deployed missiles 

170 

539 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles 

170 

926 

Aggregate number of second stages 

175 

726 

Deployed launchers 

0 

197 

Non-deployed launchers 

1 

40 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers 

1 

237 


III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles 
and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

1. Deployed 

The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations 
and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed 
as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the 
support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and 
launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each 
listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of 
Understanding. 1 The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying 
geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to 
include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways. 

1 For information on the availability of site diagrams and accompanying photographs, call 
or write: Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520 (202-647-6575). 


178 



(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


(i) Pershing II 


Deployment Area One 

The Federal Republic of Germany 

Boundaries: 

The territory of The Federal Republic of Germa¬ 
ny bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east 
by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east 
longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 min¬ 
utes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the 
national boundaries of The Federal Republic 
of Germany. 

Missile Operating Bases 


Schwaebisch-Gmuend 



40 

36 

Launch Pad Shelter 

0 

48 48 54 N 

009 48 

29 

E 

(includes 

4 spares) 


Training Missile Stage 

24 

Neu Ulm 




40 

43 

Launch Pad Shelter 

0 

48 22 40 N 

010 00 

45 

E 

(includes 

(includes 

Training Missile Stage 

24 





4 spares) 

7 spares) 



W aldheide-N eckarsulm 



40 

36 

Launch Pad Shelter 

0 

49 07 45 N 

009 16 

31 

E 

(includes 

4 spares) 


Training Missile Stage 

24 


(ii) BGM-109G 


Deployment Area One 

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and North¬ 
ern Ireland 

Boundaries: 

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded 
on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 
degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; 
on the south by the English Channel; and on 
the east by the English Channel and the 
North Sea. 




Missile Operating Base 

Greenham Common 

51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W 

101 

with launch 
canister 
(includes 

5 spares) 

29 

(includes 

5 spares) 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 


0 

7 


Deployment Area Two 

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and North¬ 
ern Ireland 
Boundaries: 

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded 
on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 
degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; 
on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; and on the east by the 
English Channel and the North Sea. 


179 


Missile Operating Base 
Molesworth 

52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W 


Missiles 


18* 

with launch 
canister 


Deployment Area 
The Republic of Italy 
Boundaries: 

The territory of The Republic of Italy within the 
boundaries of the Island of Sicily. 


Missile Operating Base 
Com iso 

36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E 


Deployment Area 

The Kingdom of Belgium 

Boundaries: 

The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium. 

Missile Operating Base 
Florennes 

50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E 


Deployment Area Two 

The Federal Republic of Germany 

Boundaries: 

The territory of The Federal Republic of Germa¬ 
ny bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east 
by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east 
longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 min¬ 
utes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the 
west by the national boundaries of The Feder¬ 
al Republic of Germany. 

Missile Operating Base 
Wueschheim 

50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E 


Deployment Area 

The Kingdom of the Netherlands 

Boundaries: 

The territory of The Kingdom of the Nether¬ 
lands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within 
the national boundaries of The Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. 


108 

with launch 
canister 
(includes 
12 spares) 


20 

with launch 
canister 
(includes 
4 spares) 


62 

with launch 
canister 
(includes 
14 spares) 


Missile Operating Base 
Woensdrecht 

51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E 


0 

with launch 
canister 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


6* Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 


31 Training Missile 

(includes Training Launch Canister 

7 spares) 


12 Training Missile 

(includes Training Launch Canister 

8 spares) 


31 Training Missile 

(includes Training Launch Canister 

9 spares) 


0 Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 


0 

7 


0 

7 


0 

7 


1 

10 


0 

0 


*In preparation for operational status. 


180 



Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 


(i) SS-20 


Deployment Area 
Postavy 


55 12 13 N 

027 

00 

00 

E 

54 52 47 

026 

41 

18 


54 43 58 

026 

04 

07 


55 01 13 

026 

03 

43 


Missile Operating 

Base 



Postavy 





55 09 47 N 

026 

54 

21 

E 


Deployment Area 



Vetrino 



55 28 44 N 

028 42 

29 E 

55 01 03 

028 15 

03 

55 01 16 

027 48 

46 

55 16 22 

027 49 

05 

Missile Operating Base 


Vetrino 



55 24 19 N 

028 33 

29 E 


Deployment Area 



Polotsk 



55 37 36 N 

028 23 

49 E 

55 28 07 

029 20 

25 

54 32 15 

029 09 

47 

54 39 32 

028 10 

40 

Missile Operating Base 


Polotsk 



55 22 34 N 

028 44 

17 E 


Deployment Area 


Smorgon’ 


54 37 43 N 

026 52 34 E 

54 22 37 

026 52 37 

54 37 18 

025 41 58 

54 45 21 

026 15 13 

Missile Operating Base 

Smorgon’ 


54 36 16 N 

026 23 05 E 


Deployment Area 



Smorgon’ 



54 29 01 N 

026 26 

40 E 

54 05 04 

025 53 

59 

54 24 14 

025 31 

18 

54 35 27 

026 19 

10 

Missile Operating Base 


Smorgon’ 



54 31 36 N 

026 17 

20 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 0 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


181 


CTJOCTSO 050050 050050 050050 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Lida 


53 

45 

24 

N 

025 

29 

02 

E 

53 

34 

00 


024 

49 

35 


53 

42 

25 


024 

38 

15 


53 

58 

05 


025 

10 

17 


Missile Operating Base 



Lida 








53 

47 

39 

N 

025 

20 

27 

E 


Deployment Area 


Gezgaly 


53 38 53 N 

025 25 38 E 

53 23 48 

025 26 12 

53 12 46 

025 08 38 

53 22 57 

024 35 43 

Missile Operating Base 

Gezgaly 


53 32 50 N 

025 16 48 E 


Deployment Area 



Slonim 



52 58 15 N 

025 55 

42 E 

52 45 02 

025 31 

08 

53 04 08 

025 09 

00 

53 08 45 

025 30 

20 

Missile Operating Base 


Slonim 



52 55 54 N 

025 21 

59 E 


Deployment Area 


Ruzhany 


52 55 21 N 

024 58 40 E 

52 46 32 

024 48 25 

52 45 52 

024 16 26 

53 07 34 

024 22 14 

Missile Operating Base 

Ruzhany 


52 49 29 N 

024 45 45 E 


Deployment Area 




Zasimovichi 




52 37 55 N 

024 

48 

50 E 

52 22 00 

024 

10 

52 

52 32 36 

023 

56 

54 

52 45 52 

024 

16 

26 

Missile Operating Base 


Zasimovichi 




52 30 38 N 

024 

08 

43 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 0 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 0 


182 


OOlOOi © © © © ©050© 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Mozyr’ 


52 05 

31 

N 

029 

13 

04 

E 

51 39 

05 


029 

39 

31 


51 42 

00 


029 

01 

30 


51 52 

57 


028 

51 

32 


Missile ( 

Operating Base 



Mozyr’ 







52 02 

27 

N 

029 

11 

15 

E 


Deployment Area 
Petrikov 


52 16 29 N 

029 

03 

52 08 06 

028 

48 

52 08 33 

028 

13 

52 27 47 

028 

28 


04 E 
40 
37 
17 


Missile Operating Base 
Petrikov 

52 10 29 N 028 34 52 E 


Deployment Area 
Zhitkovichi 
52 23 40 N 
52 08 35 
52 08 55 
52 24 01 


028 10 31 E 
028 10 07 
027 14 01 
027 14 06 


Missile Operating Base 
Zhitkovichi 

52 11 36 N 027 48 07 E 


Deployment Area 
Rechitsa 


52 26 34 N 

030 

21 

52 05 27 

030 

43 

51 47 47 

030 

23 

52 13 08 

030 

00 


10 E 
26 
27 
53 


Missile Operating Base 
Rechitsa 

52 11 58 N 030 07 11 E 


Deployment Area 
Slutsk 


53 28 29 N 
53 02 31 
53 13 35 
53 28 40 


027 57 50 E 
028 07 59 
027 25 09 
027 28 55 


027 42 15 E 


Missile Operating Base 
Slutsk 
53 14 20 N 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


183 


O (C O ® OdO<T5 ®d®0} OfflOO) o ® o ® 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Lutsk 


51 08 14 N 

025 54 51 E 

50 50 45 

025 34 49 

51 16 24 

025 16 49 

51 20 51 

025 26 59 

Missile Operating Base 

Lutsk 


50 56 07 N 

025 36 26 E 

Deployment Area 


Lutsk 


51 10 05 N 

025 27 21 E 

50 43 54 

025 07 49 

50 47 35 

024 33 38 

51 11 22 

024 35 49 

Missile Operating Base 

Lutsk 


50 50 06 N 

025 04 02 E 

Deployment Area 


Brody 


50 14 00 N 

025 29 11 E 

50 00 46 

025 09 30 

50 17 32 

024 41 55 

50 22 10 

024 58 33 

Missile Operating Base 

Brody 


50 06 09 N 

025 12 14 

Deployment Area 


Chervonograd 


50 41 07 N 

024 33 58 E 

50 13 10 

024 38 45 

50 19 02 

024 11 30 

50 36 26 

024 17 15 

Missile Operating Base 

Chervonograd 


50 22 45 N 

024 18 16 E 

Deployment Area 


Slavuta 


50 18 55 N 

027 03 22 E 

50 08 07 

027 03 21 

50 07 59 

026 16 22 

50 29 38 

026 29 34 

Missile Operating Base 

Slavuta 


50 17 05 N 

026 41 31 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


184 


0 500CD OtOOffl O <S O (O OtOOffl CKDO® 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Belokorovichi 
51 10 19 N 

50 51 05 

51 21 28 
51 21 22 


028 12 04 E 
027 51 07 
027 01 43 
027 37 54 


Missile Operating Base 
Belokorovichi 

51 10 45 N 028 03 20 E 


Deployment Area 


Lipniki 
51 11 38 N 

50 52 28 

51 05 53 
51 20 57 


029 10 28 E 
028 55 56 
028 22 14 
028 26 07 


Missile Operating Base 
Lipniki 

51 12 22 N 028 26 37 E 


Deployment Area 
Vysokaya Pech’ 


50 

29 

13 

N 

028 

21 

10 

E 

50 

09 

49 


028 

20 

37 


50 

10 

10 


027 

40 

19 


50 

29 

33 


027 

43 

58 


Missile Operating Base 



Vysokaya Pech’ 





50 

10 

11 

N 

028 

16 

22 

E 


Deployment Area 
Vysokaya Pech’ 


50 

13 

33 

N 

029 

01 

05 

E 

49 

56 

07 


029 

10 

23 


49 

52 

42 


028 

06 

47 


50 

07 

39 


028 

20 

33 


Missile Operating 

Base 



Vysokaya Pech’ 





50 

05 

43 

N 

028 

22 

09 

E 


Deployment A rea 
Korosten’ 

50 54 31 N 
50 41 34 
50 42 05 
50 55 01 


029 02 51 E 
029 02 16 
028 28 20 
028 28 44 


Missile Operating Base 
Korosten’ 

50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


6 6 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


185 


005005 005005 005005 OOOO OOOO 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Lebedin 


50 35 26 N 
50 12 10 
50 14 25 
50 35 42 


034 41 41 E 
034 00 31 
033 50 28 
034 21 21 


034 26 02 E 


Missile Operating Base 
Lebedin 
50 33 06 N 


Deployment Area 
Glukhov 

52 02 16 N 033 52 28 E 

51 36 21 033 55 26 

51 34 22 033 27 42 

52 02 21 033 38 28 

Missile Operating Base 
Glukhov 

51 41 00 N 033 30 56 E 


Deployment Area 
Glukhov 

51 42 59 N 033 27 47 E 

51 23 31 033 37 56 

51 23 37 032 56 33 

51 43 02 033 10 25 

Missile Operating Base 
Glukhov 

51 36 44 N 033 29 17 E 


Deployment Area 
Akhtyrka 
50 17 58 N 034 

49 49 59 034 

50 10 03 033 

50 18 24 034 


54 32 E 
50 05 
57 06 
24 13 


Missile Operating Base 
Akhtyrka 

50 16 01 N 034 49 53 E 


Deployment Area 
Akhtyrka 

50 10 43 N 035 34 34 E 

49 54 08 035 00 16 

50 18 24 034 24 13 

50 26 42 034 48 07 

Missile Operating Base 
Akhtyrka 

50 21 59 N 034 57 03 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


186 


0 ( 00(0 0 ( 00(0 0 ( 00(0 0 ( 00(0 0 ( 00(0 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Novosibirsk 


55 51 09 N 

083 52 28 E 

55 14 33 

083 49 49 

55 21 52 

083 08 41 

55 30 29 

083 09 09 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 


55 22 05 N 

083 13 52 E 


Deployment A rea 


Novosibirsk 


55 06 17 N 

083 34 11 E 

54 57 40 

083 33 38 

55 04 53 

082 52 45 

55 24 16 

082 53 40 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 


55 22 57 N 

082 55 16 E 


Deployment Area 
Novosibirsk 


55 31 47 N 

084 

08 

55 13 26 

082 

56 

55 20 01 

082 

49 

55 40 13 

084 

00 


57 E 
55 

41 

42 


Missile Operating Base 
Novosibirsk 

55 19 32 N 082 56 18 E 


Deployment A rea 
Novosibirsk 
55 08 01 N 083 53 

54 52 56 083 52 

55 11 17 082 56 

55 22 00 083 01 


07 E 
02 
49 
07 


Missile Operating Base 
Novosibirsk 

55 18 44 N 083 01 38 E 


Deployment Area 
Novosibirsk 


55 03 58 N 

084 18 

27 E 

54 53 12 

084 19 

10 

55 04 49 

082 56 

30 

55 22 00 

083 01 

07 

Missile Operating Base 


Novosibirsk 



55 19 07 N 

083 09 

59 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


187 


OfflO® o®o® o® o® o®o® o® o® 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 
51 44 02 N 
51 22 28 
51 22 49 
51 44 16 


113 08 33 E 
113 07 32 
112 46 52 
112 54 39 


Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 


51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E 


Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 

51 37 34 N 113 08 14 E 


51 22 28 
51 18 39 
51 27 14 


113 07 32 
112 36 23 
112 40 08 


Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 

51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E 


Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 
51 24 52 N 
51 20 36 
51 18 54 
51 23 13 


112 53 51 E 
112 50 13 
112 15 44 
112 15 51 


Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 


51 22 59 N 112 49 55 E 


Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 
51 26 54 N 
51 18 13 
51 18 47 
51 29 39 


113 00 50 E 
113 03 54 
112 26 03 
112 19 29 


Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 


51 20 18 N 113 00 54 E 


Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 
51 33 19 N 
51 22 32 
51 22 49 
51 33 36 


113 04 35 E 
113 04 05 
112 46 52 
112 47 17 


Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 

51 23 49 N 112 52 13 E 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


188 


050050 050050 050050 050050 050050 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Barnaul 

53 54 32 N 084 01 02 E 

53 43 46 084 01 48 

53 35 30 083 43 07 

53 44 16 083 36 24 

Missile Operating Base 
Barnaul 

53 46 08 N 083 57 11 E 


Deployment Area 
Barnaul 
53 29 21 N 

52 58 43 

53 13 47 
53 29 02 


084 31 45 E 
083 47 57 
083 48 56 
084 17 18 


Missile Operating Base 
Barnaul 

53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E 


Deployment Area 
Barnaul 


53 16 38 N 
52 59 32 

52 55 09 

53 16 02 


084 43 16 E 
084 51 20 
084 47 58 
084 14 31 


084 40 10 E 


Missile Operating Base 
Barnaul 
53 13 29 N 


Deployment Area 
Barnaul 

53 27 33 N 084 49 55 E 

53 16 42 084 46 52 

53 16 02 084 14 31 

53 26 58 084 21 02 

Missile Operating Base 
Barnaul 

53 18 47 N 084 30 27 E 


Deployment Area 
Kansk 


56 32 14 N 
56 15 16 
56 28 30 
56 34 39 


096 12 14 E 
095 34 54 
095 20 13 
095 36 13 


095 28 35 E 


Missile Operating Base 
Kansk 
56 22 31 N 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


189 


510050 C5 O ffl O oofflO 0)00)0 OOC5© 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Kansk 


56 30 47 N 

095 

12 

56 19 53 

095 

19 

56 13 45 

094 

59 

56 31 03 

094 

56 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 



56 20 09 N 

095 

16 


Deployment Area 


Kansk 


56 19 29 N 

096 20 

56 08 43 

096 21 

56 08 17 

096 02 

56 19 14 

095 50 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 


56 11 19 N 

096 03 


Deployment Area 



Kansk 



56 14 50 N 

096 

05 

55 59 57 

096 

14 

55 59 41 

096 

03 

56 15 00 

095 

46 


Missile Operating Base 
Kansk 

56 02 19 N 096 04 


33 E 
41 
58 
58 


34 E 


56 E 

41 
24 

42 


13 E 


46 E 
35 
03 
30 


58 E 


(ii) SS-4 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


9 9 Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Deployment Area 
Sovetsk 
55 05 33 N 
55 03 22 

54 57 04 

55 01 23 


021 52 38 E 
021 56 20 
021 29 58 
021 26 16 


Missile Operating Base 


Sovetsk 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

11 

54 59 07 N 

021 36 36 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 




Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

52 





Training Missile 

6 

Deployment Area 






Gusev 






54 46 02 N 

022 07 07 E 





54 24 14 

022 28 42 





54 20 01 

022 21 10 





54 43 58 

021 55 53 





Missile Operating Base 





Gusev 


5 

7 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 

54 43 59 N 

022 03 27 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 




Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

52 





Training Missile 

7 


190 


o«oo® o«o® o®o® 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment Area 
Malorita 


51 53 50 N 

024 

05 39 E 

51 43 09 

024 

09 49 

51 42 59 

023 

57 07 

51 53 45 

023 

57 50 

Missile Operating Base 

Malorita 



51 51 47 N 

024 

01 55 E 

Deployment Area 



Pinsk 



52 15 03 N 

025 

49 43 E 

52 04 09 

025 

39 30 

52 03 56 

025 

22 00 

52 14 54 

025 

35 40 

Missile Operating Base 

Pinsk 



52 10 56 N 

025 

41 27 E 

Deployment Area 



Vyru 



57 49 33 N 

027 

00 00 E 

57 43 05 

027 

00 00 

57 43 04 

026 

43 54 

57 49 32 

026 

43 51 

Missile Operating Base 

Vyru 



57 45 47 N 

026 

47 13 E 


Deployment Area 


Aluksne 


57 25 51 N 

026 56 00 E 

57 21 32 

026 56 01 

57 17 12 

026 40 06 

57 25 49 

026 40 01 

Missile Operating Base 

Aluksne 


57 25 04 N 

026 49 46 E 


Deployment A rea 




Ostrov 




57 38 21 N 

028 

20 

22 E 

57 21 04 

028 

23 

43 

57 21 14 

028 

07 

47 

57 38 28 

028 

08 

19 


Missile Operating Base 
Ostrov 

57 31 53 N 028 12 19 E 


6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

14 

(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 

Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

48 


Training Missile 

5 


5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

13 

(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 

Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

47 


Training Missile 

6 


6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

11 

(Launch 

Missile Erector 

5 

Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

51 


Training Missile 

6 


6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 

(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 

Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

45 


Training Missile 

6 


8 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 

(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 

Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

48 


Training Missile 

6 


5 

5 

5 

5 

5 


191 


Deployment Area 
Karmelava 
55 06 12 N 
54 57 49 

54 55 00 

55 01 28 


024 22 04 E 
024 33 51 
024 04 05 
024 03 36 


Missile Operating Base 
Karmelava 

55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E 


Deployment Area 
Ukmerge 

55 17 41 N 024 59 06 E 

55 04 25 024 40 58 

55 08 35 024 33 12 

55 19 43 024 51 26 


Missile Operating Base 
Ukmerge 

55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E 


Deployment Area 
Taurage 
55 18 07 N 
55 09 30 
55 03 10 
55 13 35 


022 30 42 E 
022 30 22 
022 18 52 
022 21 01 


Missile Operating Base 
Taurage 

55 04 58 N 022 19 38 E 


Deployment Area 
Kolomyya 

48 45 01 N 024 55 59 E 

48 36 23 024 56 20 

48 36 04 024 40 04 

48 44 42 024 39 40 


Missile Operating Base 
Kolomyya 

48 39 32 N 024 48 04 E 


Deployment Area 
Stryy 

49 19 59 N 
49 11 22 
49 21 09 
49 29 46 


023 58 46 E 
023 58 29 
023 31 57 
023 32 24 


Missile Operating Base 
Stryy 

49 25 23 N 023 34 56 E 


Missiles Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


5 

5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

13 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

47 



Training Missile 

6 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

14 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

50 



Training Missile 

6 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

47 



Training Missile 

6 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

46 



Training Missile 

7 


5 

7 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

7 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

49 



Training Missile 

7 


192 


Deployment Area 
Skala-Podol’skaya 


48 54 37 N 

026 17 26 E 

48 48 09 

026 17 32 

48 48 02 

026 01 12 

48 54 30 

026 01 04 

Missile Operating Base 

Skala-Podol ’ skay a 

48 51 02 N 

026 08 36 E 


... .. , , Support Structures and 

Missiles Launchers v . _ 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

12 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

6 


Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

46 



Training Missile 

5 


2. Non-Deployed 

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for 
each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types 
in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and 
support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for 
agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 


(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

(i) Pershing II 

Missile Production Facilities: 
Hercules Plant # 1 
Magna, Utah 

40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W 

Launcher Production Facilities: 
Martin Marietta 

Middle River, Maryland 
39 35 N 076 24 W 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 
Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Redstone Arsenal 
Huntsville, Alabama 
34 36 N 086 38 W 

Weilerbach 

Federal Republic of Germany 
49 27 N 007 38 E 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 
Redstone Arsenal 
Huntsville, Alabama 
34 35 N 086 37 W 


Missiles Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


0 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

0 


0 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

0 


111 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

4 


1 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

20 


12 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

0 


0 


1 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 


0 

0 


193 


Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile Repair Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 0 

Pueblo, Colorado 
38 18 N 104 19 W 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

EMC Hausen, Frankfurt 0 

Federal Republic of Germany 
50 08 N 008 38 E 

Redstone Arsenal 0 

Huntsville, Alabama 
34 37 N 086 38 W 

Ft. Sill 0 

Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 
34 40 N 098 24 W 

Pueblo Depot Activity 0 

Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Test Ranges: 

Complex 16 3 

Cape Canaveral, Florida 
28 29 N 080 34 W 

Training Facilities: 

Ft. Sill 0 

Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 
34 41 N 098 34 W 

Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 0 

Transit 

(ii) BGM-109G 


Missile Production Facilities: 

McDonnell-Douglas 52 

Titusville, Florida with launch 

28 32 N 080 40 W canister 

General Dynamics 48 

Kearney Mesa, California with launch 

32 50 N 117 08 W canister 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Air Force Plant 19 2 

San Diego, California with launch 

32 45 N 117 12 W canister 


Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 

10 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 

2 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 

0 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 


0 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 0 


39 Launch Pad Shelter 0 

Training Missile Stage 78 


0 Training Missile Stage 4 


0 Training Missile 0 

Training Launch Canister 0 

0 Training Missile 0 

Training Launch Canister 0 


4 Training Missile 0 

Training Launch Canister 0 


194 


Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


Missile Repair Facilities: 

SABCA 

Gosselies, Belgium 

50 27 N 004 27 E 

16 

with launch 
canister 

0 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 




Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 




Test Ranges: 

Dugway Proving Grounds 

Utah 

40 22 N 113 04 W 

0 

with launch 
canister 

0 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 

Training Facilities: 

Davis-Monthan AFB 

Tucson, Arizona 

32 11 N 110 53 W 

0 

with launch 
canister 

7 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 

Ft. Huachuca 

Ft. Huachuca, Arizona 

31 29 N 110 19 W 

0 

with launch 
canister 

6 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 

Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 




Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 

15 

with launch 
canister 

0 

Training Missile 

Training Launch Canister 

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 




(i) SS-20 




Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 

Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 

57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 

36* 

0 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Barrikady Plant 

Volgograd 

48 44 N 044 32 E 

0 

1 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


*In various stages of manufacture. 


0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

27 

0 

8 

0 

2 

36 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 


195 



Missile Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
Postavy 

55 10 N 026 55 E 


Gezgaly 

53 36 N 025 28 E 


Mozyr’ 

52 03 N 029 11 E 


Lutsk 

50 53 N 025 30 E 


Belokorovichi 
51 09 N 028 00 E 


Lebedin 

50 36 N 034 25 E 


Novosibirsk 
55 16 N 083 02 E 


Drovyanaya 
51 30 N 113 03 E 


Kansk 

56 16 N 095 39 E 


Barnaul 

53 34 N 083 48 E 


Kolosovo 

53 31 N 026 55 E 


Zherebkovo 
47 51 N 029 54 E 


Support Structures and 


3 Launch Canister 3 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 1 

2 Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 4 

2 Launch Canister 4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

1 Launch Canister 3 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

2 Launch Canister 3 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 1 

1 Launch Canister 5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 3 

1 Launch Canister 3 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

2 Launch Canister 4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 10 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

1 Launch Canister 2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 1 

1 Launch Canister 1 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 3 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Launch Canister 144 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Launch Canister 21 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 2 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 1 


Missiles 

2 

2 

2 

1 

2 

2 

1 

2 

1 

1 

144 

20 


196 


Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 


Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
Bataysk 

47 08 N 039 47 E 

Test Ranges: 

Kapustin Yar 

48 37 N 046 18 E 

Training Facilities: 

Serpukhov 

54 54 N 037 28 E 


Krasnodar 

45 03 N 038 58 E 


Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar 
48 38 N 046 10 E 


Elimination Facilities: 
Sarny 

51 21 N 026 35 E 


Aral’sk 

46 50 N 61 18 E 


Chita 

52 22 N 113 17 E 


Kansk 

56 20 N 095 06 E 


Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 
NONE 

(ii) SS-4 

Missile Production Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

NONE 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


11 Launch Canister 2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 4 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

8 Launch Canister 0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 3 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 1 

Training Missile 0 

6 Launch Canister 4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 4 

1 Launch Canister 2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 2 

7 Launch Canister 12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 3 

Training Missile 12 

68 Launch Canister 32 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 35 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 3 

0 Launch Canister 0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Launch Canister 0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Launch Canister 0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 0 

Training Missile 0 


Missiles 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

29 

0 

0 

0 


197 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Kolosovo 

35 

1 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

9 

53 31 N 026 55 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

10 



Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

59 




Training Missile 

31 

Zherebkovo 

56 

3 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

5 

47 51 N 029 54 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

4 



Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

11 




Training Missile 

30 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

Bataysk 

0 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

47 08 N 039 47 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

0 



Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

0 




Training Missile 

6 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 





Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 





Test Ranges: 

Kapustin Yar 

14 

2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

4 

48 35 N 046 18 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

2 



Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

4 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 



Training Missile 

1 

Elimination Facilities: 

Lesnaya 

0 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

52 59 N 025 46 E 


(Launch 

Missile Erector 

0 



Stand) 

Propellant Tank 

0 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

NONE 



Training Missile 

0 

iii) SS-5 





Missile Production Facilities: 

NONE 





Launcher Production Facilities: 

NONE 





Missile Storage Facilities: 

Kolosovo 

6 

0 




53 31 N 026 55 E 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 


198 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

Lesnaya 0 

52 59 N 025 46 E 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

NONE 


3. Training Launchers 

In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, 
the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate- 
range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be 
training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is: 

(a) for the United States of America—29; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—65. 

Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures 
set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 


199 


IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and 
Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and 
Launchers 

1. Deployed 

The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, 
for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in 
Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support 
equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include 
boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 


Missiles Launchers Support Equipment 

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

(i) Pershing IA 

Missile Operating Base: 

NONE 


(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
(i) SS-12 

Missile Operating Bases: 


Koenigsbrueck 


19 

11 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

9 

German Democratic Republic 



Training Missile 

10 

51 16 40 N 

013 53 20 E 





Bischofswerda 


8 

5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

German Democratic Republic 



Training Missile 

4 

51 08 33 N 

014 12 18 E 





Waren 


22 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

9 

German Democratic Republic 



Training Missile 

7 

53 32 40 N 

012 37 30 E 





Wokuhl 


5 

6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

German Democratic Republic 



Training Missile 

7 

53 16 20 N 

013 15 50 E 





Hranice 


39 

24 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

15 

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 



Training Missile 

13 

49 33 00 N 

017 45 00 E 





Pashino 


0 

4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

1 

55 16 37 N 

082 59 42 E 



Training Missile 

5 

Gornyy 


36 

14 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

4 

51 33 10 N 

113 01 30 E 



Training Missile 

10 

Lapichi 


9 

5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

1 

53 25 30 N 

028 30 00 E 



Training Missile 

10 

Kattakurgan 


9 

5 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

1 

39 38 18 N 

065 58 40 E 



Training Missile 

6 

Saryozek 


36 

15 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

3 

44 31 58 N 

077 46 20 E 



Training Missile 

16 

Novosysoyevka 


37 

14 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

5 

44 11 58 N 

133 26 05 E 



Training Missile 

17 


200 


Missiles Launchers Support Equipment 

(ii) SS-23 


Missile Operating Bases: 


Weissenfels 

German Democratic Republic 

51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E 

6 

4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

3 

18 

Jena-Forst 

German Democratic Republic 

50 54 55 N 011 32 40 E 

47 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

8 

3 

Stan’ko vo 

53 38 30 N 

027 13 20 E 

40 

18 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

18 

10 

Tsel’ 

53 23 38 N 

028 28 06 E 

26 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

11 

9 

Slobudka 

52 30 30 N 

024 31 30 E 

26 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

12 

10 

Bayram-Ali 

37 36 18 N 

062 10 40 E 

0 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

12 

0 

Semipalatinsk 
50 23 00 N 

080 09 30 E 

22 

12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

12 

4 


2. Non-Deployed 

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for 
each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in 
Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile 
support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to 
this Memorandum of Understanding. 


Support Equipment 


Training Missile Stage 0 


Training Missile Stage 0 


Training Missile Stage 53 

Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 


Missiles 


Launchers 


(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

(i) Pershing IA 

Missile Production Facilities: 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant 
Marshall, Texas 
32 39 N 094 08 W 

Launcher Production Facilities: 
Martin Marietta 
Middle River, Maryland 
39 35 N 076 24 W 


Missile Storage Facilities: 
Pueblo Depot Activity 


169 


201 



Missiles 

Launchers 

Support Equipment 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 

Pueblo, Colorado 

38 19 N 104 20 W 

0 

1 

Training Missile Stage 


Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 1 0 Training Missile Stage 0 

Transit 


(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
(i) SS-12 


Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 

0 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 

57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 



Training Missile 

0 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Barrikady Plant 

0 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

Volgograd 

48 44 N 044 32 E 



Training Missile 

0 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

Lozovaya 

126 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

48 55 N 036 22 E 



Training Missile 

12 

Ladushkin 

72 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

54 35 N 020 12 E 



Training Missile 

18 

Bronnaya Gora 

170 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

52 37 N 025 04 E 



Training Missile 

3 

Balkhash 

138 

0 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

0 

46 50 N 075 36 E 



Training Missile 

47 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Berezovka 

0 

15 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

10 

50 20 N 028 26 E 



Training Missile 

0 


Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 


202 


Test Ranges: 
NONE 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Equipment 


Training Facilities: 

Saratov 0 

51 34 N 046 01 E 

Kazan’ 0 

55 58 N 049 11 E 

Kamenka 0 

53 11 N 044 04 E 

Elimination Facilities: 

Saryozek (Missiles) 0 

44 32 N 077 46 E 

Stan’kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter 0 

Vehicles) 

53 38 N 027 13 E 


Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

NONE 

(ii) SS-23 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 0 

Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building 0 

Plant 

Petropavlovsk 

54 51 N 069 09 E 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

Ladushkin 33 

54 35 N 020 12 E 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Berezovka 0 

50 20 N 028 26 E 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Test Ranges: 

NONE 


3 Missile Transporter Vehicle 2 

Training Missile 0 

2 Missile Transporter Vehicle 2 

Training Missile 0 

0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 


0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 


0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 


0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 42 

13 Missile Transporter Vehicle 5 

Training Missile 0 


203 


Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Equipment 


Training Facilities: 

Saratov 0 

51 34 N 046 01 E 

Kazan’ 0 

55 58 N 049 11 E 

Kamenka 0 

53 11 N 044 04 E 

Elimination Facilities: 

Saryozek (Missiles) 0 

44 32 N 077 46 E 

Stan’kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter 0 

Vehicles) 

53 38 N 027 13 E 


Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 
NONE 


3 Missile Transporter Vehicle 2 

Training Missile 0 

3 Missile Transporter Vehicle 2 

Training Missile 0 

1 Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Training Missile 0 

0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 

0 Missile Transporter Vehicle 0 

Training Missile 0 


V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry 
into Force of the Treaty 

The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, 
for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers 
of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but 
were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed 
missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 


Missiles Launchers Support Equipment 

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

(i) Pershing IB 

Missile Production Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 


204 


Missiles Launchers 


Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

NONE 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

NONE 

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
(i) SSC-X-4 

Missile Production Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated Produc- 0 0 

tion Works “M. I. Kalinin Machine Building with 

Plant” launch 

Sverdlovsk canister 

56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Jelgava 84 6 

56 40 N 024 06 E with 

launch 

canister 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

Jelgava 

56 40 N 024 06 E 


0 0 
with 
launch 
canister 


Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 
NONE 


Support Equipment 


205 


VI. Technical Data 

Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers 
subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. 
Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment 
listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 


Intermediate-Range Missiles 
(a) Missile Characteristics: 

P-II 

BGM-109G 

SS-20 

SS-4 

SS-5 

SSC-X-4 

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

1 

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters) 

(iii) Length of 

10.61 

6.40 

16.49 

22.77 

24.30 

8.09 

1st stage (meters) 

3.68 

— 

8.58 

18.60 

21.62 

— 

2nd stage (meters) 

2.47 

— 

4.60 

— 

— 

— 

(iv) Maximum diameter of 

— 

0.53 

— 

1.65 

2.40 

0.51 

1st stage (meters) 

1.02 

— 

1.79 

— 

— 

— 

2nd stage (meters) 

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front 
section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty 

1.02 


1.47 




weight) 

6.78 

— 

— 

3.35 

4.99 

— 

1st stage 

4.15 

— 

26.63 

— 

— 

— 

2nd stage 

2.63 

— 

8.63 

— 

— 

— 

Missile in canister 

(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons 
(with fuel) 



42.70 




In canister 

— 

1.71 

— 

— 

— 

2.44 

Without canister 

(b) Launcher Characteristics: 

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in 


1.47 




1.70 

meters) 

9.60 

10.64 

16.81 

3.02 

— 

12.80 


2.49 

2.44 

3.20 

3.02 

— 

3.05 

(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is 
capable of carrying or containing at 

2.86 

2.64 

2.94 

3.27 


3.80 

one time 

1 

4 

1 

1 

— 

6 

(iii) Weight (in metric tons) 

(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maxi¬ 
mum length, width, height in meters): 

12.04 

14.30 

40.25 

6.90 


29.10 

(i) Fixed structure for a launcher 



27.70 

9.07 

6.82 


" 

~ 

(ii) Launch pad shelter 

(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (max¬ 
imum length, width, height in meters): 

74.00 

14.60 

10.00 






(i) Launch canister 

— 

6.94 

19.32 

— 

_ 

8.39 

(Diameter) 

— 

0.53 

2.14 

— 

— 

0.65 


206 


P-II 


SS-5 


SSC-X-4 


BGM-109G SS-20 SS-4 

(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles 


per vehicle) 

— - 17.33 

3.20 

2.90 

(1) 

22.85 — 

2.72 

2.50 

(1) 


(iii) Missile erector 

- - 

15.62 — 

3.15 

3.76 

— 

(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable) 

Fuel 

Oxidizer 

- - - 

11.38 — 

2.63 — 

2.96 

10.70 — 

2.63 

3.35 



Pershing IA Pershing IB 

SS-12 

SS-23 


2. Shorter-Range Missiles 


(a) Missile Characteristics: 

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile 

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters) 

(iii) Length of 

1st stage (meters) 

2nd stage (meters) 

(iv) Maximum diameter of 

1st stage (meters) 

2nd stage (meters) 

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front 

section) 

1st stage 
2nd stage 

(b) Launcher Characteristics: 

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in 

meters) 

(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is 

capable of carrying or containing at one time 

(iii) Weight (in metric tons) 

(c) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With 
Such Missiles and Launchers: 

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maxi¬ 
mum length, width, height in meters): 

Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per 
vehicle) 


1 

1 

1 

1 

10.55 

8.13 

12.38 

7.52 

2.83 

3.68 

4.38 

5.17 

2.67 

— 

5.37 

— 

1.02 

1.02 

1.01 

0.97 

1.02 

— 

1.01 

— 

4.09 

4.15 

8.80 

3.99 

2.45 

— 

4.16 

— 

1.64 

— 

4.64 

— 


9.98 

9.60 

13.26 

11.76 

2.44 

2.49 

3.10 

3.13 

3.35 

2.86 

3.45 

3.00 

1 

1 

1 

1 

8.53 

12.04 

30.80 

24.07 


— 

— 

13.15 

11.80 



3.10 

3.13 



3.50 

3.00 



(1) 

(1) 


207 


VII. Research and Development Booster Systems 

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research 
and development booster systems. 


Number of 
Launchers 

1. Research and Development Launch Sites 
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 


Eastern Test Range, Florida 1 


28 27 N 080 42 W 


Eglin AFB, Florida 

30 36 N 086 48 W 

5 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 

32 30 N 106 30 W 

4 

Green River, Utah 

38 00 N 109 30 W 

2 

Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska 

65 07 N 147 29 W 

6 

Roi Namur, Kwajalein 

09 25 N 167 28 E 

3 

Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii 

22 06 N 159 47 W 

4 

Western Test Range, California 

34 37 N 120 37 W 

1 

Cape Cod, Massachusetts 

42 01 N 070 07 W 

1 

Wake Island 

19 18 N 166 37 E 

2 

Wallops Island, Virginia 

37 51 N 075 28 W 

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

1 

Plesetskaya 

62 53 N 040 52 E 

3 

Kapustin Yar 

48 32 N 046 18 E 

2 


208 


Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it 
is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this 
Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data 
and inclusion of the data contained herein. 

This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It 
shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall 
remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. 

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 


FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 


FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 


Ronald Reagan 


M.S. Gorbachev 


President of the United States 
of America 


General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 


209 






Protocol 

on Procedures Governing the Elimination of 
the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty Between 
the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 

Shorter-Range Missiles 


Pursuant to and in implementation of 
the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 
1987, hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon 
procedures governing the elimination 
of the missile systems subject to the 
Treaty. 

I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to 
Elimination 

The specific items for each type of 
missile system to be eliminated are: 

1. For the United States of 
America: 

Pershing II: missile, launcher 
and launch pad shelter; 

BGM-109G: missile, launch 
canister and launcher; 

Pershing IA: missile and 
launcher; and 

Pershing IB: missile. 

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: 

SS-20: missile, launch canister, 
launcher, missile transporter vehicle 
and fixed structure for a launcher; 

SS-4: missile, missile transporter 
vehicle, missile erector, launch stand 
and propellant tanks; 

SS-5: missile; 

SSC-X-4: missile, launch 
canister and launcher; 

SS-12: missile, launcher and 
missile transporter vehicle; and 

SS-23: missile, launcher and 
missile transporter vehicle. 

3. For both Parties, all training 
missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training 
launchers shall be subject to 
elimination. 


4. For both Parties, all stages of 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
GLBMs shall be subject to elimination. 

5. For both Parties, all front 
sections of deployed intermediate-range 
and shorter-range missiles shall be 
subject to elimination. 

II. Procedures for Elimination at 
Elimination Facilities 

1. In order to ensure the reliable 
determination of the type and number 
of missiles, missile stages, front 
sections, launch canisters, launchers, 
missile transporter vehicles, missile 
erectors and launch stands, as well as 
training missiles, training missile 
stages, training launch canisters and 
training launchers, indicated in Section 
I of this Protocol, being eliminated at 
elimination facilities, and to preclude 
the possibility of restoration of such 
items for purposes inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Treaty, the 
Parties shall fulfill the requirements 
below. 

2. The conduct of the elimination 
procedures for the items of missile 
systems listed in paragraph 1 of this 
Section, except for training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers, shall 
be subject to on-site inspection in 
accordance with Article XI of the 
Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. 
The Parties shall have the right to 
conduct on-site inspections to confirm 
the completion of the elimination 
procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
this Section for training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers. The 
Party possessing such a training 
missile, training missile stage, training 
launch canister or training launcher 
shall inform the other Party of the 


name and coordinates of the 
elimination facility at which the on-site 
inspection may be conducted as well as 
the date on which it may be conducted. 
Such information shall be provided no 
less than 30 days in advance of that 
date. 

3. Prior to a missile’s arrival at the 
elimination facility, its nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements 
may be removed. 

4. Each Party shall select the 
particular technological means 
necessary to implement the procedures 
required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of 
this Section and to allow for on-site 
inspection of the conduct of the 
elimination procedures required in 
paragraph 10 of this Section in 
accordance with Article XI of the 
Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol 
on Inspection. 

5. The initiation of the elimination 
of the items of missile systems subject 
to this Section shall be considered to be 
the commencement of the procedures 
set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this 
Section. 

6. Immediately prior to the 
initiation of the elimination procedures 
set forth in paragraph 10 of this 
Section, an inspector from the Party 
receiving the pertinent notification 
required by paragraph 5(c) of Article 
IX of the Treaty shall confirm and 
record the type and number of items of 
missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 
of this Section, which are to be 
eliminated. If the inspecting Party 
deems it necessary, this shall include a 
visual inspection of the contents of 
launch canisters. 

7. A missile stage being eliminated 
by burning in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of 
this Section shall not be instrumented 
for data collection. Prior to the 


211 


initiation of the elimination procedures 
set forth in paragraph 10 of this 
Section, an inspector from the 
inspecting Party shall confirm that 
such missile stages are not 
instrumented for data collection. Those 
missile stages shall be subject to 
continuous observation by such an 
inspector from the time of that 
inspection until the burning is 
completed. 

8. The completion of the 
elimination procedures set forth in this 
Section, except those for training 
missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training 
launchers, along with the type and 
number of items of missile systems for 
which those procedures have been 
completed, shall be confirmed in 
writing by the representative of the 
Party carrying out the elimination and 
by the inspection team leader of the 
other Party. The elimination of a 
training missile, training missile stage, 
training launch canister or training 
launcher shall be considered to have 
been completed upon completion of the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
this Section and notification as 
required by paragraph 5(e) of Article 
IX of the Treaty following the date 
specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
this Section. 

9. The Parties agree that all 
United States and Soviet intermediate- 
range and shorter-range missiles and 
their associated reentry vehicles shall 
be eliminated within an agreed overall 
period of elimination. It is further 
agreed that all such missiles shall, in 
fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to 
the end of the overall period of 
elimination. During the last fifteen 
days, a Party shall withdraw to its 
national territory reentry vehicles 
which, by unilateral decision, have 
been released from existing programs 
of cooperation and eliminate them 
during the same timeframe in 
accordance with the procedures set 
forth in this Section. 

10. The specific procedures for the 
elimination of the items of missile 
systems listed in paragraph 1 of this 
Section shall be as follows, unless the 
Parties agree upon different procedures 
to achieve the same result as the 
procedures identified in this paragraph: 


For the Pershing II: 

Missile: 

(a) missile stages shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 

(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 

For the BGM-109G: 

Missile: 

(a) missile airframe shall be 
cut longitudinally into two pieces; 

(b) wings and tail section shall 
be severed from missile airframe at 
locations that are not assembly joints; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size or destroyed by explosion. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 


(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 

For the Pershing IA: 

Missile: 

(a) missile stages shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 

(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 

For the Pershing IB: 

Missile: 

(a) missile stage shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and 
motor case not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

For the SS-20: 

Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminated 
by explosive demolition of the missile 
in its launch canister or by burning 
missile stages; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 


212 



(c) front section, including 
reentry vehicles, minus nuclear 
warhead devices, and instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be destroyed by explosive 
demolition together with a missile, or 
shall be destroyed separately by 
explosion, cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size, crushed or 
flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the launcher 
chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, 
shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
with missile loading and mounting 
shall be removed from transporter 
vehicle chassis; 

(b) all mountings of such 
mechanisms shall be cut off 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(c) all components of the 
mechanisms associated with missile 
loading and mounting shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(d) external instrumentation 
compartments shall be removed from 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(e) transporter vehicle leveling 
supports shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle chassis and cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two 
pieces of approximately equal size; and 


(f) a portion of the transporter 
vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in 
length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle. 

For the SS-4: 

Missile: 

(a) nozzles of propulsion 
system shall be cut off at locations that 
are not assembly joints; 

(b) all propellant tanks shall 
be cut into two pieces of approximately 
equal size; 

(c) instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(d) front section, minus 
nuclear warhead device, shall be 
crushed or flattened. 

Launch Stand: launch stand 
components shall be cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two 
pieces of approximately equal size. 

Missile Erector: 

(a) jib, missile erector leveling 
supports and missile erector 
mechanism shall be cut off missile 
erector at locations that are not 
assembly joints; and 

(b) jib and missile erector 
leveling supports shall be cut into two 
pieces of approximately equal size. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 
mounting components for a missile and 
for a missile erector mechanism as well 
as supports for erecting a missile onto 
a launcher shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle at locations that are not 
assembly joints. 

For the SS-5: 

Missile: 

(a) nozzles of propulsion 
system shall be cut off at locations that 
are not assembly joints; 

(b) all propellant tanks shall 
be cut into two pieces of approximately 
equal size; and 

(c) instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 


For the SSC-X-4: 

Missile: 

(a) missile airframe shall be 
cut longitudinally into two pieces; 

(b) wings and tail section shall 
be severed from missile airframe at 
locations that are not assembly joints; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size or destroyed by explosion. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(f) the launcher chassis shall 
be severed at a location determined by 
measuring no more than 0.70 meters 
rearward from the rear axle. 

For the SS-12: 

Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminated 
by explosive demolition or by burning 
missile stages; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device, and instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed, flattened or 
destroyed by explosive demolition 
together with a missile. 


213 


Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the launcher 
chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, 
shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
with missile loading and mounting 
shall be removed from transporter 
vehicle chassis; 

(b) all mountings of such 
mechanisms shall be cut off 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(c) all components of the 
mechanisms associated with missile 
loading and mounting shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(d) external instrumentation 
compartments shall be removed from 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(e) transporter vehicle leveling 
supports shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle chassis and cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two 
pieces of approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the transporter 
vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in 
length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle. 

For the SS-23: 

Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminated 
by explosive demolition or by burning 
the missile stage; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and 
motor case not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 


(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device, and instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed, flattened, 
or destroyed by explosive demolition 
together with a missile. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher body; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment shall be removed from 
launcher body; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher body; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; 

(f) each environmental cover of 
the launcher body shall be removed 
and cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(g) a portion of the launcher 
body, at least 0.85 meters in length, 
shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
with missile loading and mounting 
shall be removed from transporter 
vehicle body; 

(b) all mountings of such 
mechanisms shall be cut off 
transporter vehicle body; 

(c) all components of 
mechanisms associated with missile 
loading and mounting shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(d) control equipment of the 
mechanism associated with missile 
loading shall be removed from 
transporter vehicle body; 

(e) transporter vehicle leveling 
supports shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle body and cut at locations that 
are not assembly joints into two pieces 
of approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the transporter 
vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in 
length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle. 


11. The specific procedures for the 
elimination of the training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers 
indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section 
shall be as follows: 

Training Missile and Training 
Missile Stage: training missile and 
training missile stage shall be crushed, 
flattened, cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size or destroyed 
by explosion. 

Training Launch Canister: 

training launch canister shall be 
crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces 
of approximately equal size or 
destroyed by explosion. 

Training Launcher: training 
launcher chassis shall be cut at the 
same location designated in paragraph 
10 of this Section for launcher of the 
same type of missile. 

III. Elimination of Missiles by Means 
of Launching 

1. Elimination of missiles by means of 
launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of 
Article X of the Treaty shall be subject 
to on-site inspection in accordance with 
paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty 
and the Protocol on Inspection. 
Immediately prior to each launch 
conducted for the purpose of 
elimination, an inspector from the 
inspecting Party shall confirm by 
visual observation the type of the 
missile to be launched. 

2. All missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching shall be launched 
from designated elimination facilities 
to existing impact areas for such 
missiles. No such missile shall be used 
as a target vehicle for a ballistic 
missile interceptor. 

3. Missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching shall be launched 
one at a time, and no less than six 
hours shall elapse between such 
launches. 

4. Such launches shall involve 
ignition of all missile stages. Neither 
Party shall transmit or recover data 
from missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching except for 
unencrypted data used for range safety 
purposes. 


214 


5. The completion of the 
elimination procedures set forth in this 
Section, and the type and number of 
missiles for which those procedures 
have been completed, shall be 
confirmed in writing by the 
representative of the Party carrying 
out the elimination and by the 
inspection team leader of the other 
Party. 

6. A missile shall be considered to 
be eliminated by means of launching 
after completion of the procedures set 
forth in this Section and upon 
notification required by paragraph 5(e) 
of Article IX of the Treaty. 

IV. Procedures for Elimination In Situ 

1. Support Structures 

(a) Support structures listed in 
Section I of this Protocol shall be 
eliminated in situ. 

(b) The initiation of the 
elimination of support structures shall 
be considered to be the commencement 
of the elimination procedures required 
in paragraph 1(d) of this Section. 

(c) The elimination of support 
structures shall be subject to 
verification by on-site inspection in 
accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 
XI of the Treaty. 

(d) The specific elimination 
procedures for support structures shall 
be as follows: 

(i) the superstructure of the 
fixed structure or shelter shall be 
dismantled or demolished, and removed 
from its base or foundation; 

(ii) the base or foundation of 
the fixed structure or shelter shall be 
destroyed by excavation or explosion; 

(iii) the destroyed base or 
foundation of a fixed structure or 
shelter shall remain visible to national 
technical means of verification for six 
months or until completion of an on¬ 
site inspection conducted in accordance 
with Article XI of the Treaty; and 

(iv) upon completion of the 
above requirements, the elimination 
procedures shall be considered to have 
been completed. 

2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 
Missiles 

Fixed and transportable propellant 
tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be 
removed from launch sites. 


3. Training Missiles, Training 
Missile Stages, Training Launch 
Canisters and Training Launchers 

(a) Training missiles, training 
missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers not 
eliminated at elimination facilities 
shall be eliminated in situ. 

(b) Training missiles, training 
missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers being 
eliminated in situ shall be eliminated 
in accordance with the specific 
procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
Section II of this Protocol. 

(c) Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct an on-site inspection to 
confirm the completion of the 
elimination procedures for training 
missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training 
launchers. 

(d) The Party possessing such a 
training missile, training missile stage, 
training launch canister or training 
launcher shall inform the other Party 
of the place-name and coordinates of 
the location at which the on-site 
inspection provided for in paragraph 
3(c) of this Section may be conducted as 
well as the date on which it may be 
conducted. Such information shall be 
provided no less than 30 days in 
advance of that date. 

(e) Elimination of a training 
missile, training missile stage, training 
launch canister or training launcher 
shall be considered to have been 
completed upon the completion of the 
procedures required by this paragraph 
and upon notification as required by 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the 
Treaty following the date specified 
pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this 
Section. 


V. Other Types of Elimination 

1. Loss or Accidental Destruction 

(a) If an item listed in Section I 
of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a 
result of an accident, the possessing 
Party shall notify the other Party 
within 48 hours, as required in 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the 
Treaty, that the item has been 
eliminated. 

(b) Such notification shall 
include the type of the eliminated item, 


its approximate or assumed location 
and the circumstances related to the 
loss or accidental destruction. 

(c) In such a case, the other 
Party shall have the right to conduct 
an inspection of the specific point at 
which the accident occurred to provide 
confidence that the item has been 
eliminated. 


2. Static Display 

(a) The Parties shall have the 
right to eliminate missiles, launch 
canisters and launchers, as well as 
training missiles, training launch 
canisters and training launchers, listed 
in Section I of this Protocol by placing 
them on static display. Each Party 
shall be limited to a total of 15 
missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 
launchers on such static display. 

(b) Prior to being placed on static 
display, a missile, launch canister or 
launcher shall be rendered unusable 
for purposes inconsistent with the 
Treaty. Missile propellant shall be 
removed and erector-launcher 
mechanisms shall be rendered 
inoperative. 

(c) The Party possessing a 
missile, launch canister or launcher, as 
well as a training missile, training 
launch canister or training launcher 
that is to be eliminated by placing it on 
static display shall provide the other 
Party with the place-name and 
coordinates of the location at which 
such a missile, launch canister or 
launcher is to be on static display, as 
well as the location at which the on¬ 
site inspection provided for in 
paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may 
take place. 

(d) Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct an on-site inspection of 
such a missile, launch canister or 
launcher within 60 days of receipt of 
the notification required in paragraph 
2(c) of this Section. 

(e) Elimination of a missile, 
launch canister or launcher, as well as 
a training missile, training launch 
canister or training launcher, by 
placing it on static display shall be 
considered to have been completed 
upon completion of the procedures 
required by this paragraph and 
notification as required by paragraph 
5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. 


215 


This Protocol is an integral part of 
the Treaty. It shall enter into force on 
the date of the entry into force of the 
Treaty and shall remain in force so 
long as the Treaty remains in force. As 
provided for in paragraph 1(b) of 
Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties 
may agree upon such measures as may 
be necessary to improve the viability 


FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 

Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 
of America 


and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such 
measures shall not be deemed 
amendments to the Treaty. 

DONE at Washington on 
December 8, 1987, in two copies, each 
in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 


FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

M. Gorbachev 

General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 


216 


Protocol 

Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles 


Pursuant to and in implementation of 
the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 
1987, hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon 
procedures governing the conduct of 
inspections provided for in Article XI 
of the Treaty. 

I. Definitions 

For the purposes of this Protocol, the 
Treaty, the Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Protocol on 
Elimination: 

1. The term “inspected Party” 
means the Party to the Treaty whose 
sites are subject to inspection as 
provided for by Article XI of the 
Treaty. 

2. The term “inspecting Party” 
means the Party to the Treaty carrying 
out an inspection. 

3. The term “inspector” means an 
individual designated by one of the 
Parties to carry out inspections and 
included on that Party’s list of 
inspectors in accordance with the 
provisions of Section III of this 
Protocol. 

4. The term “inspection team” 
means the group of inspectors assigned 
by the inspecting Party to conduct a 
particular inspection. 

5. The term “inspection site” 
means an area, location or facility at 
which an inspection is carried out. 

6. The term “period of inspection” 
means the period of time from arrival 
of the inspection team at the inspection 
site until its departure from the 
inspection site, exclusive of time spent 
on any pre- and post-inspection 
procedures. 


7. The term “point of entry” 
means: Washington, D.C., or San 
Francisco, California, the United States 
of America; Brussels (National 
Airport), The Kingdom of Belgium; 
Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase), The 
Federal Republic of Germany; Rome 
(Ciampino), The Republic of Italy; 
Schiphol, The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or 
Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the 
German Democratic Republic; and 
International Airport Ruzyne, the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 

8. The term “in-country period” 
means the period from the arrival of 
the inspection team at the point of 
entry until its departure from the 
country through the point of entry. 

9. The term “in-country escort” 
means individuals specified by the 
inspected Party to accompany and 
assist inspectors and aircrew members 
as necessary throughout the in-country 
period. 

10. The term “aircrew member” 
means an individual who performs 
duties related to the operation of an 
airplane and who is included on a 
Party’s list of aircrew members in 
accordance with the provisions of 
Section III of this Protocol. 

II. General Obligations 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty, each Party 
shall facilitate inspection by the other 
Party pursuant to this Protocol. 

2. Each Party takes note of the 
assurances received from the other 
Party regarding understandings 
reached between the other Party and 
the basing countries to the effect that 


the basing countries have agreed to the 
conduct of inspections, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, on 
their territories. 

III. Pre-Inspection Requirements 

1. Inspections to ensure verification of 
compliance by the Parties with the 
obligations assumed under the Treaty 
shall be carried out by inspectors 
designated in accordance with 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section. 

2. No later than one day after 
entry into force of the Treaty, each 
Party shall provide to the other Party: 
a list of its proposed aircrew members; 
a list of its proposed inspectors who 
will carry out inspections pursuant to 
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI 
of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed 
inspectors who will carry out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty. None of these lists shall 
contain at any time more than 200 
individuals. 

3. Each Party shall review the lists 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
proposed by the other Party. With 
respect to an individual included on 
the list of proposed inspectors who will 
carry out inspection activities pursuant 
to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty, if such an individual is 
unacceptable to the Party reviewing 
the list, that Party shall, within 20 
days, so inform the Party providing the 
list, and the individual shall be deemed 
not accepted and shall be deleted from 
the list. With respect to an individual 
on the list of proposed aircrew 
members or the list of proposed 
inspectors who will carry out 
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 

4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, 
each Party, within 20 days after the 
receipt of such lists, shall inform the 
other Party of its agreement to the 


217 


designation of each inspector and 
aircrew member proposed. Inspectors 
shall be citizens of the inspecting 
Party. 

4. Each Party shall have the right 
to amend its lists of inspectors and 
aircrew members. New inspectors and 
aircrew members shall be designated in 
the same manner as set forth in 
paragraph 3 of this Section with 
respect to initial lists. 

5. Within 30 days of receipt of the 
initial lists of inspectors and aircrew 
members, or of subsequent changes 
thereto, the Party receiving such 
information shall provide, or shall 
ensure the provision of, such visas and 
other documents to each individual to 
whom it has agreed as may be required 
to ensure that each inspector or 
aircrew member may enter and remain 
in the territory of the Party or basing 
country in which an inspection site is 
located throughout the in-country 
period for the purpose of carrying out 
inspection activities in accordance with 
the provisions of this Protocol. Such 
visas and documents shall be valid for 
a period of at least 24 months. 

6. To exercise their functions 
effectively, inspectors and aircrew 
members shall be accorded, throughout 
the in-country period, privileges and 
immunities in the country of the 
inspection site as set forth in the 
Annex to this Protocol. 

7. Without prejudice to their 
privileges and immunities, inspectors 
and aircrew members shall be obliged 
to respect the laws and regulations of 
the State on whose territory an 
inspection is carried out and shall be 
obliged not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of that State. In the event the 
inspected Party determines that an 
inspector or aircrew member of the 
other Party has violated the conditions 
governing inspection activities set forth 
in this Protocol, or has ever committed 
a criminal offense on the territory of 
the inspected Party or a basing 
country, or has ever been sentenced for 
committing a criminal offense or 
expelled by the inspected Party or a 
basing country, the inspected Party 
making such a determination shall so 
notify the inspecting Party, which shall 
immediately strike the individual from 
the lists of inspectors or the list of 
aircrew members. If, at that time, the 
individual is on the territory of the 
inspected Party or a basing country, 
the inspecting Party shall immediately 
remove that individual from the 
country. 


8. Within 30 days after entry into 
force of the Treaty, each Party shall 
inform the other Party of the standing 
diplomatic clearance number for 
airplanes of the Party transporting 
inspectors and equipment necessary for 
inspection into and out of the territory 
of the Party or basing country in which 
an inspection site is located. Aircraft 
routings to and from the designated 
point of entry shall be along 
established international airways that 
are agreed upon by the Parties as the 
basis for such diplomatic clearance. 

IV. Notifications 

1. Notification of an intention to 
conduct an inspection shall be made 
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers. The receipt of this notification 
shall be acknowledged through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the 
inspected Party within one hour of its 
receipt: 

(a) For inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, such 
notifications shall be made no less than 
16 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team 
at the point of entry and shall include: 

(i) the point of entry; 

(ii) the date and estimated 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 

(iii) the date and time when 
the specification of the inspection site 
will be provided; and 

(iv) the names of inspectors 
and aircrew members. 

(b) For inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, such 
notifications shall be made no less than 
72 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team 
at the point of entry and shall include: 

(i) the point of entry; 

(ii) the date and estimated 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 

(iii) the site to be inspected 
and the type of inspection; and 

(iv) the names of inspectors 
and aircrew members. 

2. The date and time of the 
specification of the inspection site as 
notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of 
this Section shall fall within the 
following time intervals: 

(a) for inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, neither less 


than four hours nor more than 24 
hours after the estimated date and 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 
and 

(b) for inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI 
of the Treaty, neither less than four 
hours nor more than 48 hours after the 
estimated date and time of arrival at 
the point of entry. 

3. The inspecting Party shall 
provide the inspected Party with a 
flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers, for its flight from 
the last airfield prior to entering the 
air space of the country in which the 
inspection site is located to the point of 
entry, no less than six hours before the 
scheduled departure time from that 
airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in 
accordance with the procedures of the 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization applicable to civil 
aircraft. The inspecting Party shall 
include in the remarks section of each 
flight plan the standing diplomatic 
clearance number and the notation: 
“Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance 
processing required.” 

4. No less than three hours prior t 
the scheduled departure of the 
inspection team from the last airfield 
prior to entering the airspace of the 
country in which the inspection is to 
take place, the inspected Party shall 
ensure that the flight plan filed in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
Section is approved so that the 
inspection team may arrive at the 
point of entry by the estimated arrival 
time. 

5. Either Party may change the 
point or points of entry to the 
territories of the countries within 
which its deployment areas, missile 
operating bases or missile support 
facilities are located, by giving notice of 
such change to the other Party. A 
change in a point of entry shall become 
effective five months after receipt of 
such notification by the other Party. 

V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival 
at the Point of Entry 

1. The in-country escort and a 
diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to 
the Government of either the inspected 
Party or the basing country in which 
the inspection site is located shall meet 
the inspection team and aircrew 
members at the point of entry as soon 
as the airplane of the inspecting Party 
lands. The number of aircrew members 
for each airplane shall not exceed ten. 


218 


The in-country escort shall 
expedite the entry of the inspection 
team and aircrew, their baggage, and 
equipment and supplies necessary for 
inspection, into the country in which 
the inspection site is located. A 
diplomatic aircrew escort shall have 
the right to accompany and assist 
aircrew members throughout the in¬ 
country period. In the case of an 
inspection taking place on the territory 
of a basing country, the in-country 
escort may include representatives of 
that basing country. 

2. An inspector shall be considered 
to have assumed his duties upon 
arrival at the point of entry on the 
territory of the inspected Party or a 
basing country, and shall be considered 
to have ceased performing those duties 
when he has left the territory of the 
inspected Party or basing country. 

3. Each Party shall ensure that 
equipment and supplies are exempt 
from all customs duties. 

4. Equipment and supplies which 
the inspecting Party brings into the 
country in which an inspection site is 
located shall be subject to examination 
at the point of entry each time they 
are brought into that country. This 
examination shall be completed prior 
to the departure of the inspection team 
from the point of entry to conduct an 
inspection. Such equipment and 
supplies shall be examined by the in¬ 
country escort in the presence of the 
inspection team members to ascertain 
to the satisfaction of each Party that 
the equipment and supplies cannot 
perform functions unconnected with 
the inspection requirements of the 
Treaty. If it is established upon 
examination that the equipment or 
supplies are unconnected with these 
inspection requirements, then they 
shall not be cleared for use and shall 
be impounded at the point of entry 
until the departure of the inspection 
team from the country where the 
inspection is conducted. Storage of the 
inspecting Party’s equipment and 
supplies at each point of entry shall be 
within tamper-proof containers within 
a secure facility. Access to each secure 
facility shall be controlled by a “dual 
key” system requiring the presence of 
both Parties to gain access to the 
equipment and supplies. 

5. Throughout the in-country 
period, the inspected Party shall 
provide, or arrange for the provision of, 
meals, lodging, work space, 


transportation and, as necessary, 
medical care for the inspection team 
and aircrew of the inspecting Party. 

All the costs in connection with the 
stay of inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty, on the territory of the 
inspected Party, including meals, 
services, lodging, work space, 
transportation and medical care shall 
be borne by the inspecting Party. 

6. The inspected Party shall 
provide parking, security protection, 
servicing and fuel for the airplane of 
the inspecting Party at the point of 
entry. The inspecting Party shall bear 
the cost of such fuel and servicing. 

7. For inspections conducted on the 
territory of the Parties, the inspection 
team shall enter at the point of entry 
on the territory of the inspected Party 
that is closest to the inspection site. In 
the case of inspections carried out in 
accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection 
team leader shall, at or before the time 
notified pursuant to paragraph l(a)(iii) 
of Section IV of this Protocol, inform 
the inspected Party at the point of 
entry through the in-country escort of 
the type of inspection and the 
inspection site, by place-name and 
geographic coordinates. 


VI. General Rules for Conducting 
Inspections 

1. Inspectors shall discharge their 
functions in accordance with this 
Protocol. 

2. Inspectors shall not disclose 
information received during inspections 
except with the express permission of 
the inspecting Party. They shall 
remain bound by this obligation after 
their assignment as inspectors has 
ended. 

3. In discharging their functions, 
inspectors shall not interfere directly 
with on-going activities at the 
inspection site and shall avoid 
unnecessarily hampering or delaying 
the operation of a facility or taking 
actions affecting its safe operation. 

4. Inspections shall be conducted in 
accordance with the objectives set forth 
in Article XI of the Treaty as 
applicable for the type of inspection 
specified by the inspecting Party under 
paragraph 1(b) of Section IV or 
paragraph 7 of Section V of this 
Protocol. 


5. The in-country escort shall have 
the right to accompany and assist 
inspectors and aircrew members as 
considered necessary by the inspected 
Party throughout the in-country 
period. Except as otherwise provided in 
this Protocol, the movement and travel 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be at the discretion of the in¬ 
country escort. 

6. Inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 
shall be allowed to travel within 50 
kilometers from the inspection site 
with the permission of the in-country 
escort, and as considered necessary by 
the inspected Party, shall be 
accompanied by the in-country escort. 
Such travel shall be taken solely as a 
leisure activity. 

7. Inspectors shall have the right 
throughout the period of inspection to 
be in communication with the embassy 
of the inspecting Party located within 
the territory of the country where the 
inspection is taking place using the 
telephone communications provided by 
the inspected Party. 

8. At the inspection site, 
representatives of the inspected facility 
shall be included among the in-country 
escort. 

9. The inspection team may bring 
onto the inspection site such documents 
as needed to conduct the inspection, as 
well as linear measurement devices; 
cameras; portable weighing devices; 
radiation detection devices; and other 
equipment, as agreed by the Parties. 
The characteristics and method of use 
of the equipment listed above, shall 
also be agreed upon within 30 days 
after entry into force of the Treaty. 
During inspections conducted pursuant 
to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection 
team may use any of the equipment 
listed above, except for cameras, which 
shall be for use only by the inspected 
Party at the request of the inspecting 
Party. During inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article 
XI of the Treaty, all measurements 
shall be made by the inspected Party at 
the request of the inspecting Party. At 
the request of inspectors, the in¬ 
country escort shall take photographs 
of the inspected facilities using the 
inspecting Party’s camera systems 
which are capable of producing 
duplicate, instant development 
photographic prints. Each Party shall 
receive one copy of every photograph. 


219 



10. For inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors 
shall permit the in-country escort to 
observe the equipment used during the 
inspection by the inspection team. 

11. Measurements recorded during 
inspections shall be certified by the 
signature of a member of the 
inspection team and a member of the 
in-country escort when they are taken. 
Such certified data shall be included in 
the inspection report. 

12. Inspectors shall have the right 
to request clarifications in connection 
with ambiguities that arise during an 
inspection. Such requests shall be made 
promptly through the in-country 
escort. The in-country escort shall 
provide the inspection team, during the 
inspection, with such clarifications as 
may be necessary to remove the 
ambiguity. In the event questions 
relating to an object or building located 
within the inspection site are not 
resolved, the inspected Party shall 
photograph the object or building as 
requested by the inspecting Party for 
the purpose of clarifying its nature and 
function. If the ambiguity cannot be 
removed during the inspection, then 
the question, relevant clarifications 
and a copy of any photographs taken 
shall be included in the inspection 
report. 

13. In carrying out their activities, 
inspectors shall observe safety regu¬ 
lations established at the inspection 
site, including those for the protection 
of controlled environments within a 
facility and for personal safety. 
Individual protective clothing and 
equipment shall be provided by the 
inspected Party, as necessary. 

14. For inspections pursuant to 
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI 
of the Treaty, pre-inspection 
procedures, including briefings and 
safety-related activities, shall begin 
upon arrival of the inspection team at 
the inspection site and shall be 
completed within one hour. The 
inspection team shall begin the 
inspection immediately upon 
completion of the pre-inspection 
procedures. The period of inspection 
shall not exceed 24 hours, except for 
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 
or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The 
period of inspection may be extended, 
by agreement with the in-country 
escort, by no more than eight hours. 
Post-inspection procedures, which 
include completing the inspection 


report in accordance with the pro¬ 
visions of Section XI of this Protocol, 
shall begin immediately upon 
completion of the inspection and shall 
be completed at the inspection site 
within four hours. 

15. An inspection team conducting 
an inspection pursuant to Article XI of 
the Treaty shall include no more than 
ten inspectors, except for an inspection 
team conducting an inspection 
pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that 
Article, which shall include no more 
than 20 inspectors and an inspection 
team conducting an inspection 
activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
that Article, which shall include no 
more than 30 inspectors. At least two 
inspectors on each team must speak 
the language of the inspected Party. 

An inspection team shall operate under 
the direction of the team leader and 
deputy team leader. Upon arrival at 
the inspection site, the inspection team 
may divide itself into subgroups 
consisting of no fewer than two 
inspectors each. There shall be no more 
than one inspection team at an 
inspection site at any one time. 

16. Except in the case of 
inspections conducted pursuant to 
paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of 
the Treaty, upon completion of the 
post-inspection procedures, the 
inspection team shall return promptly 
to the point of entry from which it 
commenced inspection activities and 
shall then leave, within 24 hours, the 
territory of the country in which the 
inspection site is located, using its own 
airplane. In the case of inspections 
conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 
7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the 
inspection team intends to conduct 
another inspection it shall either: 

(a) notify the inspected Party of 
its intent upon return to the point of 
entry; or 

(b) notify the inspected Party of 
the type of inspection and the 
inspection site upon completion of the 
post-inspection procedures. In this case 
it shall be the responsibility of the 
inspected Party to ensure that the 
inspection team reaches the next 
inspection site without unjustified 
delay. The inspected Party shall 
determine the means of transportation 
and route involved in such travel. 

With respect to subparagraph (a), the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of 
Section V of this Protocol and 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of 
this Protocol shall apply. 


VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant 
to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI 
of the Treaty 

1. Within one hour after the time for 
the specification of the inspection site 
notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of 
Section IV of this Protocol, the 
inspected Party shall implement pre¬ 
inspection movement restrictions at the 
inspection site, which shall remain in 
effect until the inspection team arrives 
at the inspection site. During the 
period that pre-inspection movement 
restrictions are in effect, missiles, 
stages of such missiles, launchers or 
support equipment subject to the 
Treaty shall not be removed from the 
inspection site. 

2. The inspected Party shall 
transport the inspection team from the 
point of entry to the inspection site so 
that the inspection team arrives at the 
inspection site no later than nine hours 
after the time for the specification of 
the inspection site notified pursuant to 
paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this 
Protocol. 

3. In the event that an inspection 
is conducted in a basing country, the 
aircrew of the inspected Party may 
include representatives of the basing 
country. 

4. Neither Party shall conduct 
more than one inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 5(a) of Article XI of the 
Treaty at any one time, more than one 
inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) 
of Article XI of the Treaty at any one 
time, or more than 10 inspections 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI 
of the Treaty at any one time. 

5. The boundaries of the inspection 
site at the facility to be inspected shall 
be the boundaries of that facility set 
forth in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 

6. Except in the case of an 
inspection conducted pursuant to 
paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of 
the Treaty, upon arrival of the 
inspection team at the inspection site, 
the in-country escort shall inform the 
inspection team leader of the number 
of missiles, stages of missiles, 
launchers, support structures and 
support equipment at the site that are 
subject to the Treaty and provide the 
inspection team leader with a diagram 
of the inspection site indicating the 
location of these missiles, stages of 
missiles, launchers, support structures 
and support equipment at the 
inspection site. 


220 


7. Subject to the procedures of 
paragraphs 8 through 14 of this 
Section, inspectors shall have the right 
to inspect the entire inspection site, 
including the interior of structures, 
containers or vehicles, or including 
covered objects, whose dimensions are 
equal to or greater than the dimensions 
specified in Section VI of the 
Memorandum of Understanding for the 
missiles, stages of such missiles, 
launchers or support equipment of the 
inspected Party. 

8. A missile, a stage of such a 
missile or a launcher subject to the 
Treaty shall be subject to inspection 
only by external visual observation, 
including measuring, as necessary, the 
dimensions of such a missile, stage of 
such a missile or launcher. A container 
that the inspected Party declares to 
contain a missile or stage of a missile 
subject to the Treaty, and which is not 
sufficiently large to be capable of 
containing more than one missile or 
stage of such a missile of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, shall be 
subject to inspection only by external 
visual observation, including 
measuring, as necessary, the 
dimensions of such a container to 
confirm that it cannot contain more 
than one missile or stage of such a 
missile of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty. Except as provided for in 
paragraph 14 of this Section, a 
container that is sufficiently large to 
contain a missile or stage of such a 
missile of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty that the inspected Party 
declares not to contain a missile or 
stage of such a missile subject to the 
Treaty shall be subject to inspection 
only by means of weighing or visual 
observation of the interior of the 
container, as necessary, to confirm that 
it does not, in fact, contain a missile or 
stage of such a missile of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty. If such a 
container is a launch canister 
associated with a type of missile not 
subject to the Treaty, and declared by 
the inspected Party to contain such a 
missile, it shall be subject to external 
inspection only, including use of 
radiation detection devices, visual 
observation and linear measurement, 
as necessary, of the dimensions of such 
a canister. 

9. A structure or container that is 
not sufficiently large to contain a 
missile, stage of such a missile or 
launcher of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty shall be subject to 


inspection only by external visual 
observation including measuring, as 
necessary, the dimensions of such a 
structure or container to confirm that 
it is not sufficiently large to be capable 
of containing a missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty. 

10. Within a structure, a space 
which is sufficiently large to contain a 
missile, stage of such a missile or 
launcher of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty, but which is 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
inspection team not to be accessible by 
the smallest missile, stage of a missile 
or launcher of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty shall not be 
subject to further inspection. If the 
inspected Party demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the inspection team by 
means of a visual inspection of the 
interior of an enclosed space from its 
entrance that the enclosed space does 
not contain any missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, such an 
enclosed space shall not be subject to 
further inspection. 

11. The inspection team shall be 
permitted to patrol the perimeter of 
the inspection site and station 
inspectors at the exits of the site for 
the duration of the inspection. 

12. The inspection team shall be 
permitted to inspect any vehicle 
capable of carrying missiles, stages of 
such missiles, launchers or support 
equipment of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty at any time 
during the course of an inspection and 
no such vehicle shall leave the 
inspection site during the course of the 
inspection until inspected at site exits 
by the inspection team. 

13. Prior to inspection of a building 
within the inspection site, the 
inspection team may station subgroups 
at the exits of the building that are 
large enough to permit passage of any 
missile, stage of such a missile, 
launcher or support equipment of the 
inspected Party subject to the Treaty. 
During the time that the building is 
being inspected, no vehicle or object 
capable of containing any missile, stage 
of such a missile, launcher or support 
equipment of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty shall be permitted 
to leave the building until inspected. 

14. During an inspection conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article 
XI of the Treaty, it shall be the 
responsibility of the inspected Party to 
demonstrate that a shrouded or 


environmentally protected object which 
is equal to or larger than the smallest 
missile, stage of a missile or launcher 
of the inspected Party subject to the 
Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of 
such a missile or launcher of the 
inspected Party subject to the Treaty. 
This may be accomplished by partial 
removal of the shroud or 
environmental protection cover, 
measuring, or weighing the covered 
object or by other methods. If the 
inspected Party satisfies the inspection 
team by its demonstration that the 
object is not a missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, then there 
shall be no further inspection of that 
object. If the container is a launch 
canister associated with a type of 
missile not subject to the Treaty, and 
declared by the inspected Party to 
contain such a missile, then it shall be 
subject to external inspection only, 
including use of radiation detection 
devices, visual observation and linear 
measurement, as necessary, of the 
dimensions of such a canister. 

VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant 
to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of 
the Treaty 

1. Inspections of the process of 
elimination of items of missile systems 
specified in the Protocol on Elimination 
carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
Article XI of the Treaty shall be 
conducted in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in this paragraph 
and the Protocol on Elimination: 

(a) Upon arrival at the 
elimination facility, inspectors shall be 
provided with a schedule of elimination 
activities. 

(b) Inspectors shall check the 
data which are specified in the 
notification provided by the inspected 
Party regarding the number and type 
of items of missile systems to be 
eliminated against the number and 
type of such items which are at the 
elimination facility prior to the 
initiation of the elimination 
procedures. 

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 
11 of Section VI of this Protocol, 
inspectors shall observe the execution 
of the specific procedures for the 
elimination of the items of missile 
systems as provided for in the Protocol 
on Elimination. If any deviations from 
the agreed elimination procedures are 
found, the inspectors shall have the 
right to call the attention of the in- 


221 


country escort to the need for strict 
compliance with the above-mentioned 
procedures. The completion of such 
procedures shall be confirmed in 
accordance with the procedures 
specified in the Protocol on 
Elimination. 

(d) During the elimination of 
missiles by means of launching, the 
inspectors shall have the right to 
ascertain by visual observation that a 
missile prepared for launch is a missile 
of the type subject to elimination. The 
inspectors shall also be allowed to 
observe such a missile from a safe 
location specified by the inspected 
Party until the completion of its 
launch. During the inspection of a 
series of launches for the elimination of 
missiles by means of launching, the 
inspected Party shall determine the 
means of transport and route for the 
transportation of inspectors between 
inspection sites. 

2. Inspections of the elimination of 
items of missile systems specified in 
the Protocol on Elimination carried out 
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI 
of the Treaty shall be conducted in 
accordance with the procedures set 
forth in Sections II, IV or V of the 
Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise 
agreed by the Parties. 

IX. Inspection Activities Conducted 
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI 
of the Treaty 

1. The inspected Party shall maintain 
an agreed perimeter around the 
periphery of the inspection site and 
shall designate a portal with not more 
than one rail line and one road which 
shall be within 50 meters of each other. 
All vehicles which can contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party shall exit only through this 
portal. 

2. For the purposes of this Section, 
the provisions of paragraph 10 of 
Article VII of the Treaty shall be 
applied to intermediate-range GLBMs 
of the inspected Party and the longest 
stage of such GLBMs. 

3. There shall not be more than 
two other exits from the inspection 
site. Such exits shall be monitored by 
appropriate sensors. The perimeter of 
and exits from the inspection site may 
be monitored as provided for by 
paragraph 11 of Section VII of this 
Protocol. 


4. The inspecting Party shall have 
the right to establish continuous 
monitoring systems at the portal 
specified in paragraph 1 of this Section 
and appropriate sensors at the exits 
specified in paragraph 3 of this Section 
and carry out necessary engineering 
surveys, construction, repair and 
replacement of monitoring systems. 

5. The inspected Party shall, at the 
request of and at the expense of the 
inspecting Party, provide the following: 

(a) all necessary utilities for the 
construction and operation of the 
monitoring systems, including 
electrical power, water, fuel, heating 
and sewage; 

(b) basic construction materials 
including concrete and lumber; 

(c) the site preparation necessary 
to accommodate the installation of 
continuously operating systems for 
monitoring the portal specified in 
paragraph 1 of this Section, 
appropriate sensors for other exits 
specified in paragraph 3 of this Section 
and the center for collecting data 
obtained during inspections. Such 
preparation may include ground 
excavation, laying of concrete 
foundations, trenching between 
equipment locations and utility 
connections; 

(d) transportation for necessary 
installation tools, materials and 
equipment from the point of entry to 
the inspection site; and 

(e) a minimum of two telephone 
lines and, as necessary, high frequency 
radio equipment capable of allowing 
direct communication with the 
embassy of the inspecting Party in the 
country in which the site is located. 

6. Outside the perimeter of the 
inspection site, the inspecting Party 
shall have the right to: 

(a) build no more than three 
buildings with a total floor space of not 
more than 150 square meters for a data 
center and inspection team 
headquarters, and one additional 
building with floor space not to exceed 
500 square meters for the storage of 
supplies and equipment; 

(b) install systems to monitor the 
exits to include weight sensors, vehicle 
sensors, surveillance systems and 
vehicle dimensional measuring 
equipment; 

(c) install at the portal specified 
in paragraph 1 of this Section 
equipment for measuring the length 


and diameter of missile stages 
contained inside of launch canisters or 
shipping containers; 

(d) install at the portal specified 
in paragraph 1 of this Section non¬ 
damaging image producing equipment 
for imaging the contents of launch 
canisters or shipping containers 
declared to contain missiles or missile 
stages as provided for in paragraph 11 
of this Section; 

(e) install a primary and back-up 
power source; and 

(f) use, as necessary, data 
authentication devices. 

7. During the installation or 
operation of the monitoring systems, 
the inspecting Party shall not deny the 
inspected Party access to any existing 
structures or security systems. The 
inspecting Party shall not take any 
actions with respect to such structures 
without consent of the inspected Party. 
If the Parties agree that such 
structures are to be rebuilt or 
demolished, either partially or 
completely, the inspecting Party shall 
provide the necessary compensation. 

8. The inspected Party shall not 
interfere with the installed equipment 
or restrict the access of the inspection 
team to such equipment. 

9. The inspecting Party shall have 
the right to use its own two-way 
systems of radio communication 
between inspectors patrolling the 
perimeter and the data collection 
center. Such systems shall conform to 
power and frequency restrictions 
established on the territory of the 
inspected Party. 

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted 
to land within the perimeter of the 
monitored site except for emergencies 
at the site and with prior notification 
to the inspection team. 

11. Any shipment exiting through 
the portal specified in paragraph 1 of 
this Section which is large enough and 
heavy enough to contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party shall be declared by the 
inspected Party to the inspection team 
before the shipment arrives at the 
portal. The declaration shall state 
whether such a shipment contains a 
missile or missile stage as large or 
larger than and as heavy or heavier 
than an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party. 


222 


12. The inspection team shall have 
the right to weigh and measure the 
dimensions of any vehicle, including 
railcars, exiting the site to ascertain 
whether it is large enough and heavy 
enough to contain an intermediate- 
range GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party. These 
measurements shall be performed so as 
to minimize the delay of vehicles 
exiting the site. Vehicles that are 
either not large enough or not heavy 
enough to contain an intermediate- 
range GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party shall not 
be subject to further inspection. 

13. Vehicles exiting through the 
portal specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Section that are large enough and 
leavy enough to contain an 
ntermediate-range GLBM or longest 
itage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
3 arty but that are declared not to 
contain a missile or missile stage as 
large or larger than and as heavy or 
heavier than an intermediate-range 
GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party shall be 
subject to the following procedures. 

(a) The inspecting Party shall 
have the right to inspect the interior of 
all such vehicles. 

(b) If the inspecting Party can 
determine by visual observation or 
dimensional measurement that, inside 
a particular vehicle, there are no 
containers or shrouded objects large 
enough to be or to contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party, then that vehicle shall not be 
subject to further inspection. 

(c) If inside a vehicle there are 
one or more containers or shrouded 
objects large enough to be or to contain 
an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party, it shall be the 
responsibility of the inspected Party to 
demonstrate that such containers or 
shrouded objects are not and do not 
contain intermediate-range GLBMs or 
the longest stages of such GLBMs of 
the inspected Party. 

14. Vehicles exiting through the 
portal specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Section that are declared to contain a 
missile or missile stage as large or 
larger than and as heavy or heavier 
than an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party shall be subject to the 
following procedures. 


(a) The inspecting Party shall 
preserve the integrity of the inspected 
missile or stage of a missile. 

(b) Measuring equipment shall 
be placed only outside of the launch 
canister or shipping container; all 
measurements shall be made by the 
inspecting Party using the equipment 
provided for in paragraph 6 of this 
Section. Such measurements shall be 
observed and certified by the in¬ 
country escort. 

(c) The inspecting Party shall 
have the right to weigh and measure 
the dimensions of any launch canister 
or of any shipping container declared 
to contain such a missile or missile 
stage and to image the contents of any 
launch canister or of any shipping 
container declared to contain such a 
missile or missile stage; it shall have 
the right to view such missiles or 
missile stages contained in launch 
canisters or shipping containers eight 
times per calendar year. The in¬ 
country escort shall be present during 
all phases of such viewing. During such 
interior viewing: 

(i) the front end of the launch 
canister or the cover of the shipping 
container shall be opened; 

(ii) the missile or missile stage 
shall not be removed from its launch 
canister or shipping container; and 

(iii) the length and diameter of 
the stages of the missile shall be 
measured in accordance with the 
methods agreed by the Parties so as to 
ascertain that the missile or missile 
stage is not an intermediate-range 
GLBM of the inspected Party, or the 
longest stage of such a GLBM, and that 
the missile has no more than one stage 
which is outwardly similar to a stage of 
an existing type of intermediate-range 
GLBM. 

(d) The inspecting Party shall 
also have the right to inspect any other 
containers or shrouded objects inside 
the vehicle containing such a missile or 
missile stage in accordance with the 
procedures in paragraph 13 of this 
Section. 

X. Cancellation of Inspection 

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due 
to circumstances brought about by 
force majeure, it cannot be carried out. 
In the case of a delay that prevents an 
inspection team performing an 
inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 
or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from 


arriving at the inspection site during 
the time specified in paragraph 2 of 
Section VII of this Protocol, the 
inspecting Party may either cancel or 
carry out the inspection. If an 
inspection is cancelled due to 
circumstances brought about by force 
majeure or delay, then the number of 
inspections to which the inspecting 
Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 

XI. Inspection Report 

1. For inspections conducted pursuant 
to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article 
XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection 
procedures, and no later than two 
hours after the inspection has been 
completed, the inspection team leader 
shall provide the in-country escort with 
a written inspection report in both the 
English and Russian languages. The 
report shall be factual. It shall include 
the type of inspection carried out, the 
inspection site, the number of missiles, 
stages of missiles, launchers and items 
of support equipment subject to the 
Treaty observed during the period of 
inspection and any measurements 
recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of 
Section VI of this Protocol. 

Photographs taken during the 
inspection in accordance with agreed 
procedures, as well as the inspection 
site diagram provided for by paragraph 
6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall 
be attached to this report. 

2. For inspection activities 
conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days 
after the end of each month, the 
inspection team leader shall provide 
the in-country escort with a written 
inspection report both in the English 
and Russian languages. The report 
shall be factual. It shall include the 
number of vehicles declared to contain 
a missile or stage of a missile as large 
or larger than and as heavy or heavier 
than an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party that left the inspection 
site through the portal specified in 
paragraph 1 of Section IX of this 
Protocol during that month. The report 
shall also include any measurements of 
launch canisters or shipping containers 
contained in these vehicles recorded 
pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI 
of this Protocol. In the event the 
inspecting Party, under the provisions 
of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this 
Protocol, has viewed the interior of a 
launch canister or shipping container 


223 



declared to contain a missile or stage of 
a missile as large or larger than and as 
heavy or heavier than an intermediate- 
range GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party, the 
report shall also include the 
measurements of the length and 
diameter of missile stages obtained 
during the inspection and recorded 
pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI 
of this Protocol. Photographs taken 
during the inspection in accordance 
with agreed procedures shall be 
attached to this report. 

3. The inspected Party shall have 
the right to include written comments 
in the report. 

4. The Parties shall, when possible, 
resolve ambiguities regarding factual 
information contained in the inspection 
report. Relevant clarifications shall be 
recorded in the report. The report shall 
be signed by the inspection team leader 
and by one of the members of the in¬ 
country escort. Each Party shall retain 
one copy of the report. 

This Protocol is an integral part of 
the Treaty. It shall enter into force on 
the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and shall remain in force as 
long as the Treaty remains in force. As 
provided for in paragraph 1(h) of 
Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties 
may agree upon such measures as may 


be necessary to improve the viability 
and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such 
measures shall not be deemed 
amendments to the Treaty. 

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 

Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 
of America 


DONE at Washington on 
December 8, 1987, in two copies, each 
in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

M. Gorbachev 

General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 


ANNEX 

Provisions on Privileges and 
Immunities of Inspectors and 
Aircrew Members 


In order to exercise their functions 
effectively, for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaty and not for 
their personal benefit, the inspectors 
and aircrew members referred to in 
Section III of this Protocol shall be 
accorded the privileges and immunities 
contained in this Annex. Privileges and 
immunities shall be accorded for the 
entire in-country period in the country 
in which an inspection site is located, 
and thereafter with respect to acts 
previously performed in the exercise of 
official functions as an inspector or 
aircrew member. 

1. Inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be accorded the inviolability 
enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant 
to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 
1961. 

2. The living quarters and office 
premises occupied by an inspector 
carrying out inspection activities 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI 
of the Treaty shall be accorded the 
inviolability and protection accorded 
the premises of diplomatic agents 
pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 

3. The papers and correspondence 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to 
the papers and correspondence of 
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 
30 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the 
aircraft of the inspection team shall be 
inviolable. 

4. Inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be accorded the immunities 
accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of 


the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. The immunity from 
jurisdiction of an inspector or an 
aircrew member may be waived by the 
inspecting Party in those cases when it 
is of the opinion that immunity would 
impede the course of justice and that it 
can be waived without prejudice to the 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Treaty. Waiver must always be 
express. 

5. Inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 
shall be accorded the exemption from 
dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic 
agents pursuant to Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 

6. Inspectors and aircrew members 
of a Party shall be permitted to bring 
into the territory of the other Party or 
a basing country in which an 
inspection site is located, without 
payment of any customs duties or 
related charges, articles for their 
personal use, with the exception of 
articles the import or export of which 
is prohibited by law or controlled by 
quarantine regulations. 

7. An inspector or aircrew member 
shall not engage in any professional or 
commercial activity for personal profit 
on the territory of the inspected Party 
or that of the basing countries. 

8. If the inspected Party considers 
that there has been an abuse of 
privileges and immunities specified in 
this Annex, consultations shall be held 
between the Parties to determine 
whether such an abuse has occurred 
and, if so determined, to prevent a 
repetition of such an abuse. 


224 


APPENDIX B 


ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY AND INF 

TREATY CHRONOLOGY 


1987 December 1. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Task Force, under the leadership of Brigadier General Eugene L. 
Daniel, begins work on a concept of operations and organizational structure for the implementation of the 
INF Treaty. 

December 8. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty in 
Washington, D.C. 

1988 January 15. President Reagan, accepting the JCS Task Force recommendations, directs the Secretary of 

Defense to establish the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). 

January 25. President Reagan submits the INF Treaty to the U.S. Senate for hearings, debate, and the 
exercise of its constitutional role in ratifying the treaty. 

January 26. William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, establishes OSIA as a separate operating 
agency of the Department of Defense. 

February 1. Brigadier General Roland Lajoie (USA) becomes the first OSIA Director. 

February 8. The first cadre of 40 military inspectors, escorts, linguists, and civilian staff arrives at OSIA 
headquarters at Buzzard Point, Washington, D.C. 

February 23. The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), located in the State Department, becomes 
operational. Assistant Secretary of State H. Allen Holmes is named as the first NRRC Director. 

March 9-12. The first round of INF Treaty Technical Talks is held in Moscow. The U.S. delegation is 
led by Brigadier General Uajoie, Director OSIA; the Soviet delegation is headed by General Major 
Vladimir I. Medvedev, Director of the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. 

March 30. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reports the INF Treaty out of committee 
and submits it to the Senate for debate. 

April 15-June 9. OSIA conducts full-scale mock inspections with the cooperation of the U.S. Air Force 
and U.S. Army at 31 INF facilities in the United States and Europe. 

May 1. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington achieve operational readiness 
for communicating INF Treaty notifications in Russian and English. 

May 10-11. At a U.S.-Soviet ministerial meeting in Geneva, Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resolve key INF Treaty implementation issues. 


225 



May 12. U.S. INF Treaty chief negotiator Maynard Glitman and Soviet treaty representative Colonel 
General Nikolay Chernov exchange a diplomatic note, formally incorporating the ministerial decis¬ 
ions into the treaty. 

May 16-27. The U.S. Senate debates the INF Treaty. It votes 93 to 5 in favor of the treaty on May 27, 
sending the formal Senate resolution on ratification to President Reagan, who is attending the Moscow 
Summit. 

May 18-22. The final round of INF Treaty Technical Talks convenes in Vienna. 

May 21. The United States and the Soviet Union exchange a list of corrected data for the INF Treaty's 
Memorandum of Understanding. This new data list corrected site coordinates and the number and 
dimensions of the INF missiles, launchers, and support equipment. 

June 1. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchange the instruments of ratification in 
Moscow. The INF Treaty enters into force. Baseline and continuous portal monitoring inspections begin 
in 30 days. 

June 6-July 15. The first session of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) meets in Geneva. U.S. 
commissioner Steven Steiner and Soviet commissioner Mikhail Strel'tsov lead the delegations. 

June 22. The U.S. Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) is established in U.S. Embassy, Moscow. 
Its mission is to assist U.S. aircrews and inspection teams who are conducting INF Treaty and other treaty 
on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. 

July 1. The first U.S. inspection team arrives in Moscow to conduct the first of 133 INF Treaty baseline 
inspections, which must be completed within 60 days. 

July 1. The first U.S. portal inspection team arrives in Moscow, flies to the Ural Mountains, and initiates 
continuous portal monitoring inspections at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. 

July 2. The first teams of Soviet inspectors arrive at Travis Air Force Base. California, to initiate baseline 
inspections of U.S. INF facilities. The group includes the first team of Soviet portal monitoring inspectors 
and equipment bound for Magna. Utah. 

July 5. Soviet inspectors begin continuous portal monitoring of the Hercules Plant No. 1, at Magna, 
Utah. 

July 22. The first Soviet SS-20 missile and canister are eliminated under INF Treaty at the Kapustin Yar 
Missile Test Complex. 

August 1. The first Soviet SS-12 missile is eliminated at the Saryozek Missile Elimination Facility. 

August 25. The first Soviet SS-20 missiles are eliminated by launching at the Chita and Kansk missile 
sites. 

August 29. All INF Treaty baseline inspections are completed. During the 60-day period, the United 
States conducted 133 inspections of Soviet INF facilities. The Soviet Union conducted 31 inspections of 
U.S. INF missile sites. Both nations initiated continuous portal monitoring inspections. 

September 8. The first U.S. missile elimination is conducted. With Vice President George Bush in 
attendance, Soviet inspectors observe the elimination of a Pershing IA first stage and a Pershing II 
first-stage rocket motor at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Longhorn, Texas. 


226 


October 5. Elimination of the Soviet SSC-X-4 cruise missile system is completed. 

October 18. The first Pershing II launchers are eliminated at the U.S. Army Equipment Maintenance 
Center at Hausen, West Germany. 

October 18. The first U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) are eliminated at Davis-Monthan 
Air Force Base, Arizona. 

November 30. A key INF Treaty deadline is reached—all missile eliminations by launching must be 
completed. The Soviet Union eliminated 72 SS-20 missiles by this method, the United States none. 

December 30. INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding is updated in an exchange of data between 
U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs). 


1989 February 28. OSIA headquarters is relocated from Buzzard Point in southeast Washington, D.C., to Dulles 

International Airport. 

April 10. At Votkinsk, U.S. portal monitoring inspectors move into permanent housing and staff quarters 
located next to the missile assembly plant. 

April 17. At Magna, Soviet portal monitoring inspectors move into a permanent housing complex in West 
Jordan, Utah, located approximately five miles from the Hercules Rocket Motor Production Plant. 

May 31. The end of the first treaty year. Since entry into force, U.S. inspectors had conducted 244 on-site 
inspections and observed 945 Soviet INF missiles being eliminated. Soviet inspectors completed 96 
inspections and monitored the elimination of 324 U.S. INF missiles. Portal monitoring inspectors had 
conducted continuous inspections at Votkinsk and at Magna. 

July 6. The last of 169 U.S. Pershing 1A missiles is eliminated at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, 
Texas. 

July 25. The last of 718 Soviet SS-12 missiles is eliminated at the Saryozek Missile Elimination Facility. 

August 9. The sixth and final SS-5 missile is eliminated at the Lesnaya Missile Elimination Facility. 

October 27. The last of 239 SS-23 missiles is destroyed at the Saryozek Missile Elimination Facility. The 
final SS-23 launcher is eliminated the same day at the Stan'kovo Elimination Facility. 

November 30. The treaty deadline is reached for eliminating all shorter-range INF missiles and launchers. 
Both nations met this deadline. The United States eliminated 169 Pershing I As; the Soviet Union 718 
SS-12s and 239 SS-23 missiles. 

December 21. At the Special Verification Commission (SVC) in Geneva, SVC commissioners Steiner 
and Strel'tsov sign the INF Treaty’s Memorandum of Agreement. This agreement codifies existing 
procedures for treaty notifications, elimination procedures, inspection procedures, and the technical 
characteristics of the INF missile systems. 


1990 


March 21. At the U.S. portal monitoring site in Votkinsk, the CargoScan X-ray imaging system becomes 
operational. 

May 22. The last of 149 Soviet SS-4 missiles is eliminated at the Lesnaya Missile Elimination Facility. 
The only remaining Soviet INF system is the SS-20. 


227 


1991 


May 31. The end of the second treaty year. Since entry into force, the United States had conducted 346 
inspections and observed the elimination of 1,646 missiles. The Soviet Union had carried out 142 
inspections and monitored the elimination of 495 missiles. Portal monitoring inspections had been 
conducted continuously at Votkinsk and Magna. 

June 1. President Bush and President Gorbachev sign the Protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and 
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty at the Washington Summit. The On-Site Inspection Agency 
receives, in a presidential directive, the mission to plan, train, and prepare for on-site inspections under 
these treaties. At the same time, the agency is authorized to prepare and train for implementing two other 
amis reduction treaties in the final stages of negotiations—-the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 

September 25. The U.S. Senate, following hearings and debate, votes 98 to 0 in favor of ratifying the two 
nuclear testing treaties. 

October 9. The USSR’s Supreme Soviet ratifies the nuclear testing treaties. 

November 19. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is signed by 22 states in Paris, France. 

December 11. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the new 
protocols authorizing and detailing on-site inspections enter into force. 


January 22. Major General Roland Lajoie, Director OSIA, is reassigned as the Deputy Director for 
International Negotiations, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As OSIA's first Director. General Lajoie led the agency 
in implementing the INF Treaty and directed its expansion as it prepared for implementing the on-site 
inspection provisions of the Nuclear Testing Treaties, the CFE Treaty, and the START Treaty. 

January 25. Major General Robert W. Parker (USAF) assumes command, becoming the second OSIA 
Director. 

February 24. A Soviet delegation arrives in Washington for the first Coordinating Group Meeting to plan 
for the first U.S. nuclear test to be monitored under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 

April 16. The final Pershing II launcher is eliminated at the U.S. Army EMC Facility in West Germany. 
The United States eliminated a total of 165 Pershing II launchers. 

May 1. The final GLCM missile and launcher elimination is conducted at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, 
Arizona. In all, the United States eliminated 443 missiles and 123 launchers. 

May 6. The last of 234 Pershing II missiles is eliminated at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, 
Marshall, Texas. 

May 12. The last of 654 SS-20 missiles is eliminated at the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Complex. 

May 28. The last of 499 SS-20 launchers is eliminated at the Samy Launcher Elimination Facility. 

May 31. The end of the third treaty year. Since the treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, the United 
States conducted 421 on-site inspections and monitored the elimination of 1,846 Soviet INF missiles. The 
Soviet Union conducted 207 inspections and observed the elimination of 846 U.S. INF missiles. 
Inspectors from both nations established and maintained continuous portal monitoring inspections of the 
respective INF missile production facilities. 


228 


APPENDIX C 


ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY 
KEY PERSONNEL 

JANUARY 1988-MAY 1991 


DIRECTOR 


Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, USA February 1988-January 1991 

Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF January 1991- 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR 


George L. Rueckert February 1988-September 1988 

Edward J. Lacey September 1988-January 1990 

Joerg H. Menzel January 1990- 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 

Raymond F. Smith February 1988-July 1988 

David A. Pabst July 1988- 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 


Edward J. Curran 
Frank A. LoTurco 


March 1988-October 1990 
October 1990- 


229 



JANUARY 1988-MAY1991 


CHIEF OF STAFF 


Colonel Albert E. Hervey, USA 

February 1988-March 1988 

Lt. Colonel Albert E. Shively, Jr., USMC 

April 1988-September 1988 

Colonel Robert B. McConnell, USAF 

October 1988-November 1989 

Colonel Douglas M. Englund, USA 

November 1989-May 1991 

Colonel James S. Loftus, Jr., USA 

May 1991- 


DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS 


Colonel Robert B. McConnell, USAF 

February 1988-October 1988 

Colonel Ronald P. Forest, USA 

October 1988- 


DIRECTOR FOR PORTAL OPERATIONS 


Colonel Douglas M. Englund, USA 

February 1988-October 1989 

Colonel George M. Connell, USMC 

October 1989-September 1990 

Colonel Lawrence K. Burgess, USMC 

September 1990- 


DIRECTOR FOR SUPPORT 

Colonel Stephen A. Huff, USAF August 1988- 

CHIEF OF INSPECTION DIVISION 


Colonel Serge A. Chemay, USAF 

February 1988-October 1988 

Captain David E. Olsen, USN 

May 1988-April 1990 

Colonel Nils L. Wurzburger, USAF 

April 1990-September 1990 

Captain John C. Williams, USN 

September 1990- 


230 



JANUARY 1988-MAY 1991 


CHIEF OF ESCORT DIVISION 


Colonel Ronald P. Forest, USA 

February 1988-October 1988 

Colonel Gerald V. West, USAF 

October 1988- 


CHIEF OF PORTAE OPERATIONS, MAGNA 


Lt. Commander James L. Szatkowski, USN 

April 1988-September 1989 

Colonel William R. McNally, USAF 

September 1989- 


CHIEF OF WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE 


Colonel Gerald V. West USAF 

February 1988-October 1988 

Lt. Colonel Albert E. Shively, Jr., USMC 

October 1988-January 1991 

Lt. Colonel Robert A. Marshall, USA 

January 1991- 


CHIEF OF SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 


Colonel Thomas E. Smalls, USA 

March 1988-November 1988 

Lt. Colonel Stephen E. Boyd, USAF 

November 1988- 


CHIEF OF FIELD OFFICE EUROPE 


Colonel John Fer, USAF 

April 1988-June 1990 

Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF 

June 1990- 


231 

























APPENDIX D 

ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY 
ASSIGNED PERSONNEL 

1990 1991 



32% 


m AIR FORCE 
m ARMY 
m NAVY 
□ MARINES 
■ CIVILIAN 



TOTAL ASSIGNED 1990: 241 


TOTAL ASSIGNED 1991: 517 



180 


IfifV 


1990 

1991 


AIR FORCE 


ARMY 


NAVY 


MARINES 


CIVILIAN 


233 




















































































































APPENDIX E 

OSIA BUDGET FY* 1988 - 1991 



• IN FY 88, INF TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE IN MID YEAR 

• IN FY 89, INF TREATY IN EFFECT FOR FULL YEAR 

• IN FY 91, OSIA ASSIGNED MISSION OF PREPARATION FOR START, 

CFE, CW, AND TTBT TREATIES 

* FY: Fiscal Year (1 October - 30 September) 


235 






































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247 









INDEX 








INDEX 


A 

Abrosimov, Colonel Ivan Y. 52, 121, 123 
aircrews 15 

airlift operations 26, 107, 138 - 139 
cargo flights to Izhevsk, USSR 85 
Federal Aviation Administration 140 
International Civil Aviation Organization 140 
Akimenkov, Colonel Vladimir A. 64, 117 
Albom, SSGT Susan 137 
arms control treaties and agreements 
Open Skies 161 
Chemical Weapons 152 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 152 - 153 
Nuclear Testing 152 
Strategic Arms Reduction 152 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 16 - 18, 110, 
156 

Arms Control Implementation Unit 
in Moscow 7, 62 
in Ulan-Ude 7, 62 

B 

Baker, James D. Ill, Secretary of State 93 
Barton, Lt. Commander. Robert P. 16 
baseline period, INF 49, 54 
Boyd, Lt. Colonel Stephen B. 28, 106 - 107 
Bozhenkov, Viktor 105 
Brezhnev, General Secretary Leonid 37 
Brock, Lt. Colonel Thomas S. 22, 112 
Burgess, Colonel Laurence 94 
Bush, President George 151, 158, 160; as Vice 
President 99, 104 

c 

Cabaniss, Colonel Edward H. 121 

Cape Canaveral, Florida 124 -125 

Caramancia, Lt. Col. Nicolas G. 16 

Carlucci, Frank C., Secretary of Defense 18 - 19, 23 

Carswell Air Force Base 160 

Cassidy, General Duane H. 26 

Chentsov, Colonel Anatoly S. 125 

Clarke, Richard A. 162 

closeout inspections, first American 121 

closeout inspections, first Soviet 123 

Connell, Captain James 63, 130 


Connell, Colonel George M. 22, 72-73 75, 77, 78, 83, 
93,94 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 
baseline inspections 162 
mandatory data exchanges 162 
trial inspections 161 
Corned, Lt. Colonel Terry 112, 114 
Crowe, Jr., Admiral William J. 14, 19 
Curran, Edward J. 5 

D 

Daniel, Major General Eugene L. 15, 17 - 18,76 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base 104, 106, 132 
Defense Intelligence College 

as site for OSIA training courses 16, 20 
Defense Nuclear Agency 

to provide logistical support for OSIA 20 
Department of Defense 

as location for OSIA 17 
U.S. European Command 153 - 154 
Department of Energy 
Nevada Test Site 157 
underground nuclear tests 152 
Dugway Proving Grounds 124 

E 

elimination inspections 
record of 103 

scheduling 101 - 102, 105 - 106 
sites 100 
Soviet 101 

Englund, Colonel Douglas M. 75, 77, 81, 83, 85, 94, 113 
first director of portal monitoring 22, 70, 72 
leader of first American team to Votkinsk 68 
Erickson, Robert 89 
Evans, Lt. Commander William G. 16 

F 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 5, 20, 26 
Fer, Colonel John 28, 63, 132 
Floyd, Jane and John 63 

Forest, Colonel Ronald P. 22, 27, 28, 1 13, 117, 156 


251 






G 

Gibby, MSGT Richard O. 22 
Giglio, Eileen K. 22 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, President 151, 155, 158 - 160, 161; 

as General Secretary 1,15, 30, 38, 47, 99, 160. 
Graham, Captain Albert E. 125 
Grosick, Colonel Frederick E. 106, 154 
Gulf War 156 

H 

Hausen, West Germany 104 

U.S. Army Equipment Maintenance Center 100, 106 
Heuer, Lt. Colonel Gerald J.K. 26 
Higgins, Commander Edward J. 20 
Holmes, H. Allen 

first NRRC director 40 
Hranice, Czechoslovakia 121 - 122 
Hritsik, Lt. Colonel Michael J. 23 
Hughes Technical Services Company 76, 84 
Hutton, Capt. Leon 16 

I 

Ifft, Dr. Edward M. 162 
INF sites and facilities 
in Western Europe 3 
INF Treaty 

See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
inspection team chiefs, U.S. 

selection of first hand-picked cadre 21 
inspection teams 

See on-site inspection teams 
intermediate-range nuclear force 

origination of term by Paul Nitze 36 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1 
authorized team equipment 142 
basic documents 44 
baseline period 26, 49, 62 
closeout inspections, Soviet 133 
closeout inspections, U.S. 131 
collateral constraints 41 
communication centers 40, 146 
congressional scrutiny of 25 
details of treaty mission 8 
escorting 3, 15, 30, 51,78, 103, 106- 107, 125 
evaluation by media 63 
final eliminations 113, 156 
launching missiles to destruction 103 
Memorandum of Understanding 40 
missile elimination sites 54,57,60, 105, 107, 


111 - 112, 113 - 114, 127, 130 
mock inspections 27 - 30, 40 
Moscow 1988 Summit Meeting 30 
national technical means for verification 33 
on-site inspections, five types 9, 10, 118 
See Also on-site inspections, types 
Protocol on Eliminations 103, 112, 146 
Protocol on Inspections 48, 53, 93, 146 
Special Verification Commission 33 
U.S. articles of ratification 30 
See Also Special Verification Commission 

J 

Johnson, Major Jerome E. 16, 63 

K 

Kansk, USSR 130 

Keating, Lt. Colonel Kenneth C. 16, 23 
Kelley, Colonel Lawrence G. 22, 50-55, 113, 121, 123, 
154,161 

Kirichenko. Major Igor 127 
Kohl. Chancelor Helmut 38 
Kokurin, Lev, 93 
Komogortsev, Gennadig M. 143 
Kuznetsov, Colonel Aleksandr V. 109, 144 

L 

Lacey, Edward J. 105 
Lafleur, MSGT. David G. 22, 137 
Lajoie, Major General Roland 19 -20, 27, 99, 104, 139, 
147, 153 

biographical information 4, 21 
Congressional Committees, appearances 26 
criteria for team chiefs 21 
first American inspection team 50 
"Insights" interview in Arms Control Today 63 
interview with Soviet reporters in Ulan-Ude 57 
Magna, Utah final preparations 74 
member of first American inspection team 50, 53 
mock inspections 28 
meeting with Military Air Command 26 
Oval Office visit 30 
reassignment to Joint Staff 155 
setting tone for initial inspections 51 
technical talks, participation 24, 26 
trip to Belgium to brief NATO representatives 23 
Lang, Lt. Colonel Scott G. 28, 63, 154 
Lebedev, Colonel Vyacheslav 55, 79, 94 


252 



Lehman, Ambassador Ronald F. 110, 156 
Lesnaya Elimination Facility, USSR 112 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant 100, 104 - 106, 110 
Look, George W. 93 

M 

MacDonald, Joe 108 
Magna, Utah 71 - 72, 88 -90 
construction projects 73 
former Pershing II rocket motor plant site 6, 67 
Hercules Plant No. 1 56, 69, 71,74, 78, 79, 82 
OSIA Detachment 73-74 
U.S. team leaders 73 
USSR team leaders 88, 94 
Malloy, Eileen, U.S. State Department 52 
Marino, Master Sergeant Gary 158 
Massimini, Lt. Colonel Sebastian V. 16, 28 
Matlock, Ambassador Jack F. 85, 87 
McClain, Shirley 20 

McConnell, Colonel Robert B. 22, 26, 28, 30 
McKenna, Lt. Tamara Suwalow 59 
McNally, Colonel William R. 94 
Medvedev, General Major Vladimir I. 105, 111. 113, 

129, 139, 156, 162 
at Votkinsk 87 

first director of the Soviet NRRC 41,85, 110, 160 
leader of Soviet team to technical talks 24 
description of Soviet inspectors 57 
Memorandum of Understanding 21,22,48, 100, 107, 

126, 132 

Data Update 60, 118 - 119, 146 
Section VI (Technical Data) 48, 143 
Menzel, Dr. Joerg H. 106 
Military Air Command 26, 107 

transport of American and Soviet inspectors 61, 140 
missile eliminations 
Soviet 54, 112 
U.S. 104- 106 
missiles, Soviet 

SS-20 34,74,85,91, 102 - 103, 108, 111, 113, 114 
SS-20, SS-4, SS-12, and SS-23 9, 101, 112 
SS-25 68,74,91 
SSC-X-4, SS-5 9, 121 

transporter-erector-launcher vehicles 101 - 102 
missiles, U.S. 

BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile 36, 108 
Pershing II 82, 132 
Pershing II missiles in Europe 28, 35 
Pershing II, BGM-109G, and Pershing 1 A, IB 9, 100, 
104- 106 

Mostovoj, Lt. Colonel Vitali 153 


MOU 

See Memorandum of Understanding 
multinational inspection teams 154 
Murphy, Joe 159 

N 

National Security Council 15, 152, 153 
national technical means 

inspected party, treaty requirements 42 
reconnaissance satellites 41 
Nehonov, Irene 153 

Nelson, Lt. Colonel Paul H. 22, 55, 121, 128, 153 
Nitze, Paul 36 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

threat of Soviet SS-20 missiles to 35 
NRRC 

See Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 24, 33 
U.S. NRRC 17,33,39-40 
USSR NRRC 41 

Nuclear Testing Treaties 152 - 153 
Nunn, Senator Sam 33, 38 

o 

Olsen, Captain David E. 28 
On-Site Inspection Agency 
annual budget 3 

as separate DOD operating agency 4 
CFE Treaty mission 154 
changed to multi-treaty agency 152 
deputy directors 4 
European Operations Command 161 
Executive Committee 20 
experience of initial cadre 5 
field offices 6,28, 131, 154 
first director of 4 

first location at Buzzard Point 4, 13 

headquarters at Washington Dulles Inti Airport 20 

INF Treaty mission 4 

initial staff training course 22 

issues during organization of 18 

National Security Council 15 

Magna Detachment 74 

mission 1 

mock training 27 - 28, 49 
OSIA-Europe 154-155 
task force leading to establishment of 14 
See Also Magna, Utah OSIA Detachment 
on-site inspection teams 
chiefs of U.S., 1988 55 


253 



forward deployment of 30 
points of entry 6 
resident 3, 67, 74 
on-site inspections 2 

during summer of 1988 53 
first American 50 
first Soviet 55 - 56 
in Stockholm Document 2 
radiation detection equipment 145 - 146 
report, content of 53 
results of first 60 days 58 
on-site inspections, types 

baseline inspections 47 - 64 
closeout inspections 117-133 
continuous poertal monitoring inspections 67 - 96 
elimination inspections 99-114 
short notice 137-148 
Open Skies Treaty 

inspection regime 161 
OSIA 

See On-Site Inspection Agency 

P 

Pabst. David L. 20 

Parker. Major General Robert W. 109 - 111, 113, 156 - 
157,162 

director of OSIA 155 
on first CFE inspection team 163 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 151. 155 
Pease, Commander Kendell 23 
Peterson,Lt. Colonel Roy E. 92 - 94 
Petropavlovsk. Kazakhstan 121 
portal monitoring inspection operations 72. 96 
equipment, installation of 75 
in Votkinsk 57. 67 - 69, 94 
Monthly Portal Inspection Report 78 
preparations for in Magna, Utah 79 
reciprocal rights and obligations 70 
reciprocal treatment as policy issue 83 
portal monitoring inspection teams, Soviet 56, 78, 89. 94 
portal monitoring inspection teams, U.S. 15. 30. 78. 94 
Potebnya, Orr 89 

Powell, General Colin L. 14, 17 - 18 
Prato. SGT Stephen C. 143 
Pueblo Depot Activity 100.104,106 

R 

Reagan, President Ronald 1, 13, 18, 30. 47, 99 
Rechitsa, Byelorussia 

site of Soviet SS-20 missile base 52 


Reppert, Colonel John C. 153 
Rueckert. George L. 4, 23 

S 

Sanders, Phyllis 95 

Samarin, Colonel Anatoly Y. 106 

leader of first Soviet inspectors to Magna 68, 78 
Saryozek, Kazakhstan 127,130 
Schmidt, Chancelor Helmut 35 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 153 
Sfafranski. Colonel Richard 160 
Shabalin, General Major Nikolai 99, 104 
Deputy Director of Soviet NRRC 57 
Shevardnadze, Eduard, Soviet Foreign Minister 25, 33, 
37, 39, 73, 93 

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State 18. 25, 39, 73 

Slifka, Major Michael W. 27, 63 

Smalls, Colonel Thomas E. 28, 55 

Smith, Colonel William R. 161 

Smith. Raymond F. 5 

Smith, SGT. Spenser A. 144 

Solntse, Colonel Gennadiy I. 124 

Soviet Union 

INF missile sites 3 
collapse of 158, 161 
coup d'etat 158 

Special Verification Commission 17, 93, 144. 146 
meeting in Geneva. June-July 1988 43 
memoranda of agreements 43 
Memorandum of Understanding 44 
Memorandum of Agreement 44, 86, 90, 91 - 93, 
141 - 142 

portal monitoring issues 82, 90. 91 
requirement of INF Treaty 18 
START 

See Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Steiner. Ambassador Steven E. 44. 90 
Steinmetz, SGT John 52. 63 
Stevens, Commander Marjory M. 23 
Strategic Anns Reduction Treaty 96, 111, 157 
exhibition teams 162 
inspection teams 158 
mock inspections 157 
on-site inspection teams 160 
Strategic Rocket Forces, Soviet 34, 113 
Strel'tsov, Ambassador Mikhail N. 44. 90 
summit meetings 

Geneva, November 1985 38 - 39 
Moscow, June 1988 30 
Reykjavik, October 1986 38 
Szatkowski. Lt. Commander James L. 73 - 74, 79, 90 


254 



T 

Taft, William H. IV 4 
technical talks, INF Treaty 23, 73 
issues resolved at 24 
portal monitoring inspections 72 
Threashold Test Ban Treaty 151 - 152, 155 
Semipalatinsk Test Site 161 
U.S.-Soviet Coordinating Group Meeting 157 
Tolmachev, V.G. 87 
Tomilov, Anatoly D. 78, 93 
Trahan, Major Paul P. 15, 23 
Travis Air Force Base 107, 124 
Troyan, Lt. Colonel Nicholas 127 - 128, 130- 131, 147 

u 

Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 26 
Ulan-Ude 26, 130 

eastern point of entry to Soviet Union 6 
United States 

INF missile sites 3 

V 

Volkov, General Colonel Alexander P. 113 
Votkinsk, USSR 68, 72 

activities during first treaty year 83 

American advance site team 78 

CargoScan monitoring equipment 75, 85 - 86, 91 - 94 


Hughes Technical Services Company 76, 84 

installation of inspection equipment 84 - 86 

Machine Building Plant 26, 87 

preparations for U.S. portal monitoring 74 

resolution of dispute about Cargo Scan 93 

site of former SS-20 missile assembly plant 6, 67 

U.S. site commanders 77, 86, 94 

use of imaging devices by American inspectors 68, 92 

visual inspection of missiles, limited 68 

w 

Warner, Senator John 33, 38 

West, Colonel Gerald V. 22, 28, 64, 157 

White, Lt. Colonel Guy 162 

Williams, Captain John C. 22, 47, 60, 112 - 113, 143 

Wyckoff, Lt. Colonel Claesen D. 28, 124 - 125 

Y 

Yablonski, Lt. Colonel Robert 28. 124 
interview about mock inspections 29 
Yeltsin, President Boris, 158 - 159, 161 
Yevdokimov, Colonel V.V. 106, 110 
Yokota Air Base 130 

z 

zero option 

proposed by President Reagan 37 


255 









This book was designed by Paul Andino, Senior Communications Service, Inc., Fairfax, Virginia. 
Together with the author, he designed the book cover, title pages, and page layout. The book was printed 
in New Times Roman, 11-point typeface. All photographs, unless identified, were reproduced from 
official U.S. Government sources. 


256 


ISBN 0-16-041719-8 


9 780160 41 


71 


91 


90000 




























































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